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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reports the findings of new inquiry in to the 
formulation and implementation of the 1929 Local 
Government Act. it focuses on two reforms contained 
within the Act: first, the reform of local health care 
and local government structure that was contained within 
the reform of the poor law; and secondly, the reform of 
exchequer grants through the introduction of a block 
grant. 
Chapter one provides an explanatory introduction to 
the reforms, and a synthesis of existing literature 
broadly favourable to them, which is concerned to define 
common themes of interpretation of their formulation and 
implementation. Chapter two questions the intellectual 
basis of such literature, discusses the critical 
orthodoxy on the reforms, and proposes an alternative 
theoretical perspective which may be used as a basis for 
their reconsideration. The chapter ends by offering new 
perspectives on the origins of reform proposals 
immediately after the First World War. 
Chapter three then analyses the development of the 
reforms in the Ministry of Health between 1921 and 1924, 
and reveals the controversy that debate aroused. Chapter 
four completes the analysis of formulation by analysing 
the political motives for reform of Neville Chamberlain, 
and the political partiality of the Ministry of Health. 
It also analyses the extent to which interests outside 
government were involved in the creation and revision of 
reform and the implications for the reforms aims of the 
access given to the local authority associations. 
Chapters five and six are concerned with the 
implementation of the reforms. Chapter five assesses the 
record of the block grant as a grant-aid control, and as 
a means of redistributing grant aid in relation to need 
during the 1930s. Chapter six assesses the nature of 
local authority health care in the 1930s after reform, 
and the impact theron of the block grant and the system 
of central control associated with the block grant. Both 
chapters assess the implications of the experience of 
implementation for later reform. 
The conclusion is concerned to draw together the new 
perspectives offered by these chapters, and with an 
attempt to locate the significance of the 1929 Local 
Government Act as a whole in the long-term development of 
local government, central-local relations and social 
policy reform. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1929 Local Government Act was introduced to 
Parliament by the then Minister of Health, Neville 
Chamberlain, and came in to force on the appointed day of 
April Ist 1930. The Act comprised a number of reforms 
separately developed. Inter alia it is notable for 
setting in progress the regrouping of district councils 
through a review procedure to be carried out by county 
councils. It also extended the powers of county councils 
over road administration, gave additional planning powers 
to county councils and county boroughs, and empowered 
borough councils to initiate town plans. The 
administration of births, deaths and marriage 
registration, for long a function of the poor law 
authorities, was passed to the county and county borough 
councils. With regard to local sources of finance, 
agricultural land and farm buildings were made totally 
exempt from paying the rates, having previously been 3/4 
exempt, and industrial property and the railways, 
originally fully liable for local rates, were made liable 
only for 1/4 of their rates bill. 
' 
These were important changes, but the two reforms 
which earned most attention from contemporaries, and 
have 
continued to engage the most attention from historians, 
were those contained in Parts I and VI of the Act. Part 
I For a brief introduction to the contents of the 1929 
Local Government Act, see C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the 
Wars, 1918- 1940, (1955), pp. 340-342. 
1 
I reformed the poor law and Part VI reformed the system 
of central finance to local authorities through exchequer 
grants. It is these reforms with which this thesis is 
directly concerned, although it should be stressed that 
the thesis is primarily concerned to analyse the reform 
of the poor law as a reform of local government and as a 
reform of the organisation of local health care. In 
addition, it must be noted that the 1929 Act contained 
separate provisions for reform in relation to London. 
These lie outside the consideration of this thesis. 
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis in the 
thesis is primarily based on qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, evidence. 
Even though the scope of the thesis is limited in this 
way it is hoped that analysis of significant parts of the 
1929 Local Government Act may be made, and through this a 
contribution to an understanding of the whole Act. 
Through such a study it is further hoped that some 
response may be given to those historians who draw 
attention to the fact that local government, central- 
local relations and their roles in public policy-making 
still remain amongst the greatest imponderables in our 
understanding of inter-war domestic history. 
2 
This chapter will first, seek to explain the context 
of the poor law (health care) and exchequer grant 
reforms, in particular discussing the nature of local 
government, local health provision and central-local 
2 See, for example, E. P. Hennock, 'Central/Local 
Government Relations in England: an outline, 1800-1950' 
in the Urban History Yearbook (1982), pp. 38-50. 
2 
financial relations before 1929. It will then explain 
the content of the reforms. Finally, the chapter will 
bring together some of the main findings of empirically 
based research on the historical problems posed by the 
reforms as a received orthodoxy which then may be 
examined. 
1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS BEFORE 
1929 
In 1929 there were two systems of elected local 
government in England and Wales: the local authorities, 
created by the local government acts of 1888,1894 and 
1899; and the poor law authorities, created by the Poor 
Law Amendment Act of 1834. Each had their own separate 
methods of operation, responsibilities and framework of 
relations with central government. 
(i) LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
outside London local government areas took two forms: the 
county boroughs and the administrative counties. 3 The 
county boroughs were urban areas of over 50,000 
population and their counci s were all-purpose 
3 Much of the following discussion is based upon 
H. J. Laski, W. I. Jennings, W. A. Robson ed, A Centurv of 
munici-oal ProQress 1835-1935 (1935)/ K. B. Smellie, A 
History of Local Government (1946), J. H. Warren, Local 
Government (1950), J. Stanyer, UnderstandinQ Local 
Government (1976), B. Keith-Lucas and P. G. Richards, L 
History of Local Government in the Twentieth Century 
(1978) and M. Loughlin, M. D. Gelfand and K. Young, Half a 
Century of Municii)al Decline (1985). 
3 
authorities. In 1919 there were eighty two of these with 
Doncaster being the single addition during the next 
twenty years. The sixty two administrative counties 
covered the rest of the country. In each administrative 
county there were three tiers of local government. The 
principal authority was the county council, which 
administered the majority of services over the whole 
county area. Beneath the county council were the non- 
county boroughs and urban and rural district councils, 
collectively known as the second tier authorities, which 
administered certain services within their own areas. 
The most local form of county government was conducted in 
a variety of forms at the parish level. 
Figure I The Structure of local govermuent 
London County Administrative 















( Source: P. G. Richards, The Reformed Local Government 
System (1973), p. 23 ) 
Local authorities shared certain common political 
features. They were made up of councillors elected by a 
franchise wholly within the local authority area. Under 
the 1918 Representation of the People Act, amended by an 
Act of the same name in 1928, this franchise was 
4 
standardised. 4 There was also some indirect 
representation. On county borough and county councils a 
third of the council membership was made up of aldermen 
who were elected for longer periods by the councillors 
themselves. Generally, aldermen were elected from among 
the councillors in recognition of long service or 
particular abilities, but they could extraordinarily be 
elected from outside. In county and non-county boroughs 
council leadership was vested in a mayor elected by 
aldermen and councillors. In county and urban and rural 
district councils the same power was vested in a 
chairman. These arrangements ensured that local 
authorities were made up of members who were either 
directly o r indirectly accountable to their local 
electorate, thus giving local authorities a democratic 
basis for autonomous policy making, although only in 
relation to matters designated by parliament. 
The structure of the policy making process in local 
authorities also had common features. Committees of 
4 See B. Keith-Lucas, The English Local Government 
Franchise 
. 
(1952), pp. 226-236. The local franchise was 
held by any person of full age who had occupied land or 
premises in an area for six months, as well as their 
husband or wife who lived in the same premises. Such 
persons were also allowed to be elected, as well as 
landowners within the area who did not otherwise meet the 
electoral qualification. The 1918 Act also gave the vote 
in local elections to paupers, as long as they met the 
electoral qualifications. Although they remained banned 
from membership of boards of guardians the 1918 Act 
allowed paupers to stand for election to county and 
county borough councils. A provision in the 1929 Local 
Government Act eliminated this possibility, and the 1933 
Local Government Act banned those in receipt of public 
assistance from representation on any local authority. 
See also J. P. D. Dunbabin, 'British Local Government 
Reforms: The Nineteenth Century and after,, Enalish 
Historical Review, vol 92,1977, p. 801. 
5 
members met to propose policies for individual services, 
which were then submitted to meetings of full council at 
monthly or quarterly intervals for discussion, amendment 
and resolution. The committees were then responsible for 
the execution of policy for individual services once it 
had been ratified by full council. In both the 
preparation and execution of policy committees could set 
up sub-committees and sometimes co-opt non-elected 
representatives for their specialist knowledge. 
Departments of local government officers assisted the 
members at all stages of their work but were essentially 
there to carry out the will of the elected members. 5 
In the period between 1889 and 1929 the statutory 
duties and powers of local authorities expanded variously 
to include work in relation to the provision of 
education, roads and planning, housing, and a range of 
public protection services such as fire cover and weights 
and measures inspection. The accretion of duties and 
powers in relation to health care played an integral part 
6 in this expansion. From their inception county boroughs 
and second tier authorities were sanitary authorities, 
thus inheriting responsibility for the improvement on 
19th century achievements in relation to water supply, 
drainage, sanitation and refuse disposal. Under the 1875 
Public Health Act local authorities were given the power 
5 See H. J. Laski, 'The Committee 
Government' in Laski, Jennings and Rob 
of MuniciDal Progress, 1835-1935, pp. 82 
The Machinery of Local Government (1958) 
6 See J. Parker, Local Health and 
(1965). 
System in Local 
son ed, A Centurv 




to set up general hospitals, and there followed the 
creation of further specific responsibilities. 7 County 
boroughs and county councils were given a statutory 
responsibility for providing institutional accommodation 
for those considered mentally ill under the 1890 Lunacy 
Act. In addition, county boroughs and second tier 
authorities provided hospitals for such infectious 
diseases as smallpox, and under the 1893 and 1901 
Isolation Hospitals Acts county councils were empowered 
to set up hospital districts within county areas to 
enable joint action between county and second tier 
councils. By 1921 free local authority hospital bed 
provision had begun to rival that of the voluntary 
hospitals, although the former came primarily in the form 
8 of specialist provision. 
During the period of the First World War and af ter, 
however, local authorities acquired an even fuller range 
of health care responsibilities. Under the 1913 Mental 
Deficiency Act county boroughs and county councils were 
required to extend institutional accommodation to those 
considered mentally handicapped. In 1916 the public 
health (venereal diseases) regulations then pushed local 
authorities firmly into the field of out-patient care. 
7 Note that in the mid-19th century, hospital provision 
even for people, who whilst not being recipients of poor 
relief, could not afford to pay for treatment, was almost 
totally the preserve of the voluntary sector. The 
voluntary sector remained an important provider of 
hospitals into the twentieth century. 
8 See R. Pinker, English Hos-oital Statistics, 1861-1938 
(1966), pp. 72-79. During the 1920s local authority and 
voluntary providers were hotly to debate the issue of 
patient-charging to fund both existent and expanded 
provision. 
7 
County councils and county boroughs were required to 
provide centres for treatment and diagnosis, 
practitioners and drugs, and to examine any specimen 
provided by practitioners. The 1918 Maternity and Child 
Welfare Act extended the powers of county councils and 
county borough further by enabling them to provide a 
variety of maternity and child welfare services, 
including ante-natal and child welfare clinics, as well 
as subsidised milk and post-natal care. 9 The care of 
the young child complemented county and county borough 
responsibilities for the health of the child of school 
age, which had been acquired before the First World War 
and were extended in 1921. It should be noted, however, 
that some second tier local authorities became 
responsible for maternity and child welfare under the 
1918 Act within their own areas. The 1920 Blind Persons 
Act then extended county and county borough council 
responsibilities for the handicapped. They were required 
to promote the welfare of the blind as well as providing 
them with technical education where appropriate. Finally, 
under the 1921 Public Health Act county and county 
borough councils were given the duty of providing out- 
patient dispensaries for the treatment of tuberculosis. 
They were also responsible for notification of the 
disease and keeping a register of sufferers, and at this 
9 J. Lewls, The Politics of Motherhood, Child and 
Maternal Welfare in England, 1900-1939 (1980), p. 34. 
8 
time were encouraged to provide more sanitaria for the 
isolation of sufferers-10 
In short, by 1929, as part of a considerable expansion 
of statutory duties and powers across a range of services 
the local authorities had become major local health care 
agencies. County borough councils were providers of 
sanitary, preventative, out-patient and some in-patient 
health care. In the counties the second tier authorities 
were still providers of sanitary services, some in- 
patient care, and in some cases maternity and child 
welfare services, but the county councils had risen to 
take responsibility for the remainder. In some county 
and county borough councils such was the burden of work 
that separate public health and maternity and child 
welfare committees were created. 
In the execution of their health care 
responsibilities, as in all others, local authorities 
were dependent upon the revenue raised from the local 
rate. " This was based on the valuation of property, and 
the contribution of each ratepayer was based on the rate 
poundage set by a council at the beginning of a financial 
year to meet the costs of its budget. The existence of 
the rate was crucial for it allowed local authorities 
autonomy in making spending decisions. However, it also 
made them financially accountable to their electorates 
10 See N. Wilson, Munici-oal Health Services (1946), 
pp. 1-122. 
11 For further discussion of local authority finance in 
the inter-war period see A. H. Marshall, Financial 
Administration in Local Government (1960) and the 
articles by A. Collins on finance and local financial 
organisation in Municipal Review (1936). 
9 
and in the setting of each annual rate poundage local 
authorities had to bear in mind the level of rate which 
was desirable to their electorates. This placed a 
constraint on what aggregate level of rate-aided 
expenditure was possible. It then followed that all 
local authorities annually had to decide how that 
aggregate level of expenditure should be divided between 
different service responsibilities. Much of local 
authority politics was bound up in deciding aggregate 
levels of expenditure and then what slice of the cake 
each committee could win for its service 
responsibilities. Local authority spending on health 
services, as on all other services, was, therefore, 
habitually prey to the rate politics and service 
priorities of each and every local authority. 12 
The political and financial realities of local 
government drew it in to ever more complex sets of 
relationships with central government. This derived from 
the very fact that as state intervention had grown since 
the late 19th century Parliament had devolved direct 
responsibility for so many services to local government 
as the most appropriate institution of provision. Where 
such services were deemed to be of national importance 
central government was interested in the promotion of 
service development and the maintenance of standards 
consistent with central aims. It was considered 
essential that no service should suffer from the vagaries 
12 See, for example, J. P. Bradbury, Government and 
County, A History of NorthamDtonshire County Council, 
1889-1989 (1989), p. 46. 
10 
of individual council policies. Consequently, central 
government developed a system of relationships with local 
authorities which centred on the promotion of services at 
a local level and the control of the way in which those 
services were provided. 13 
At the heart of such a system was the provision of 
exchequer finance in aid of local services. 14 From 1888 
central government had attempted to concentrate central 
finance through the granting to local government of the 
proceeds of a range of licences, duties and taxes, known 
collectively as the assigned revenues. It was hoped that 
such sources of finance would expand with the needs of 
local authorities. However, central departments 
concerned with the administration of individual services 
found that promotion and control of provision by local 
government was best facilitated by the alternative 
subvention of exchequer grants-in-aid of specific 
services, the most common form of which was the 
percentage grant. 
The percentage grant promised that a considerable 
proportion of the cost of any local authority scheme 
would be met by the exchequer and was, therefore, a 
considerable inducement to local authorities to carry out 
their duties and powers enthusiastically and so achieve 
the kind of service development that central departments 
wanted. At the same time local authorities were required 
13 See Hennock, 'Central-Local relations in England: an 
outline, 1800-19501, Urban Historv Yearbook (1982), 
pp. 38-50. 
14 See D. N. Chester, Central and Local Government: 
Financial and Administrative Relations (1951). 
11 
to su mit their schemes to central departments to make 
them eligible for grant at which point the latter had the 
power to approve, modify or reject. In addition, 
expenditure under such schemes was initially made by 
local authorities and central departments then had powers 
to check each item of local expenditure to ascertain 
whether it merited grant aid. Expenditure that was 
extravagant or did not otherwise accord with central aims 
could be punished by not being passed to rank for grant 
aid. By this means the content of local service 
development could be very closely controlled. To 
accompany the controls over local policies that were part 
of the percentage grant relationship central departments 
had further powers to use regulations to prevent or 
modify local spending that was not put forward for grant 
aid. 
Local authority health care services were among many 
local services which received exchequer funding through 
the percentage grant subvention. The services for 
maternity and child welfare, tuberculosis, mental 
deficiency, blind welfare and school medical provision 
were each eligible for grants of 50%, and the services 
for venereal disease a grant of 75%. The department of 
central government responsible for local health care was 
the ministry of Health, created in 1919. In addition to 
the administration of grant-aid relations the Ministry 
also required medical officers of health of county 
boroughs and county councils to submit annual reports on 
health services and standards in their areas, as well as 
12 
five yearly comparative reports on progress. County 
councils were further required to enquire in to provision 
by second tier authorities and report to the Ministry if 
there were any deficiencies. These methods provided the 
Ministry with further raw data with which to make 
critical assessments of local provision and formulate 
approaches to be taken towards different authorities in 
grant relations. It was generally through knowledge 
gained from inspection and such reports, and the informal 
exchange of information and advice, that the Ministry 
sought to ensure local provision in line with the 
ministry's priorities rather than through resort to the 
more coercive powers attendant upon grant relations. In 
this sense the concept of partnership in central-local 
relations co-existed with a system of central control. 
However the relationship worked in practice, with regard 
to each local authority the overriding aim of the 
relationship was generally to achieve expansion, 
development and improvement in health care. 15 
it is important to recognise, however, that the 
Ministry of Health had wider responsibilities than local 
health care provision. The original impetus for its 
creation had been the unification of central government 
health care agencies. Thus in 1919 the Ministry also 
embraced the work of the health insurance commissioners 
for England and Wales, and the health care 
responsibilities previously held by the Home office and 
the Board of Education. It also inherited from the 
15 Wilson, MuniciiDal Health Services, pp. 139-150. 
13 
former Local Government Board a general responsibility 
for overseeing local government and formulating policy on 
local government reform, as well, as we shall see, as 
central powers in relation to local poor law 
administration. The Ministry also acquired after the 
First World War responsibility for local housing 
provision and planning work. 16 As a result of its 
important responsibilities the Ministry was represented 
by a minister in the Cabinet, and was administratively 
controlled by a permanent secretary. As a result of its 
varied responsibilities the ministry itself was divided 
in to a number of separate divisions, headed by assistant 
secretaries. major divisions included those for local 
government and public health. The public health division 
was then further divided in to branches, headed by 
principals. Each branch within the public health 
division related to an individual health service, its 
officers having a national remit. There was also a Welsh 
Board of Health, which was attached to the Ministry and 
answered to the Minister. In addition to divisional 
organisation local health care services also came under 
the scrutiny of the chief medical officer and his deputy, 
and the accountant-general's office, which was concerned 
with the finance of services. 
it is also important to note that the Treasury, as 
defender of the exchequer, had an interest in the 
relations between the central departments and local 
16 See D. N. Chester (ed) and F. M. G. Willson, The 
Orcra British Central Government, 1914-1964 
(1968), pp. 148-168. 
14 
authorities. Central grants to local government 
constituted a significant proportion of public 
expenditure by the 1920s. Consequently, in budgeting 
public expenditure the Treasury was keen to have some 
control over the level of grant-aid dispensed by all the 
spending departments, which included the Ministry of 
Health. This inevitably entailed inter-departmental 
relations at a central level which influenced the 
policies of the Ministry vis-a-vis local government and 
its provision of services, including those in relation to 
health. The Treasury was organised into only three 
divisions. These were the finance, supply and 
establishments divisions, the first two of which had 
interests in local government and individual service 
issues. 17 
By 1929, therefore, the structure and operation of 
local authorities as well as their responsibilities in 
relation to health care were clearly defined. Central- 
local relations were dominated by the percentage grant 
subvention, and in relation to health care were managed 
by the major department responsible for local government, 
which itself needed to have dealings on local government 
issues with other major departments of central 
government. How does a discussion of the poor law 
complete our understanding of local government and 
central-local relations before 1929? 
17 See H. E. Dale, The Higher Civil Service of Great 
Brit-ai-L--(1941), pp. 1-24, Im-nerial Calendar and Civil 
Se -vice Lists, and Public Record Office Current Guide, _ 
I)a 't I, div 4,. 
15 
(ii) THE POOR LAW AUTHORITIES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Under the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act the country was 
separately divided in to 635 poor law unions, each union 
being further sub-divided in to areas of administration 
for boards of guardians. 18 The way in which poor law 
authorities functioned was in many ways a mirror image of 
the local authorities. The guardian franchise and the 
system of election were the same as in local authorities, 
with the important qualification of the position of the 
pauper. 19 Similarly, the guardians had the right to levy 
a local rate. Consequently, guardians had a democratic 
basis for autonomous policy making and an independent 
fiscal basis for expenditure decisions. They were also 
accountable to their local electorates. Poor law 
authorities did, of course, work in the same areas as 
other local authorities, and in county areas this led to 
some overlaps. Often rural district councils and boards 
of guardians were synonymous and elected at the same 
t ime. It was also co=onplace for a borough or county 
councillor to be a guardian. 
18 Much of the following discussion is based upon S. 
and B. Webb, English Poor Law History, Part II, Volume II 
(1929) M. E. Rose, The Relief of Poverty, 1834-1914 (1972) 
and M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System, 1834-1929 (1981). 
19 See B. Keith Lucas, The English Local Government 
Franchise (1952) and footnote 4. For a discussion of the 
politics of pauper disenfranchisement either on its own 
or allied to Poor Law reform during the 1920s see 
A. Deacon and E. Briggs, 'Local Democracy and Central 
policy: the issue of pauper votes', Policy and Politics 
(1973), pp. 347-364. 
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The boards of guardians were all-purpose authorities 
for the provision for the poor, who could no longer 
support themselves and remained outside the otherwise 
general client remit of the local authorities. The poor 
included those able-bodied who were not in work as well 
as the non able bodied - the sick, aged, mentally 
deficient and infirm - and those whose circumstances 
forbade self-preservation - widows, deserted mothers and 
children. Under the 1834 Act it was intended that all 
provision should be made within specially created union 
workhouses and central government throughout the 19th 
century worked towards this aim. However, the permissive 
nature of the 1834 Act combined with local practice meant 
that the poor law by 1929 had developed in a more complex 
manner. The able-bodied unemployed were predominantly 
relieved through cash handouts outside the workhouse. 
Meanwhile in some areas the workhouse, renamed 
institution in the early 20th century, had developed in a 
mixed manner, catering for all categories of need under 
one roof. In other areas union institutions, with the 
encouragement of the pre-First World War Local Government 
Board, had developed as a series of specialist 
institutions, dealing for each category of need 
separately. The importance of this latter development 
must not be exaggerated. In 1929 some 60% of poor law 
inmates were still accommodated in the sick and general 
wards of general institutions. However, 
it did have a 
special significance for the development of local health 
care for the poor. It meant that to an increasing extent 
17 
poor law authorities developed separate infirmaries for 
the care of the sick, including specialist medical 
institutions for those suffering from such diseases as 
tuberculosis. At the same time, by 1929 poor law 
authorities had developed an extensive domiciliary 
medical service. With the expansion of guardians, work 
authorities generally created separate committees for 
dealing with out-relief and indoor relief. The 
administrative service for poor law authorities also 
expanded and the originally generic poor law official 
spawned a number of separate professions, including that 
20 of the poor law medical officer. 
The work of poor law authorities from the beginning 
aroused the interest of central government. The aims of 
the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act were clear in directing 
poor law authorities to give a level of relief less 
eligible than the standard of living of those not reliant 
on the poor law. The reasoning was that this would 
stimulate paupers to seek to support themselves and take 
themselves off state reliance. originally this centred 
on the provision of a deterrent system of discipline 
within the workhouse, but, with the continuation of out- 
relief, came also to include levels of cash relief 
beneath the lowest levels of wages of people in work. 
The move towards specialist institutional provision for 
the poor from the late 19th century onwards, however, 
20 See M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System, 1834-1929 
(1981), G. M. Ayers, England's First State Hospitals, 1867- 
];.. g 30 (1971) and B. Abel-Smith, The Hos-nitals, 1800-1948 
(1951). 
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constituted an erosion of the spirit of 1834, in that it 
was recognised that provision for such categories of the 
poor as the sick should not be based upon the assumption 
that the pauper was responsible for his/her plight but 
that it should be of the greatest possible benefit. 
Indeed by 1929 the poor law had become a major hospital 
provider to rank alongside the voluntary hospitals, and 
some of the facilities offered by poor law hospitals 
ranked with the best to be found in the voluntary 
hospitals. Otherwise, the approach of central government 
up until 1929 remained broadly consistent with the 
original aims of 1834: to push poor law authorities into 
providing relief at the minimum level of state 
intervention. What this essentially meant was that the 
sick, amongst other categories of the poor, had gradually 
come to be perceived as deserving cases. Others, notably 
unemployed applicants for relief, who did not qualify for 
contributory unemployment insurance benefit, were still 
deemed undeserving and, therefore, were to be relieved in 
a deterrent manner outside the workhouse. 21 
Attempts at central control were not in any way 
connected with grant relationships, although the 
exchequer did provide subsidies for the payment of poor 
law officers' salaries. Rather central government had 
strong powers of inspection, and set national scales of 
out-relief which local guardians were expected to abide 
21 M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System, 1834-1929 
(1-981), pp. 88- 112. It should be noted that contributory 
national unemployment relief grew considerably after the 
First World War, leaving the poor law to cater only for 
those who were disallowed benefit nationally. 
19 
by. The 1926 Boards of Guardians (Default) Act and the 
subsequent supersession of a number of boards of 
guardians by central appointees is an indication of what 
could happen if localities went against national scales 
of relief. The central authority responsible for local 
poor law provision from 1919 was again the Ministry of 
Health, which had a poor law division. Before 1929 this 
division related to local poor law authorities entirely 
separately from the Ministry's relations with other local 
authorities. During the 1920s, whilst the division 
continued to encourage poor law unions to move away from 
general to specialised institutions, it is equally clear 
that the division embarked upon renewed efforts to keep 
out-relief at a deterrent level and that its chief 
officers were men imbued with the spirit of the poor law. 
Consequently, in 1929 the popular perception that the 
underlying philosophy of the poor law remained that of 
deterrent provision to reduce state intervention and 
encourage self-help was as strong as ever. A stigma was 
still attached to the receipt of poor relief of any kind, 
and consequently even in well developed poor law 
infirmaries hospital beds lay empty. Hence, the system 
of poor law local government, central-local relations and 
their relationship with society at large were still 
highly distinctive set against that which pertained to 
the other major local authorities. 
20 
2. THE 1929 REFORMS 
The poor law (health care) and exchequer grant reforms of 
1929 revised these systems of local government, forms of 
service provision and central-local relations in a number 
of ways. 22 First, the poor law unions and their boards 
of guardians were abolished and their staff, institutions 
and responsibilities for the poor transferred to the 
county councils and county boroughs. In London they were 
predominantly transferred to London County Council. This 
meant that all the functions of elected local government 
were concentrated in the structure set up by the 1888, 
1894 and 1899 local government acts. There was now only 
one system of elected local government in England and 
Wales. 
The county and county borough councils were expected 
to submit administrative schemes of how they were going 
to discharge the transferred responsibilities within six 
months. The Poor Law was renamed public assistance and 
the local authorities were obliged to set up public 
assistance committees. There was considerable discretion 
over how public assistance committees were to be 
composed, as local authorities were allowed to co-opt up 
to a third of the members. The county councils were, 
however, obliged to create guardians' committees to be 
responsible for much of the detailed work of public 
assistance administration in each area of their counties. 
Members of the the guardians' committees were to be 
22 Local Government Act, 1929.19 GEO. 5. CH. 17. 
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chosen by county councils from amongst the members of 
district councils, although 1/3 were to be co-opted 
members. Whilst Part I of the Act laid down that some of 
the co-opted members must be women it was expressly 
stated that it would be desirable to include former 
guardians on both public assistance and guardians 
committees. However, whatever form of local organisation 
was created out-relief had to be administered under the 
terms of the 1927 Poor Law Act. Essentially, then, the 
Act envisaged no change in the operation of out-relief. 
In this respect the poor law was merely placed under new 
management, and did not represent a major service reform. 
The reform of the poor law went much further with 
regard to provision for the non-able bodied poor. The 
Act encouraged local authorities to appropriate 
transferred services for the non-able bodied poor under 
other legislation. In this sense, the reform aimed at 
the break-up of the poor law, removing those services 
which had developed in a more progressive way in recent 
decades to the orbit of other committees of the county 
and county borough councils. Thus it was intended that 
local authorities provide former guardian infirmaries and 
health services through their public health committees 
under the 1875 Public Health Act, the 1913 Mental 
Deficiency Act, the 1918 Maternity and Child Welfare Act, 
the 1920 Blind Persons Act and the 1921 Public Health 
(tuberculosis) Act rather than under poor law acts. This 
would make the facilities and services available to 
everyone, rather than just the poor, and so unify local 
22 
health care provision. Thus, in sum, the local 
authorities were given the green light for the 
reorganisation of local health care under a philosophy of 
progressive expansion and improvement, free of the taint 
of the poor law. It is important to remember, however, 
that the legislation in respect to appropriation was 
permissive. Local authorities were not bound to use 
their new powers. 23 
With regard to local health care provision the reform 
spawned two further initiatives. First, it should be 
stressed that the transfer of poor law infirmaries meant 
that all public hospital provision was concentrated under 
the control of county and county borough councils. it 
was then considered desirable for these authorities to 
co-ordinate future hospital provision with the voluntary 
hospitals in their areas. To this end the local 
authorities were required to consult with committees set 
up by the voluntary hospitals over all future hospital 
planning. The reorganisation of local health care was, 
therefore, intended to embrace for the first time a 
relationship with local health care developed in the 
voluntary sector. Secondly, whilst the transfer of poor 
law medical services established the county boroughs as 
the only public health authority in their areas it left a 
more complex situation in the counties. Here the 
receiving authority was the county council, cementing its 
position as the major public provider. Whilst existing 
23 Local Government Act, 1929. Part I, sections 1-8. 
See also 6th schedule. 
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second tier authority responsibilities were not withdrawn 
it was clearly desirable to have a greater county council 
involvement in second tier provision if the county 
council was going to be able to secure a co-ordinated 
reorganisation of county public health care. To this end 
the Act gave county councils the power to contribute to 
second tier services, second tier authorities the power, 
by agreement, to transfer their services to the county 
councils, and the Minister the power, in the case of 
default by a second tier authority, to transfer a service 
24 to the county council. 
The reform of exchequer grants represented equally 
far-reaching change, which included reform of the central 
finance of local health services. The assigned revenues, 
the grants given in compensation for earlier partial 
derating of agriculture, several road grants and the 
percentage grants for maternity and child welfare, 
tuberculosis, venereal disease, blind welfare and mental 
deficiency were all abolished. At the same time 
agriculture became fully derated and industry and the 
railways 3/4 derated. Compensation for the discontinued 
grants and for derating valued at 1928-29 levels, were 
grouped together under a new grant, the general exchequer 
contribution, otherwise known as the block grant. 
Compensation for derating was valued at E24 million and 
for the discontinued grants at E16 million. These were 
to form fixed amounts in the grant for all time. 
However, from the beginning the block grant also included 
24 Local Government Act, 1929. Part IV, section 57. 
24 
an additional sum to ensure against local authority 
losers because of grant reform, initially set at E5 
million. This amount was to vary in future years in 
accord with a minimum proportion formula. In 1930 the 
block grant was valued at E45 million and throughout the 
1930s consistently represented 1/3 of all government 
grants. 
The block grant was based on totally different 
principles to those of the percentage grants. First, the 
block grant was a general grant and was not related to 
specific services. Hence, local health care services, 
which would include any appropriated poor law services, 
for instance, had no ear-marked grant aid. As much of 
the block grant could be used on health as local 
authorities wanted. Similarly, block grant could be 
spent on any other service. This gave considerably more 
autonomy to local authorities in the spending of grant 
aid than had pertained hitherto. Secondly, the grant was 
to be fixed by central government for periods of years, 
initially in two periods of three and four years, 
1930/31-1932/33 and 1933/34-1936/37, and thereafter for 
periods of five years. This meant that central grant was 
no longer determined by the spending levels of local 
authorities in individual years. Central government 
could fix the aggregate level of aid for years ahead at a 
time. The only variation in the quantity of block grant 
between grant periods was supplied by the working of the 
minimum proportion formula on the additional sum to be 
included in the grant. This stated that the proportion 
25 
which the block grant for any grant period bore to the 
the total amount of rate and grant borne expenditure in 
the penultimate year of the preceding grant period should 
never be less than the proportion which the block grant 
for the first period bore to the total expenditure in the 
first year of the first period. Essentially it was a 
device to keep the block grant reflective of the changes 
in financial burdens of local authorities. 25 
The third major innovation of the block grant was its 
method of distribution to local authorities. In sharp 
contrast to the specific percentage grant which was 
distributed to authorities on the basis of their level of 
expenditure, the block grant was to be distributed in 
relation to local authority needs. These were defined by 
a formula in which several factors for each local 
authority were taken into account: population, the number 
of children under five, rateable value, the proportion of 
unemployment and the population per mile of road. This 
needs-based weighted population formula was to be 
introduced gradually. For the first two periods up to 
1937 the grant was to be 75% distributed in proportion to 
local expenditure and 25% formula distributed. It should 
be noted, however, that weighting of the unemployment 
25 See Local Government Act, 1929. Part VI, section 86. 
To illustrate how the minimum proportion formula worked 
in practice in helping to determine the aggregate level 
of the block grant: - The block grant in the first period 
was E43.5 million p. a. The level of rate and grant-borne 
expenditure for 1930-1931 was E188 million. The 
proportion of the former to the latter was 0.231. The 
rate and grant-borne expenditure for 1931-32 was E189.5 
million. Hence the block grant for the second period had 
to be at least 0.231 of that figure. 
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factor was reduced from a multiplication of ten to six at 
the end of the first period. Between 1937/38 and 1941/42 
the block grant was to be 50% formula distributed; 
1941/42 and 1946/1947 75% and thereafter it was to 
26 operate on full formula redistribution. 
Provision was also made in the Act for anomalous 
results of the working of grant distribution. The 
Ministry of Health would be able to make additional 
grants to local authorities to ensure that all gained the 
equivalent of at least Is rate per head p. a.. The 
Ministry would also be able to make supplementary 
exchequer grants to second tier authorities in the case 
of the county apportionment leading to grant losses, or 
to them becoming anomalous due to changes in rate 
poundage consequent upon the regrouping of second tier 
authorities. The Act provided for quinquennial censuses 
to ensure that the population factor in the block grant 
formula remained reasonably accurate. The Act also 
required an investigation, involving the representatives 
of local government, into the working of the whole block 
grant formula before the end of the second grant period. 
Finally, the block grant was to be supplied in advance 
of expenditure. Under a specific percentage grant it was 
provided after expenditure and so allowed detailed 
checking of individual items of expenditure before grant 
was given. In being given in advance the block grant had 
to embrace a new form of central control in relation to 
the services affected, viz public health and roads, a 
26 See Local Government Act, 1929.4th schedule. 
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more general form of control. In the case of public 
health the Ministry Of Health would henceforth carry out 
surveys of the whole scale and scope of the services 
provided by each local authority, with the sanctions in 
cases of deficient provision including the reduction or 
suspension of grant for the next grant period. 27 
The poor law and exchequer grant reforms, therefore, 
contained considerable potential for change. They 
included a reform of the structure of local government, 
placed the poor law under new local control and empowered 
local authorities to conduct a reorganisation of health 
care. The financial and administrative relations between 
central and local government were significantly altered. 
Ever since the reforms were enacted they have excited 
considerable discussion. 
3. A RECEIVED ORTHODOXY 
Three principal questions have been addressed in relation 
to the reforms: first, what were the origins of the 
reforms; secondly, why and how were they achieved; and, 
thirdly, how successfully were they implemented in the 
1930s and with what implications? The basis of two 
orthodoxies in answering these questions were created 
immediately upon the Act's passing. A sympathetic and 
favourable approach was born in the Times editorial which 
stated in March 1929 that "the Local Government Act of 
27 Local Government Act, 1929. Part VI, sections 85- 
112. See also schedules 2nd to 5th. 
28 
1929 will take its place as one of the outstanding 
legislative achievements of the twentieth century". 28 By 
contrast, in the second volume of the second part of 
their epic history of the Poor Law Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb promoted an unsympathetic and critical approach with 
a denunciation of the Act on account of the problems it 
left unsolved and the new problems it created. 29 
In the period since 1929 there has been no 
comprehensive analysis of the poor law and exchequer 
grant reforms but such empirical analyses as have 
appeared predominantly follow the favourable approach 
sponsored by the Times. There are distinctive points 
of views within this literature but, more importantly, 
there are common assumptions, themes of analysis and 
conclusions. It is this literature which the thesis 
identifies as the predominant received orthodoxy on the 
1929 reforms, and the remainder of this chapter will 
analyse its contents as a basis for further critical 
examination and empirical inquiry. Critiques offered by 
the Webbs and those writing after them will be taken up 
as a crucial part of the critical examination in chapter 
two. 
(i) THE ORIGINS OF REFORM 
With regard to the formulation of the reforms many 
historians have long been agreed that the basic origins 
28 The Times, 27.3.1929. 
29 S. and B. Webb, English Poor Law Historv, Part II, 
Volume 11 (1929), pp. 986-1023. 
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lie in the identification of a series of problems and 
their solutions in the years before the end of the First 
World War. First, it was perceived that the structure of 
local government needed reform. As early as 1888 it had 
been suggested by Joseph Chamberlain in the parliamentary 
debate on local government reform that it was anomalous 
and wasteful of administrative resources to retain ad hoc 
systems of local government, each with their own staffs 
and powers to levy rates. In 1902 the school boards were 
abolished 
authorities. 
and lost their functions to the local 
In 1909 both the majority and minority 
reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law suggested 
a similar fate for the poor law unions, the only 
remaining ad hoc authorities. 30 Their responsibilities 
should go to the county and county borough councils. The 
report of the Maclean sub-committee of the Addison 
Committee on Reconstruction after the First World War, 
published in 1918, came to the same 31 conclusion. A 
rationalisation of the local government structure was, 
therefore, recommended to overcome the problems of a 
multiplicity of local authorities. 32 
Further, in the years around the turn of the century, 
local government observers became concerned that poor law 
units of administration were too small anyway for the 
30 Re-oort of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (cmd. 
4499), PP (1909), xxxvii. 
31 Re-nort of the Maclean Committee (cmd. 8917), PP 
(1918). 
32 C. H. Wilson, 'The Foundations of Local Government' in 
C. H. Wilson ed, Essays in Local Government (1948), pp. 3-6; 
M. Schulz, 'The 1929 Local Government Act and subsequent 
legislation' in C. H. Wilson ed, Essays in Local Government 
(1948), p. 67. 
30 
efficient and effective discharge of their duties. 
Socio-economic change, including population movements, 
had left many unions ill-equipped to meet the financial 
requirements of institutional provision and out-relief. 
If the poor law was to be administered in line with 
central requirements, the majority report of 1909 
concluded, then it had to be removed to local authorities 
with larger areas and greater resources where the 
economies of scale could be realised. Hence the abolition 
of a separate system of poor law authorities and the 
placement of its responsibilities under the control of 
county boroughs and county councils was also argued for 
in 1909 on the grounds of a need to have the poor law 
administered by the largest units of local government. 
In 1909 the force of this solution to the problems of 
unrationalised local administration and inefficient poor 
law provision was dented by a dispute within the Royal 
Commission over exactly what kind of poor law the county 
boroughs and county councils would administer. Whilst 
the majority report demanded the stricter application of 
the principles of 1834, the minority commissioners, led 
by the Webbs, wished for a completely new approach in 
which none of the poor were considered undeserving, and 
instead received more benevolent assistance appropriate 
to each applicant's needs, including assistance for the 
unemployed in finding work. In the 1918 Maclean Report, 
however, there was a unanimous comfirmation of the 
31 
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majority report's position in this respect with regard to 
33 the treatment of the able-bodied poor. 
The problem of deficient local health care provision 
due to inadequacies in organisation was also isolated 
before the First World War. As early as 1869 Sir John 
Simon had lamented the existence of a multiplicity of 
public health care agencies and the poor co-ordination 
and wasteful duPlication of services that resulted, and 
called for their replacement by a single public authority 
at both the central and local government level. Simon's 
views were echoed in the minority report of 1909, which 
suggested that all public services at a local level 
should be placed under the control of the county and 
county borough councils, as the basis of a co-ordinated 
state medical service. At the same time it was essential 
to place all poor law medical services under public 
health acts so as to free them from the stigma of the 
poor law. With the creation of a unified local service 
it would then be possible to develop a full-time, 
34 
salaried state medical profession. 
In 1909 the majority of the Royal Commission on the 
Poor Law were against any breaking up of the poor law, 
and in 1911 the introduction of national health insurance 
appeared to provide an alternative model for the 
development of state health care. However, the Maclean 
33 Schulz, 'The Local Government Act of 1929 and 
subsequent legislation', in Wilson ed, Essays on Local 
Govern-. iment (1948), p. 69, pp. 79-85. 
34 See C. Webster, The Health Services since the War, 
volume I, _Problems 
of Health Care: the National Health 
Service before 1957 (1988), pp. 17-18. 
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Report in 1918 revealed that official opinion with 
respect to health care reform had moved along the lines 
set by Simon and the 1909 minority report, especially as 
the specialisation of Poor Law institutions had become 
the desired approach and it was wasteful that good 
hospital provision should remain unused due to stigma. 
Voluntary and national health insurance provision had 
their separate roles alongside which direct state 
provision would best be organised by a reform of the poor 
law and the unification of local health services under 
the largest areas of local administration, the counties 
and county boroughs, where again the greatest co- 
ordination of provision and the economies of scale could 
be gained. The logic of creating just one local health 
authority in each area was consistent with the creation 
of the Ministry of Health as the single central authority 
in 1919, and in the third reading of the Ministry of 
Health bill clear indications were given by the 
government that after careful consideration this had 
become the official approach. 
35 
Consequently, by the end of the First World War 
certain problems concerning the structure of local 
government, poor law administration and local health care 
had been identified and an official consensus existed on 
their solution, embodied in the Maclean Report, which was 
to be put in to practice in the 1929 poor law (health 
care) reform. In relation to the debates over reform it 
35 See F. Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of 
Health (1970) . 
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should be stressed that a key theme was the isolation of 
the problem of relating function to area. Existing areas 
of administration were inappropriate to functional 
efficiency. The selection of the largest units of local 
government, the counties and county boroughs, as 
replacements would solve this problem. 
Allied closely to the isolation of an area-function 
problem was the isolation before the First World War of 
an area-resource-function problem. This was rooted in 
the fact that there were enormous variations in 
population and wealth between different counties and 
different county boroughs. Consequently, there were 
great variations in rateable value. The problem was that 
a low rateable value tended to reflect both a high 
service need and a low capacity to meet it. This eroded 
the potential for local authorities to perform their 
functions effectively in the poorest areas. The form of 
central f inance in aid of rates most commonly applied, 
the percentage grant, was perceived as perpetuating this 
problem. For grant aid being paid in proportion to local 
spending would assist most the wealthiest local 
authorities who could afford to spend most whilst having 
least need. Those authorities who could afford to spend 
least in the first place would consequently receive grant 
aid in proportion to their low spending. Central grants 
were, therefore guilty of not being directed at local 
authorities who needed them most. The end result was 
that the system of central-local finance in being 
regressive to need was breeding great variations in the 
34 
extent and quality of local service provision/ which, as 
an interest in the maintenance of national standards 
developed, grew increasingly intolerable. The logical 
solution was for central government to abolish percentage 
grants and instead provide grants that were related to 
the needs of different local authorities. 36 
From the 1860s the percentage grants had also been 
perceived as being problematical for democratic 
accountability at a national level. Percentage grant aid 
was seen as being beyond the control of central 
government, thus undermining the national taxpayer. The 
local authority it was that determined its own levels of 
expenditure on grant aided services, and, since the 
amount of grant given in response was automatic, the 
local authority it was that determined the levels of 
central grant too. Not surprisingly the Treasury fought 
to regain control over what was becoming an increasingly 
significant item of revenue expenditure. The assigned 
revenues were introduced in 1888 for the very reason of 
trying to present an alternative source of finance to 
local authorities which could not undermine public 
expenditure control. However, as has been shown, the 
utility of percentage grants in central-local relations 
ensured that the trend towards their usage on new local 
services continued before the First World War. Clearly, 
an alternative source of national finance for local 
36 Schulz, 'The Development of the Grant System' in 
Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government (1948), pp. 123-126. 
35 
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services which gave central government control over its 
determination still needed to be found. 37 
The percentage grants also posed certain problems for 
democratic accountability at a local government level. 
Whilst they could be financially very helpful the 
extensive amount of detailed central control associated 
with their receipt was commonly perceived in local 
government as eroding local autonomy. Further, detailed 
checking of every item of expenditure was viewed 
universally in local government and by some in the 
central administration as being generally a waste of time 
better spent on more serious matters. Consequently, 
there was also a recognition a need for a system of 
central grants which gave local authorities greater 
freedom in their expenditure. 38 
In a number of ways then problems of the percentage 
grant had been perceived before the War. These problems 
and a general concern to put central finance of local 
authorities, which had developed in an ad hoc manner 
during the nineteenth century, on to a more systematic 
footing were acknowledged by the 1901 minority report of 
the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, which importantly 
was signed by the chairman, Lord Balfour of Burleigh. The 
report proposed a block grant to cover 50% of the 
recipient local authorities' total spending on national 
services. With respect to public health this intended to 
37 ibid, pp. 125-132. 
38 See G. Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the Re-nort 
of the (Layfield) Committee of Inguiry in to Local 
Government Finance (cmd. 6453), PP (1976), p. 109. 
36 
cover personal services but not sanitary and 
environmental services, which were deemed to be of purely 
local concern. The grant was to be calculated every ten 
years, according to a formula based partly on each local 
authority, s actual expenditure but also on their relative 
needs, as measured by revenues and the ratio of 
population to ability to pay. The grant was then to be 
fixed until the next calculation. As a result, central 
government would gain the power to determine the overall 
level of central finance of local government, both local 
and central government would be relieved of the minutiae 
of itemised expenditure control, and a greater 
equalisation of resources between local authorities would 
be achieved. Here in embryo was the solution to the 
39 problems of the percentage grant system. 
Although the block grant principle had been advocated 
by only a minority of the royal commissioners in 1901 it 
received the most discussion in the ensuing years and was 
largely endorsed by the Departmental (Kempe) Committee on 
40 Local Taxation in 1914. A bill, based on the Kempe 
Report, was prepared in 1914 but had to be dropped 
because of the outbreak of War. Yet, the the block grant 
had been firmly established as a solution to all of the 
perceived problems of percentage grants. Consequently, 
in a manner similar to the debate over poor law (health 
Care) reform, the problems of exchequer grants had been 
39 Final Re-oort of the Royal Commission on Local 
Taxation (cmd. 638), PP (1901). 
40 ReT)ort of the DeiDartmental (Kem-Qe) Committee on Local 
Taxation (cmd. 7315), PP (1914). 
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isolated before the War and an official consensus existed 
for their solution, which again was to be reflected in 
the legislative changes of 1929. 
discussion of such problems and these solutions 
forms the basis of much historical analysis of the 
origins of the 1929 reforms. 41 Implicitly, it suggests a 
highly rationalist approach to seeking out reforms to 
meet the problems of modernity. For it is demonstrated 
that the reforms were conceived on the basis of work by 
key actors from both outside and inside government, 
working on a variety of royal commissions and committees, 
gradually producing agreed policy. 
It is then the common practice of historians to find 
more contemporary origins for the reforms in the 
implications of the economic slump of the 1920s, although 
their analysis suggests merely the exacerbation of the 
problems already outlined. High unemployment threw large 
numbers onto the Poor Law. This had two results. First, 
many poor law authorities complained of an inability to 
meet the cost of their clientele. Secondly, a minority 
of authorities, notably Poplar, met the challenge of high 
unemployment with outdoor relief which exceeded relief 
scales laid down by the Ministry of Health. A large 
number of poor law authorities were, therefore, hard 
pressed to or disinclined to relieve unemployment in line 
with central government requirements. This was a clear 
41 See, for example, C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the 
Wars, 1918-1940 (1955) 1 pp. 
340-342, M. Bruce, The Coming 
of the Welfare State (1965), pp. 224-228 and B. Keith-Lucas 
and P. G. Richards, A History of Local Government in the 
iturv, (1978), pp. 88-90. 
38 
re-incarnation of the area-resource problem compounded by 
what was perceived centrally as maladministration. 42 At 
the same time the slump made the lack of central control 
over grant aid all the more intolerable, and the 
inequitable nature of grant aid distribution an even 
greater source of complaint from those areas suffering 
most from the slump. 43 This context served to make the 
reform of local government the subject of considerable 
public discussion and controversy during the 1920s. 44 
It is argued by a number of historians, however, that 
this more controversial public aspect to the problems of 
local government and central-local relations, whilst 
making reform more politically possible, did not affect 
the substance of proposals for local government reform. 
This was determined by the earlier debate. 45 Within the 
post-War Ministry of Health civil servants and ministers 
worked without controversy on the elaboration of long- 
term plans for reform based upon the reform consensus 
which had been agreed by the end of the First World War. 
42 See, for example, A. J. P. Taylor, Enalish Historv, 
1914-1945 (1965)/ pp236-238 and Keith-Lucas and Richards, 
A Historv of Local Government in the Twentieth Centurv, 
pp. 88-90. 
43 See J. H. Warren (revised by P. G. Richards), The English 
Local Government System (1965), pp. 65-67 and M. Newcomer, 
'English Local Government Under the Local Government Act 
of 19291, Political Science Ouarterly, 51,1936, pp. 538- 
568. 
44 See B. B. Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 
(1970), pp. 203-235 for a full sense of the controversy. 
It should be noted, however, that Gilbert makes a 
critical rather than a favourable interpretation of the 
formulation and implementation of the poor law (health 
care) and exchequer grant reforms. See chapter two. 
45 See, for example, Rhodes in Appendix Six of the 
ReT)ort of the (Lavf ield) Committee of Inguiry into Local 
Government Finance 
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It is these plans which came to fruition in 1929 after a 
long battle to gain their achievement in a pluralist 
environment of inter-departmental relations and high 
politics. The chronology of the development of these 
plans is generally divided into two periods. 
(ii) THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH PLAN 
Analysis of the post-War bureaucratic input into the 
reform process remains scant but Rhodes has established 
conclusively that the original authorship of detailed 
reform proposals lay with the Ministry of Health. 
Officials worked on a plan for local government reform 
soon after the Ministry was created. An internal 
committee on health organisation and poor law reform put 
together a reform of the poor law and the organisation 
and functions of local authorities on the basis of the 
Maclean Report, and as a result of the Ministry's special 
position as the department with a general responsibility 
for the relations between central and local government, 
also worked on a reform of exchequer grants based on the 
pre-war advocacy of block grants. 
46 The detailed work on 
a block grant reform was undertaken by Ernest 
Strohmenger, the accountant-general, whose conclusions 
were immediately endorsed by the permanent secretary, 
Arthur Robinson, and other senior officials, for the main 
46 Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the ReDort of the 
o=ittee of Inguiry into Local Government 
Finance, pp-109-110. 
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reason that it would allow greater uniformity in service 
provision between local authorities. 47 
The committee's proposals came together in 1921 in a 
draft Cabinet memorandum for the then Minister of Health, 
Alfred Mond. The content of the proposals was basically 
that which was to appear as the main substance of parts I 
and VI of the 1929 Act, including a block grant limited 
to the replacement of the assigned revenues and only the 
percentage grants for which the Ministry was responsible, 
ie the health grants. The memorandum stated that greater 
local autonomy was desirable in itself but that this and 
the block grant's redistributive principle would also be 
beneficial in gaining the support of local authorities 
for the transfer of Poor Law functions. 48 Rhodes suggest 
that this was good thinking for at the end of the War the 
Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC), representing 
the county boroughs and non-county boroughs, and the 
County Councils Association (CCA) wanted more financial 
aid and greater freedom from central control above all 
else. 49 Stacey casts some doubt on this, suggesting that 
many local authorities remained in favour of percentage 
grants. Nevertheless, the Ministry's perception of local 
authorities views on grants remained crucial to the logic 
of the memorandum. The Ministry further expected 
47 S. Stacey, 'The Ministry of Health: ideas and practice 
in a government department' (unpublished DPhil thesis, 
oxford University, 1985), p. 227. 
48 For a copy of the Mond Memorandum, May 1921, see PRO 
HLG 68/25: Miscellaneous unallocated papers on Poor Law 
reform, 1919- 1925. 
49 Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the ReDort of the 
(Lavf ield) Committee of Inguiry in to Local Government 
Fina. nce, PP-109-110. 
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- .1 
Treasury support as the block grant gave central 
government the power to fix aid ahead of local 
50 expenditure. 
The main text of the 1929 reforms had, therefore, been 
established uncont rovers ial ly within the the Ministry of 





evidence to the 
Rhodes and Stacey suggest that the Mond 
became an established Ministry view. 
some rather contradictory evidence of 
)e Montmorency, officers in the public 
arguing for percentage grants in their 
Geddes Committee. However, he firmly 
locates this as being outside the main lines of policy 
development within the ministry. The Ministry was united 
in its intention to see the Mond memorandum through to 
the statute books. 51 
However, the Ministry's hopes ran aground on three 
rocks between 1921 and 1924. Rhodes reveals that the 
first obstacle was the financial crisis that overcame 
government in 1921. The crisis led in the first instance 
to the non-submittal of the Mond memorandum to Cabinet, 
and later to the creation of the Geddes Committee, which 
in the search for immediate economies in public 
expenditure steered the Ministry of Health in to a short- 
term policy of grant rationing and away from any long- 
term service or grant reform. 
The second problem was that the Geddes Committee came 
out in favour of the immediate abolition of all 
50 Stacey, thesis, pp. 305-306. 
51 ibid, p. 288-289. 
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percentage grants and their replacement by a block grant 
to cover all local authority aided services, thus giving 
central government complete control over the level of 
support, rather than the partial support offered by the 
Ministry of Health scheme. The Ministry of Health, as 
Rhodes showed, whilst in support of a block grant reform 
saw it as an inter-related package with poor law reform. 
Therefore, officials did not want exchequer grants 
reformed in isolation. At the same time the Geddes 
recommendation confronted the ministers of other spending 
departments dealing with local authority services with a 
block grant reform. The government appointed a committee 
under the chairmanship of Lord Meston to hear the views 
of all concerned. The Meston Committee failed to make a 
report and indeed petered out amidst the conflict between 
central departments over the block grant issue. The 
Treasury came out strongly in favour of a block grant to 
cover all local authority services, the other spending 
departments remained solidly opposed. The ministry of 
Health plan now lay in no mans land. It advocated some 
block granting but fell well short of the comprehensive 
block grant which the Treasury wanted. 
52 
It is possible that the Ministry's plan could still 
have been championed by an energetic minister in Cabinet 
for, as Leland demonstrates, all of the main political 
parties voiced themselves in favour of implementing the 
Maclean Report in 1918. There was, thus, a political 
52 Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the Renort of the 
ommittee of Incruiry in to Local Government 
Fin-an. a-e, pp. 110-112. 
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consensus on reform, which mirrored that which existed 
within Whitehall. 53 However, the third and conclusive 
reason why the Ministry reforms remained on the shelves 
was the lack of political leadership as ministers came 
and went with rapid changes of government. Stacey 
demonstrates how John Wheatley, the Labour Minister of 
Health in 1924, attempted reform but failed simply 
because his government lost office before he could 
formulate a bill. In late 1924 the Ministry's 1921 plan, 
54 therefore, remained on the shelves. 
(iii) THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REFORM 
At this point Neville Chamberlain arrived at the Ministry 
Of Health and the struggle to bring the Ministry's inter- 
related poor law (health care) and partial block grant 
reform to fruition gained new impetus. The interest of 
historians in the detailed evolution of the reforms also 
picks up. Principally Chamberlain is credited with a 
bureaucratic approach to the problems of public 
administration. He combatted the perceived mal- 
administration of poplarism with a series of measures 
between 1926 and 1928, and embarked upon the more long- 
term solutions to the problems of the Poor Law, local 
health care and central-local financial relations on the 
53 J. Woodmansee Leland, 'Neville Chamberlain and British 
Social Legislation, 1923-1929, (unpublished PhD. thesis, 
Ohio State University, 1970), p. 277. 
54 Stacey, thesis, pp. 228-229. 
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55 basis of the Ministry of Health reform plans. The more 
detailed analyses stress the energy with which he did 
this. Stacey joins Feiling, Dilks and Leland in 
characterising Chamberlain as an altruistic politician 
prepared to see complex, but necessary, reforms through 
and as both a visionary and a practical social 
56 reformer. The role played by Chamberlain in the 
achievement of the reforms is constructed as follows. 
After serving briefly at the Ministry of Health in 
1923, it is argued, he specifically asked to return in 
1924 rather than take the more prestigious position of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Dilks suggests that he did 
so out of a profound desire to carry important social 
reforms for the good of the people, which were based on 
the reform of local government. In particular, he sought 
the removal of health care from the poor law, co- 
ordination of local health services, and from a very 
early stage a partnership between the voluntary hospitals 
and local authorities. The block grant he perceived as 
an ideal way of helping the necessitous areas. The 
phenomenon of poplarism, in which some, predominantly 
Labour, boards of guardians gave more generous levels of 
out-relief than the Ministry's poor law division desired, 
did nothing to influence Chamberlain's basic commitment 
55 Ibid, pvii, Bruce, The Comincr of the Welfare State 
(1965) , pp. 224-228, Taylor, English 
History, 1914-1945 
(1965), pp. 236-238, Keith-Lucas and Richards, A History 
of Local Government in the Twentieth Century (1978), 
pp. 43-45. 
56 Stacey, thesis, pp. 146-152; K. Feiling, The Life of 
Ne ille Chamberlain (1946), pp. 126-128; D. Dilks, Neville 
Chamberlain, Volume One: Pioneering and Reform 1869-1929 
(1984), p. 405; and J. Woodmansee Leland, thesis, p. 278. 
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to move the poor law to larger county borough and county 
areas in which the financial difficulties of the poor law 
could be solved by wealthy areas subsidising their poorer 
neighbours. Nor was he afraid of the potential root and 
branch opposition of the boards of guardians to their 
57 abolition. 
In addition, Chamberlain had the necessary expertise, 
which other ministers had lacked, to understand the 
complexities of reform. This was based on personal 
service in local government and work in relation to 
voluntary hospitals. He won the respect of officials at 
the Ministry of Health and, whilst the local government 
reforms were based on Ministry-derived plans, they 
recognised that Chamberlain made the further important 
contribution of placing local government reform within a 
series of other reforms with a unifying vision. In the 
four year programme which he presented to Cabinet within 
two weeks of taking office, Chamberlain not only included 
the poor law (health care) and partial block grant reform 
but also a rating and valuation reform. This was a 
necessary pre-requisite to poor law reform, as it 
intended to remove rating powers from poor law officers, 
as well as being a necessary pre-requisite to block grant 
reform, as it provided for the greater uniformity 
essential to making rateable value a reliable indicator 
of need in a formula. He also included a reform of 
pensions, which would take many of the elderly out of the 
57 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume one: Pioneering 
an[ Rform 1869-1929, pp. 405-420. 
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poor law, thus making out-relief by local government in 
the long- run much more manageable. 58 
Chamberlain's credentials as minister of Health gained 
the immediate go ahead from Cabinet to develop the poor 
law (health care) reform and the Ministry's partial block 
grant reform in detail. over the next four years 
ministry officials were responsible for the development 
of detailed proposals, including identifying the factors 
which best reflected local authority needs for the block 
grant formula. The Royal Commission on Local Government, 
which sat between 1923 and 1929, is assumed by Schulz to 
have had considerable input in to the development of the 
reforms as well but this is repudiated by Stacey and 
Leland. The reforms were specifically left out of the 
terms of reference of the Commission so as not to further 
complicate the development of reform. Chamberlain merely 
used the Royal Commission as a sounding board for some 
ideas. Rhodes does not even mention the Royal Commission 
in his analysis. Instead, Ministry officials quietly 
went about the uncontroversial completion of reforms 
which they had first evolved after 59 the War. 
Rhodes notes, however, how Chamberlain involved the 
local authorities in deliberations over reform from the 
beginning in an effort to gain reform by consent. 
Negotiations in 1925 led to certain concessions, 
58 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: Pioneering 
and Reform, 1869-1929, pp. 413-420; Stacey, thesis, 
pp. 188-198. 
59 Schulz, 'The Local Government Act of 1929 and 
Subsequent Legislation, in Wilson ed, Essays on Local 
Government, pp. 72-74; Stacey, thesis, pp. 265-266; Leland, 
thesis, pp. 327-328. 
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including making the first grant period only three years 
rather than five years, so as to make the process of 
change more gradual. Furthermore, Chamberlain quickly 
saw how essential it would be to include an additional 
sum in the grant so as to fully placate local authority 
worries that they would lose financially by a grant 
reform and taking on more service responsibilities - By 
November 1926 policy development had proceeded swiftly 
enough for Chamberlain to go to Cabinet asking for 
sanction to bring in a bill in the next session of 
Parliament. 60 However, three issues are highlighted by 
Rhodes as causing further delays in reform. 
First, the Conservative election victory in late 1924 
had brought Lord Eustace Percy to the Board of Education. 
In 1925 Percy issued a circular to local authorities 
announcing that the Board had changed its policy on 
grants and would introduce its own block grant. The 
circular caused major political controversy and was 
withdrawn, but in 1926 Percy was still pursuing the 
issue. The Cabinet responded by creating a new 
committee, this time of officials, under the senior 
Treasury official, Sir George Barstow. The Barstow 
Committee merely served to reopen the divisions between 
the Treasury and the spending departments. The Home 
office, the Scottish office, and even Board of Education 
officials argued against block granting. The Treasury, 
meanwhile, played again for a comprehensive block grant. 
60 Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the ReDort of the 
_(_Lavfield) 
Committee of Incruiry in to Local Government 
Fin-an-ce, p. 113. 
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In Cabinet Winston Churchill, who had become Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in 1924, argued strongly for a 
comprehensive block grant which precluded Chamberlain's 
limited scheme. Churchill further refused a step-by-step 
approach of introducing a limited block grant with the 
poor law reform, which could then be followed by the 
further block granting of grant-aided local services. In 
February 1927 the Cabinet convened a further co=ittee, 
this time of ministers. However, Churchill remained 
immovable and in 1927 Chamberlain was limited by Cabinet 
to discussing only poor law reform with the local 
authorities. The Ministry of Health's block grant reform 
61 was effectively sidelined again. 
Chamberlain and the Ministry of Health, of course, 
viewed poor law and its grant reform as an inter-related 
package. The obstruction of the grant reform threatened 
the whole reform. Further, Rhodes also draws attention 
to the fact that the Cabinet was decidedly lukewarm on 
poor law reform in itself. In February 1927 reform was 
postponed to the autumn, at which time it was postponed 
again until 1928, and Chamberlain feared for its eventual 
fate. The obstacle to poor law reform in itself came 
from the rural guardians, represented by rural 
Conservative backbenchers. They seriously resented their 
abolition and opposed Chamberlain's proposed reforms. 
However, Dilks highlights Chamberlain's major political 
success in developing the reform with the consent of the 
guardians as well. Importantly, he made the concessions 
61 ibid, pp. 113-114. 
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that in the administration of public assistance by county 
and county councils former guardians could be co-opted, 
and in administration within counties devolution to 
guardians committees would be made. The guardians were 
content that their experience would not be completely 
discarded whilst Chamberlain secured his major aim of 
having the finance of administration over larger areas. 
Hence, by 1927 Chamberlain had removed one of the 
obstacles to reform. The major hurdle still left was the 
Treasury's continued commitment to a comprehensive block 
grant or none at all. 62 
At this point Winston Churchill introduced his 
derating policy, the deliberation of which further 
threatened reform. A further cabinet committee was 
appointed in January 1928 which became a new arena for 
Churchill and Chamberlain to come into conflict. 
Chamberlain opposed derating and the two still disagreed 
over the extent of block granting. The result of this 
conflict was, however, to bring about eventual Cabinet 
acceptance of Chamberlain's reforms. Schulz and others 
have suggested that Cabinet essentially backed derating 
as a major economic policy initiative in the build-up to 
the 1929 election, and that Chamberlain's reforms merely 
got in to the 1928 Local Government Bill, hanging by 
derating's shirt-tails. 63 However, Dilks is to the fore 
62 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: Ploneerina and 
Reform 1869-1929, pp. 513-514. 
63 Schulz, 'The Local Government Act of 1929 and 
Subsequent Legislation, in Wilson ed, Essavs on Local 
Government, p. 68. See also M. Gilbert, Winston 
S. C- ume Five, 1922-1939 (1976). 
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in suggesting that the Churchill-Chamberlain conflict was 
resolved through a brilliant compromise engineered by 
Chamberlain. Despite his overall opposition to derating, 
Chamberlain accepted it. Even then he won important 
revisions which ensured that important principles of 
local government were not contradicted. For instance, 
Churchill's original scheme for the complete derating of 
industry was converted to one of 3/4 derating so that an 
industrial interest in local government would be 
maintained, and any notions of local sources of income 
being collected by national government were successfully 
opposed. 
Chamberlain also then won Cabinet support for the 
local government reforms. He did so precisely because 
the rest of the Cabinet recognised Chamberlain as the 
only member of the Government who understood the complex 
questions involved and could ensure that derating was 
made a practicable policy. Furthermore, in order to win 
Chamberlain's support for derating Churchill and the 
Treasury quietly dropped their advocacy of a general 
block grant, in favour of Chamberlain's partial scheme, 
allied to poor law reform. It then became sensible to 
integrate the compensation for derating in to the 
Ministry's partial block grant. Derating was announced 
in the 1928 budget speech and in June Chamberlain finally 
introduced a white paper on the reform of local 
government and central-local financial relations, which 
51 
was still largely derived from the Mond Memorandum of 
seven years previous, only now incorporating derating. 64 
All that remained then was to fine tune the reform 
with the local authorities. Dilks suggests that this was 
the climax of Chamberlain's major achievement of gaining 
reform by consent. He shepherded the local authority 
associations in to agreement with concessions which 
whilst meaningful did not undermine the basic principles 
of the reforms. The gradual introduction of the block 
grant was assured by having the first grant period over 
three years and the second over four years. The full 
introduction of the formula basis to the grant was 
delayed until 1947. Chamberlain also assured the local 
authorities that the new grant relations would embrace 
considerably greater local autonomy in spending 
decisions. Finally, after the 2nd reading of the Local 
Government bill in November 1928 the associations still 
remained anxious about the extent of compensation for 
grant and rate losses, and the working of the block grant 
formula. In particular, the AMC and CCA wanted 
compensation for derating separated from the block grant. 
Yet, despite much public dissent, Chamberlain used his 
friendship with Alderman Williams of the AMC to get both 
the AMC and the CCA to drop opposition in return for the 
guarantee that, as a result of the inclusion of an 
additional sum in the grant and the provision for 
additional grants, no local authority would lose by the 
64 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: PioneerinQ and 
Refort 1869-1929, pp. 546-557. 
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grant reform in the first five years. At the same time 
provision was made for a five year census and a formula 
investigation. Such concessions cost little and 
represented no erosion of the main thrust of the 
reforms. 65 
Finally, then, solutions to problems of local 
government, central-local relations and economic and 
social policy, which had all been identified by the end 
of the First World War, were achieved as a set of long- 
overdue 66 reforms in the 1929 Act. Several broad 
conclusions on policy development during the 1920s can be 
drawn from the historical work discussed. officials at 
the Ministry of Health had played the key role in the 
detailed development of the reforms in a manner which 
suggests the neutral observance of the 1918 reform 
consensus. Neville Chamberlain had then played the key 
role in politically delivering the reforms in a style 
which could be characterised as that of the liberal hero 
of social reform. He had also delivered reform in a way 
which ensured consent from the many interests who at 
various times obstructed reform. By 1929 the major 
65 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: PioneerinQ and 
Reform 1869-1929, pp. 568-571. Dilks' account is based 
directly upon Chamberlain's view of the level of consent 
achieved and the relative significance of the concessions 
made. See Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 2/22, political 
diary, 24.2.1929. where Chamberlain writes "The crucial 
part was the negotiations with the L. a. s and thanks to 
careful handling they were shepherded in to asking for 
concessions on the lines on which I had always 
contemplated that I might meet them safely ... they were of 
such a character as enabled them to accept and members of 
the party to feel that they could go to their 
constituents with confidence". 
66 Stacey, thesis, p. 270. 
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departments of central government were content. The 
Ministry of Health had achieved the realisation of the 
Mond Memorandum. The Treasury, whilst preferring a 
general block grant had achieved a move towards the goal 
of greater central control of grant aid, and implemented 
derating. The other spending departments had been left 
content with their systems of percentage grants. The 
Conservative party enthusiastically acclaimed the 1929 
reforms as a great legislative achievement, and Dilks 
claims that Parliament as a whole, despite public Labour 
Party opposition, received Chamberlain's two and a half 
hour speech at the second reading of the bill with great 
67 admiration. Even the Webbs, whose criticism will be 
examined in the next chapter, have been portrayed as 
enthusiastic endorsers of the abolition of the boards of 
guardians. 68 Further, it has been suggested that 
certain critical vested interests were successfully 
mollified. For example, the rural guardians, who were 
being abolished and were, therefore, deeply resentful 
were promised a role in the new system of public 
assistance; and the county and county borough councils, 
who had voiced many criticisms, were hopeful that the 
reforms would provide a permanent solution to the 
problems of inadequate resourcing, service co-ordination 
67 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: PioneerinQ and 
Reform 1869-1929, pp. 571-574. 
68 See Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State, (1965), 
p. 226. See also N. and J. Mackenzie, The Diary of 
ruee1 LB_ea ' ce Webb, Yolume or 92? 4-1943 TLh ef ife ýt (19 85)., p. 153 . 
trl 
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and over-rigid central control. 69 By definition, if such 
problems of local government were solved then the reforms 
also stood as major social reforms in the wider interests 
of the people, especially those living in poorer areas of 
the country. In short, it appeared that the plurality of 
interests and actors who were involved had been appeased 
in the 1929 reforms: the ultimate hallmark of a 
successful reform in a democratic society. There was, as 
a result, considerable contemporary optimism for the 
future, an optimism which informs the concluding remarks 
of many of the historians cited. 70 
(iv) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM 
Historians have not on the whole researched the 
implementation of the 1929 reforms in any great depth. 
Some research on the implementation of the block grant 
suggests considerable success. it is implicitly 
suggested by Rhodes that the Treasury was pleased with 
the grant as a means of controlling Exchequer aid to 
local authorities, thus safeguarding the independence of 
the taxpayer, for in a 1932 inter-departmental conference 
the Treasury once again pressed hard for a general block 
grant to cover all grant-aided local services. It was 
thwarted once more by the arguments of the Home Office in 
69 Wilson, 'The Foundations of Local Government, in 
Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government, p. 6. 
70 For the most recent overview endorsement of the 
favourable approach to the origins and achievement of and 
the reception given to the 1929 reforms see J. Stevenson, 
. E? tv, 1914-1945 (1984), p. 301. 
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favour of the continuance of percentage grants, and had 
to accept the impossibility of finding a simple formula 
for block granting education because of the enormous 
complexity of the variations in costs of providing 
education in different areas. Yet, it is suggested that 
the Treasury never fully abandoned the potential of 
71 further block granting before the Second World War. 
With regard to directing grant aid at the poorer local 
authorities Rhodes further suggests that the "block grant 
had some effect in giving help to these areas but did not 
sufficiently offset the disadvantages which they 
suffered". 72 The decisive factor limiting the block 
grant's ability to help the necessitous areas was the 
recession which set in in these areas in 1929 and lasted 
until the mid-1930s, and in some areas until the Second 
World War. Service needs and, consequently, the demands 
on local expenditure, rose to levels not forecastable in 
the framing of the block grant reform in 1929. Hence, as 
Newcomer and Stacey point out, any failure of the block 
grant formula to distribute grant aid according to local 
need in the 1930s was more to do with the recession than 
73 
any inherent deficiencies in the reform itself. 
Schulz further argues that the detailed investigation 
of the block grant formula, conducted between 1935 and 
71 Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the ReDort of the 
(Lavf ield) Committee of Inguiry in to Local Government 
Finance, pp. 116-117. 
72 ibid, p. 117. 
73 M. Newcomer, 'English Local Government Under the Local 
Government Act of 19291, Political Science Ouarterly, 51, 
1936, pp. 563-564. For a lengthier treatment with similar 
conclusions see M. Newcomer, Central and Local Finance 
in 
Germa Ly and England (1937) . Stacey, thesis, p. 318. 
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1937 by the Ministry of Health and the local authority 
associations, with co-opted representatives of the 
necessitous areas, revealed that on the whole the formula 
had worked generally in accord with central aims in the 
first two block grant periods. It had not, however, 
fully met the needs of necessitous areas because 
increases in population allied to a decline in the number 
of children under the age of five and a general increase 
in rateable values had tended to increase the proportion 
of grant attracted to the basic formula factor, ie 
population. This worked to the advantage of the 
wealthier local authorities. The reduction in the 
weighting of the unemployment factor between the second 
and third grant periods, which had been further intended 
in 1929, was not likely to assist the situation. 
The formula investigation did, however, work to solve 
this problem. Forty modifications were tested, including 
the usage of a variety of alternative factors. This 
resulted in the adoption by the Ministry of Health of 
test D3 modified, by which there was an increase in the 
unemployment weighting for necessitous areas and an 
increase in the weighting of the population sparsity 
factor for some rural counties. Even where the block 
grant was found wanting, therefore, central government 
moved to make amends, although further moves to revise 
the distribution of grant among second tier authorities 
ran aground on a lack of local consensus. 
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74 Schulz, 'The Development of the Grant System' in 
Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government, pp. 136-142. 
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A further measure of the general success of the block 
grant can be found in the report of the Ray Committee in 
1932, in which the local authority representatives called 
for more block granting on the grounds of its beneficial 
effects for the finance of local government and local 
autonomy. 75 By 1939, Schulz authoritatively asserts, the 
block grant had become "an essential part of local 
finance,, 
. The only consistent complaints in relation to 
the financial reform of 1929 were directed at derating, 
for which local authorities considered they had received 
inadequate compensation. 76 
Successful implementation of the poor law reform has 
been less obvious to historians. Many local authorities 
found the cost of public assistance more than they could 
bear and lobbied the Royal Commission on Unemployment 
Insurance for the removal of the responsibility to 
national government. In addition, the phenomenon of 
poplarism re-occurred in the administration of out-relief 
by some county boroughs. Yet, the effect of the 
recession may also be chiefly held responsible for making 
the cost of public assistance prohibitive in poorer areas 
or for making the administration of out-relief in to a 
matter of conflict between central and local government. 
In addition, there were compelling arguments in central 
government in the early 1930s in relation to the 
administration of the unemployment insurance scheme and 
75 ReiDort of the (Rav) Committee on Local Ex-nenditure 
(England and Wales) (cmd. 4200), PP (1932). 
76 Schulz, 'The Development of the Grant System' in 
Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government, p. 142, p. 160. 
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transitional payments, which had been placed under public 
assistance committee administration in 1931, as to why 
the relief of unemployment should be placed on a totally 
national footing. It is for these reasons, then, rather 
than inherent defects in the ability of county and county 
borough councils to administer public assistance, that 
responsibility for the unemployed was taken away from 
public assistance committees by the 1934 Unemployment Act 
and placed under the newly constituted Unemployment 
Assistance Board. 77 
Research also shows problems in the successful 
implementation of the 1929 Act as a health care reform. 
Abel-Smith and Webster, for example, highlight the 
enormous variations in health care spending and standards 
between different local authority areas. 78 In his 
pessimistic analysis of health care standards in the 
1930s Webster argues that in the poorer areas, most 
affected by unemployment, resources were simply too low 
to support adequate provision. 79 Abel-Smith reveals the 
highly limited extent to which county and county borough 
councils appropriated poor law infirmaries under public 
health acts. By 1938 only 109 hospitals had been 
77 R. Lowe, AdjustinQ to Democracv, The Role of the 
Ministry of Labour in British -oolitics, 1916-1939 (1986), 
pp. 132-167. 
78 Abel-Smith, The HosiDitals; Webster, The Health 
Services Since the War, Volume One, Problems of Health 
Care: the National Health Service Before 1957. 
79 ibid, p. 8. See also C. Webster, 'Healthy or Hungry 
Thirties', History WorkshoiD Journal, no. 13,1982, pp. 110- 
129. For a feminist interpretation of the implications 
for local health standards of insufficient resourcing see 
Lewis, The Politics of Motherhood, Child and maternal 
Wel and, 1900-1939 (1980), p. 17. 
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appropriated nationwide and nearly 1/3 of all public 
hospital beds were still to be found in mixed public 
assistance institutions administered by public assistance 
committees. In addition, whilst virtually all local 
authorities consulted voluntary hospital committees over 
hospital planning, only in some urban areas, chiefly 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Plymouth and Bristol, did this 
result in substantial rationalisation. 80 
Strong evidence has, therefore, been presented to 
support the view that the block grant did little to 
enhance local health funding and services and that the 
local authorities responded to their greater financial 
autonomy and the permissive provisions of the Act, 
empowering the uni fication and co-ordination of public 
health services, with an apathy which only served to 
exacerbate deficiencies. The difficulty remains, 
however, of evaluating the primacy of these potential 
reasons for deficient local health care. This is born 
out, for example, by Bryder's study of local tuberculosis 
provision. 81 Whatever the cause of deficiency Wilson 
further suggests that the Ministry of Health power to 
reduce grant in the case of deficiency or extravagance 
was an empty one. It was never used because of problems 
for the Ministry of Health in defining whether services 
were adequate in relation to local needs, and in relation 
to cases of high expenditure it "would arouse great 
80 Abel-Smith, The Hos-nitals, pp. 368-383. 
81 L. Bryder, Below the Malic Mountain, A Social Historv 
Of Tiberculosis in Twentieth-Centurv Britain (1988), 
pp. 93-96. 
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resentment, and, in the case of a large local authority, 
a considerable political storm". 82 
Historians have, however, presented further evidence 
which lays the basis of a more optimistic interpretation 
of the implementation of reform. Schulz suggests that 
the introduction of non-specific grant-aid did not 
overall have an adverse effect on local health 
expenditures. Expenditure on maternity and child 
welfare, the most recently initiated health service, 
which logically still needed the stimulus of the specific 
percentage grant, flattened out during the early 1930s, 
but picked up from the mid-1930s once the chief medical 
officer of the ministry of Health had drawn attention to 
inadequacies in some areas. Further, local authority 
expenditure on hospital provision, which included non- 
grant aided capital expenditure rose spectacularly during 
the 1930s despite government economy campaigns. 83 
Winter's view, based on official mortality statistics, 
that health standards rose during the inter-war period in 
all but a few pockets of recession lends further credence 
to an optimistic portrayal of local health care 
development. 84 
82 Wilson, Munici-oal Health Services, pp. 150-151. 
83 Schulz, 'The Development of the Grant System' in 
Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government, p143. 
84 J. M. Winter, 'Infant Mortality, Maternal Mortality and 
Public Health in Britain in the 1930s, Journal of 
Eurovean Economic History, Volume 8,1979, pp. 439-462. 
See also J. M. Winter, 'The Decline of Mortality in Britain 
1870-19501, in T. Barker and M. Drake (eds), Po-oulation and 
So! ie. v in Britain 1850-1980 (1982), pp. 100-120, and 
j. m. Winter, The Great War and The British PeoiDle (1986). 
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It is also possible to cast doubt over whether those 
failures which did occur were due to integral weaknesses 
in the 1929 legislation. It is true that poorer local 
authorities lacked the resources to develop spending in 
the 1930s and that the redistributive quality of the 
block grant had intended to make good such deficiencies. 
However, as it has already been argued, the desired 
effects of the block grant were eroded by the 
unforecastable recession. As Wilson commented in 1946, 
"it has unfortunately been the case that for many local 
authorities in the years before the War the block grant 
was swallowed up by the mounting cost of poor relief 11 . 
He also suggested that even authorities who were 
otherwise lukewarm on health service development could 
85 argue a lack of resources even if they had not so been. 
Abel-Smith is also careful to discuss the many varied 
reasons for local failures on appropriation. First, many 
of the institutions inherited from the poor law unions 
were mixed or built many years before, or both, and were, 
therefore, unsuitable for appropriation as general 
hospitals. This explained why county council 
appropriation, other then in London, Surrey and Middlesex 
was so low, and county borough appropriation so patchy. 
The local authorities after 1929 had to improve from a 
considerable state of backwardness, which was no fault of 
their own. In addition, in trying to do so, they were 
hampered by the economy philosophy in government in the 
early 1930s, which bode against the kind of expenditure 
85 Wilson, MunicijDal Health Services, p. 150. 
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necessary for rebuilding, staffing and equipment. Many 
local authorities also became confused as to whether the 
recovery of costs from patients would be as easy under 
public health acts, and so out of a policy of safety 
first continued to prefer to register patients under poor 
law acts. Inadvertently, the provisions in the 1929 Act 
allowing continued service by former guardians as co- 
opted members also held back development. On many public 
assistance co=ittees they exercised a decisive influence 
in keeping the most interesting element of their work 
under their control rather than allowing it to go to 
public health committees. Abel-Smith also suggests that 
the limited implementation of genuine co-ordination of 
hospital planning between local authorities and voluntary 
hospitals as often as not ran aground on the apathy of 
voluntary hospitals. By 1934 only in 83 out of 146 local 
authority areas had the voluntary hospitals set up 
86 
committees for consultation. 
There were, therefore, many mitigating factors in the 
1930s which can explain why the grand hopes for local 
health care development and co-ordination could not be 
attained in the short-term. Further, Abel-Smit 
concludes that the health care reform of 1929 was above 
all an experiment in local independence. Whatever 
defects in the 1929 approach to reform were detected they 
could be used to make improvements 
in the future. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence to show that the Ministry 
of Health kept faith with the county and county 
borough 
86 Abel-Smith, The Hos-nitals, p. 368-383. 
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councils as the major local health authorities, and 
worked to expand their range of provision after 1929. 
Under the only two major pieces of health legislation in 
the 1930s, the Midwives Act of 1936, and the Cancer Act 
of 1939, they were again made the responsible 
authorities. With sophistication of the block grant 
formula and its greater role in the distribution of the 
block grant in the third and fourth grant periods the 
Ministry could expect the further problems of service 
variations due to resource deficiencies to disappear. In 
this context it would be reasonable to suggest that the 
poor view taken of the grant reduction control as a means 
to coerce backward or extravagant authorities by external 
observers was not shared by Ministry officials. 
A more optimistic interpretation of local health 
provision and implementation of the 1929 Local Government 
Act, taking account of the many mitigating factors, 
during the 1930s is given further credence by the fact 
that in planning for a national health service during the 
Second World War Ministry of Health officials continued 
to think in terms of one based upon local government. 
Even Webster, who is more critical than most in his 
criticisms of local authority health services in the 
1930s, recognises the continuation of basic ministry 
sympathy to local authorities in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, and that, but for the antagonism of the medical 
professions for local authorities as 
health providers, 
the latter rather than the former would have been the 
principal focus of attention 
in the 1946 National Health 
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Service Act. Even then Local government remained an 
important third part of the National Health Service from 
1946.87 
Research findings on the implementation of both the 
exchequer grant and poor law (health care) reforms, 
therefore, have found some evidence for success and, in 
freely discussing problems, have, nevertheless, found 
grounds for endorsing the reforms as essentially still 
rationally based, well conceived, heroically won and 
successful. The only principle in the 1929 reforms which 
was root and branch opposed in the 1930s was that of 
derating, which, of course, had not until the last minute 
been a part of reform package, and even then was forced 
upon Chamberlain and the Ministry of Health. 88 The 
problems of implementation instead were primarily caused 
by the effects of the recession in the 1930s and 
unforeseeable difficulties in implementing certain points 
of detail. 
moreover, historians record the many ways in which 
central departments and ministers kept faith with the 
structure of local government and the principles of grant 
and service reform, created in 1929, during the 1930s and 
over the next forty years. The local government 
structure essentially remained until 1972 that which was 
87 Webster, The Health Services Since the War, Volume 
One, Problems of Health Care: the National Health Service 
Before 1957, p9 and pp. 16-24. See also J. Pater, The 
Making of the National Health Service, and F. Honigsbaum, 
Health, Hanniness and Security (1989). 
88 See, for example, Newcomer, 'English Local Government 
Under the Local Government Act of 19291, Political 
Science Quarterly, 51,1936, p. 546. 
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created in 1929. Foster et al, Stacey and Jackman 
highlight the 1929 Act as establishing the needs-based 
principle in central grants to local government, which 
has been expanded to other local services with ever- 
increasing sophistication ever since. 89 Local government 
has also remained an important focus for the direct 
public provision of social policy, this role only coming 
under threat in the 1980s. The 1929 reforms have, 
therefore, been firmly established as an important stage 
in the long-term liberal conception of the improvement of 
the institutions of government to meet the problems of 
modernity. Making comparison, perhaps, with the approach 
to local government reform in the 1980s, Dilks 
characterises the overall approach to reform in 1929 as 
one which with profit could have been replicated ever 
since. 90 
........................ 
This discussion of historians, conclusions on the 1929 
reforms, has been based upon a selective but, 
nevertheless faithful, analysis of the works cited. The 
concepts used to characterise their findings-rationality, 
neutrality, uncontroversial policy development, liberal 
reformism, pluralism- are not to be found explicitly 
stated but, nevertheless, commonly are used implicitly in 
the linear description of the formulation and 
89 C. D. Foster, R. Jackman and M. Perlman, Local Government 
Finance in a Unitary State (1980), p. 184; Stacey, thesis, 
pp. 318-320; R. Jackman, 'Local Government Finance' in 
Loughlin, Gelfand, and Young ed, Half a Century of 
Munici-nal Decline, pp. 161-166. 
90 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Volume One: PioneerinQ and 
Reform 1869-1929, p. 577. 
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implementation of the reforms. The present thesis aims 
to critically discuss this conceptualisation of a 
received orthodoxy and the empirical findings upon which 
it is based. In so doing it largely avoids detailed 
reconsideration of the inter- departmental relations and 
high politics of reform. The obstacles placed in the way 
of the Ministry of Health's reforms by the Treasury and 
the machinations of Cabinet politics throughout the 1920s 
are not in dispute. Instead it focuses on providing a 
discussion of the policy formulation and implementation 
of the reforms themselves in what may be termed the 
policy arena of local government reform. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ORIGINS OF REFORM 
This chapter seeks, first, to reconsider the assumption 
of the rationality of the 1929 reforms by looking at 
other contemporary and historical writings. Secondly, 
through a brief review of theories of the state and local 
government reform, it will reconsider the hypothesis that 
government behaves neutrally in the development of 
reform. From these bases a theoretical perspective on 
the context of the formulation and implementation of the 
reforms will be advanced. Finally, the chapter will 
reconsider the historiographical and empirical evidence 
on the origins of reform in the years immediately after 
the War in the light of such a perspective. This last 
section will also add to and revise existing empirical 
understanding of the origins of the poor law (health 
care) and exchequer grant reforms in the ministry of 
Health. 
1. POLICY CHOICE AND THE RATIONALITY OF REFORM 
Against the sympathetic approach to the 1929 reforms 
summarised in the previous chapter there exists an 
alternative literature which is more hostile. This draws 
its original inspiration from critiques offered by the 
Webbs, but in fact goes much wider than their 
concentration on the poor law reform. This literature 
reveals the inappropriateness or 
inadequacy of the 1929 
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reforms to solve perceived problems of local government, 
central-local relations and public policy making; how 
such problems were exacerbated and expanded by the impact 
of the First World War, and by the impact of the slump in 
the 1920s; and the extent to which alternative policy 
options for their solution were aired before and after 
the First World War. These criticisms of the 1929 
reforms, together with the alternative policy options and 
their justification, need to be discussed in order to 
establish that the apparent policy consensus after the 
War for poor law (health care) and block grant reform was 
merely one element in a wider intellectual debate on the 
route which reform should take. 
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 
Proponents of the block grant reform in 1929 stressed its 
aim to free local authorities from detailed central 
control over individual items of grant-aided expenditure. 
Many contemporary observers cast doubt over this being 
the most appropriate means of defending local democracy 
against central control. The problem of centralisation 
had, according to Robson, expanded since the mid-19th 
century and took many forms. 
' Moreover, central 
government's willingness to use its armoury of controls 
increased during the 1920s and 1930s. Robson highlighted 
1 W. A. Robson, 'The Central Domination of Local 
Government', Political Quarterly, vol iv, no 1, Jan-March 
1933, pp. 85-104. 
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the surcharging of the Poplar borough councillors by the 
district auditor in 1925 as a prime example of central 
government overturning local democratic choice. 2 The 
more worrying long-term trend was the extent to which 
local authorities had come to rely on central funding, a 
reliance which gave central government its main basis for 
control. In the early 19th century local government had 
derived its funding almost wholly from local sources of 
revenue. Dependency on central grants grew from the mid- 
19th century with the growth in responsibilities, a trend 
which was accelerated during the period of the First 
World War and immediately after. By 1920 30% of local 
revenue expenditure (compared with the pre-war figure) 
was derived from exchequer support. 3 
The block grant promised to reduce detailed control 
over items of grant-aided expenditure, but its partial 
nature meant that 2/3 of exchequer support was still 
based on specific grants with detailed control. 
Moreover, the Local Government Act, in including the 
derating of agriculture and 3/4 derating of industry and 
the railways, reduced the local basis for raising income, 
and in giving compensation through the block grant 
increased local reliance on central funds. By 1939 40% 
of local expenditure was exchequer funded. Whilst the 
utility of the section 104 control over block grant 
2 W. A. Robson, The District Auditor, "An Old Menace In A 
New Guise" (Fabian Tract, 214,1925) . See also Milton 
E. Loomis, 'Some Random Comments on British Local 
Government', Public Administration, 1939, pp. 365-372. 
3 See A. T. Peacock and J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public 
ExiDenditure in the United Kingdo (1961), p. 200. 
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spending for central government may be debated, it was 
certainly perceived by some contemporaries as being 
potentially even more coercive than percentage grant 
controls. In the long-term he who paid the piper would 
inevitably call the tune. Crowther concludes that the 
1929 Act "was one of the most important pieces of 
legislation in the twentieth century, beginning a long 
process of centralisation". 4 Hence, contemporary 
observers and historians have often seen the 1929 block 
grant as centralist rather than a measure to enhance 
local democracy. To genuinely reverse the trend towards 
the erosion of local democracy a rather different measure 
was needed. 
Contemporaries within government spending departments 
also cast doubt on the appropriateness of a block grant 
reform to control the level of exchequer support to local 
authorities. If it was simply a measure to be able to 
confidently budget grant aid expenditure at the beginning 
of a year that central government was after then a simple 
technical revision of specific percentage grants could 
have been developed. However, to spending departments 
other than the Ministry of Health it appeared that the 
Treasury campaign for a block grant to be set for periods 
of years in this respect represented a more general 
desire to limit the growth of central-aid in respect of 
the expansion of local services, thereby throwing 
responsibility back on to local authorities to make 
4 M. A. Crowther, British Social Policv, 1914-1939 




efficiency savings to continue expansion. This, it was 
believed would have an adverse effect on local services. 
For local authorities were making expenditure only on 
that which they were required to by legislation, and the 
central departments responsible for grant relations found 
little evidence during the 1920s for censuring individual 
local authorities for extravagance. Indeed, it was hard 
for central officials to imagine any greater incentive 
than the financial crisis produced in many local 
authorities by the slump for improving efficiency. In 
this context the block grant, rather than a tool to 
merely shift some of the responsibility for service 
expansion back on to the localities, appeared to erode 
the very fiscal basis necessary for successful local 
delivery of legislated services. If exchequer support 
were to be limited without having this effect then an 
alternative policy reform was needed. 
The most commonly advocated solution to both the 
problems of the erosion of local democracy by the growth 
of grants and the central control of grant aid was the 
development of new sources of local income. They would 
both thoroughly revive the fiscal basis for local 
democracy and reverse the seemingly uncontrollable growth 
in exchequer support as local spending annually grew. 
Many suggestions for a local income tax or the rating of 
site values had been made before the First World War, and 
the argument grew stronger in the 1920s as the financial 
position of many local authorities grew worse. Again 
in 
the 1930s the AMC pressed the Ministry of Health for a 
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royal commission on land taxation, and in 1939 London 
County Council unsuccessfully tried to promote a bill for 
the rating of site values. 5 
The block grant was also found wanting with regard to 
the aim of equalising local authority resources. Bowen, 
writing in 1939, commented on its weak equalising 
tendency during the first two block grant periods and 
declared that "the popular view is entirely unfounded 
that the Local Government Act of 1929 will, when it is 
brought fully into operation, result in a distribution of 
grants conditioned largely upon factors relating to need 
and ability. The Act has made a beginning, but only a 
very small one.,, 6 Sykes, writing in the same year, came 
to the same conclusions, commenting upon the inability of 
the block grant formula to reflect need consistently. 7 
Their criticisms came in the context of lengthy 
advocacy of alternative solutions to the problem of 
resource equalisation which precluded the move towards a 
block grant. First, the vast majority of evidence to the 
Meston Committee had revealed the view that many still 
felt that percentage grants were necessary to stimulate 
local service development. Standards had not reached 
such a stage that initial stimulation should be abandoned 
5 G. Rhodes, Evidence in Appendix Six of the ReiDort of 
the (Layf ield) Committee of Incruirv in to Local 
Government Finance (cmd. 6453), PP (1976), p. 106. See 
also editions of the MuniciiDal Review and County Councils 
Gazette 1920-1921 for regular claims that the growth of 
local services was exhausting local resources and new 
sources of local income were required. 
6 H. R. Bowen, English Grants-In-Aid, A Studv in the 
Finance of Local Government (1939), p. 106. 
7 J. Sykes, A Study in English Local Authority Finance 
(1939), p. 126. 
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altogether for equalisation and it was feared, in spite 
of arguments against, that grant needed to remain 
specific for infant services, such as maternity and child 
welfare, or grant would be mainly spent on already 
developed services. Committee evidence and some of the 
committee's members, therefore, proposed only the 
revision of percentage grants so as to make them related 
to need as well as local spending. The most commonly 
aired means of doing this was to create a standard unit 
of cost of services aided against which the cost for each 
local authority could be compared. Grant distribution 
could be made at least partly on this basis. 8 Those who, 
nevertheless, advocated the complete shift to a block 
grant insisted that it would only have the desired 
equalising effect if it was distributed on the basis of a 
formula based upon uniform rateable value, which would 
provide a consistent index to need. 9 
As well as these revisionist grant reform alternatives 
to the block grant reform which was enacted, there were 
more far-reaching ideas which involved an attack on the 
inequalities between local authority resources at root. 
These involved the reform of local rating areas. For 
instance, as early as 1912, Lloyd George outlined to Sir 
John Kempe the option of enlarging rating areas so as to 
include both poor and wealthy rating areas. This would 
8 M. Schulz, 'The Development of the Grant System' in 
C. H. Wilson ed, Essays on Local Government (1948), pp. 128- 
131. 
9 See, for instance, Sykes, A Study in English Local 
AuthoritV Finance (1939), pp. 233-291 and D. N. Chester, 
Central and Local Government: Financial and 
Administrative Relations (1951), pp. 256-280. 
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inevitably mean the enlargement and reduction in the 
number of local authorities. Alternatively, local 
authority areas could be unified for certain services, 
whilst retaining autonomy over others. A final idea was 
that rating areas could maintain total autonomy, but that 
wealthy authorities be compelled to contribute from their 
rate income to the resources of poorer authorities. 10 if 
any of these options had been combined with the 
development of new sources of local income to further 
erode reliance on central funds then an inter-war local 
government reform could have involved quite a radical 
restructuring of local government and central-local 
relations, which could have, as some noted at the time 
and in the 1930s and 1940s, solved the problems of local 
democracy, fiscal autonomy and area inequalities rather 
more permanently than the 1929 reforms. 
(ii) LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND SERVICES 
Debate about the root problem of inequalities between 
local authority resources and its solution by means of 
reform of rating areas was part of a larger debate about 
local authority areas. Arguments for the concentration of 
the structure of local government in the counties and 
county boroughs rested upon them being the largest local 
authority areas, in which the co-ordination of services 
and the economies of scale in service provision could be 
10 ibid, pp. 125-126. See also Bowen, English Grants- 
In-Aid, A Study of the Finance of Local Government 
(1939), pp. 132-141. 
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most properly attained. However, others perceived that 
the rate of social and economic change, involving the 
development of transportation and the movement of 
population, rendered even these areas as obsolete in the 
attainment of these aims. County boroughs may have 
attained their status by virtue of having populations of 
over 50,000, but by the 1920s variations in population 
growth had sent some over 1,000,000 and left others 
stagnating. Consequently, county boroughs varied 
enormously in terms of population and rateable value and 
their potential to realise a similar standard of service 
co-ordination and economies of scale was highly 
questionable. A similar situation existed with regard to 
the counties. " A system of central income 
redistribution appeared comparable to placing a plaster 
over a gaping wound. 
Such area problems were compounded by rigidities in 
the reform of areas. By the 1920s many county boroughs 
had expanded their populations in to county areas. 
Whilst many had already achieved an expansion of their 
boundaries many more were queuing up. At the same time 
there were many urban second tier county authorities 
which had reached the 50,000 population threshold and 
sought county borough status. Both developments 
threatened county councils with loss of land, population 
and rateable value, which they duly resisted. The 
dispute between town and county was deliberated by the 
11 V. D. Lipman, 'Development and Boundary Changes (1888- 




Royal Commission on Local Government, and their 
conclusions resulted in an act of 1926 which essentially 
called a halt to new county borough creations. 12 The 
defence of the county was, therefore, made at the expense 
of the perpetuation of a system of local government 
areas, which did not logically relate to population or 
capacity for functional responsibility. 
This had unfortunate results for the co-ordination of 
services. For example, as Abel Smith shows, in both 
Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire, separate sanatoria 
for infectious diseases were erected by county borough 
and county council only five miles from one another. 
This was caused by there being population concentrations 
on either side of the county borough boundary but no one 
authority to provide one sanatorium for the whole 
catchment area. 13 The encouragement of more joint action 
between local authorities was an option for central 
government to overcome such problems, but local 
authorities commonly avoided joint boards and committees 
because of the competition that existed between them and 
the fear that joint action was tantamount to suggesting 
that they were not in themselves viable local authority 
areas. 
Such problems in the existing structure of local 
government led many contemporary analysts to suggest the 
creation of a completely new structure based on larger 
areas, which embraced poor and wealthy areas, were 
12 ibid, pp. 42-45. 
13 B. Abel-Smith, The HosDitals, 1800-1948 (1964)f 
pp. 371-372. 
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comparable in terms of population and rateable value, 
and, consequently, could achieve the kind of functional 
efficiency that local government reformers in the 1920s 
were seeking. This alternative policy option for solving 
the structural problems of local government was expressed 
in terms of the call for regionalism and came most 
strongly in the period immediately after the First World 
War from such academics as G. D. H. Cole and C. B. Fawcett. 
Further, the argument for regionalism as a general reform 
of the local government structure was increasingly 
applied to individual service needs, including hospital 
provision. 14 
The wider debate about relating local authority areas 
to functional efficiency coincided with other debates 
concerning the problems of and solutions to individual 
social policies. The first concerned the actual content 
of policy. Despite its apparent inspiration from the 
1909 minority report, the 1929 poor law reform was 
denounced by the Webbs for not going far enough to meet 
the aims of that report. In public assistance, the 
administrative Problems of registration, charge and 
recovery were not confronted: the divisiveness of pauper 
status was retained; and local authorities were given 
comparatively little guidance on how to conduct public 
assistance. More importantly, a contradiction was left 
in the continuation of deterrent public assistance side- 
by-side with progressive public health services, and the 
14 See B. C. Smith, Re gionalism in England 2: its nature 
and ur-g ose, 1905-1965 (Acton Society Trust, 1965). 
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provision of enabling powers only for local authorities 
with regard to the reorganisation of transferred poor 
law services. In short, the reform failed to break up 
the poor law, and in so failing, discouraged the desired 
unificat on of local health services. To the Webbs a 
thorough separation of local health services from public 
assistance was essential and the only way of achieving 
the aims of the 1929 reforms with regard to local health 
care. More recently, Gilbert has agreed with this 
ana ysis, suggesting that apart from the partial stimulus 
given to the growth of municipal hospitals the reform of 
the poor law "did not nearly accomplish the unification 
of institutional health facilities that had been the 
ideal of all Ministry of Health advocates. 1115 
The second debate, of course, related to 
responsibility for social policies. Whilst there was a 
wide consensus at the end of the First World War over the 
maintenance of the poor at some level of local 
government, the experience of the 1920s revived the 
argument of the pre-war advocates of national 
responsibility for the unemployed. 
16 The assumption 
underpinning the transfer of the poor law to larger local 
authorities was that the poor were a local 
responsibility. However, the growth and persistence of 
unemployment during the 1920s, which threw huge numbers 
15 S. and B. Webb, English Poor Law Historv, Part II, 
Volume 11 (1929), pp. 990-1023 and B. B. Gilbert, British 
Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970), p. 235. 
16 See J. Harris, UnemTDlovment and POlitics, A Studv in 
English Social Policv, 1886-1914 (1972), chapters 4 and 
5. 
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on to the poor law, was perceived as being caused by 
national factors. National government should, therefore, 
pick up the responsibility for what was a national 
problem. Even as the 1929 Local Government Act passed on 
to the statute books there were many, including the 
Webbs, who called for the integration of out-relief in to 
national schemes of unemployment assistance. 17 This 
would have ensured a more integrated approach to the 
relief of the unemployed than that which pertained in the 
early 1930s when there was still a multiplicity of 
national and local relief agencies dealing essentially 
with the same problem. Such arguments were validated by 
the 1934 Unemployment Act. The nationalisation of 
unemployment relief would also have automatically 
separated public assistance from health care and allowed 
the better unification of local health care. 
There were also contemporary experts who perceived the 
problems of health care organisation in a wider sense and 
advocated quite radically different solutions to that 
pursued by the Ministry of Health and Neville 
Chamberlain, or indeed the Webbs. Notable amongst these 
was Lord Dawson, who was appointed as the first Chairman 
of the Ministry of Health Consultative Council on Medical 
and Allied Services. The Council's interim report, 
published in 1920, reflected much of what Dawson had 
argued during the War, when involved in the organisation 
17 See, for example, The Economist, 26.1.1929, pp. 147- 
148. See also N. and J. MacKenzie (ed), The Diary of 




of war-time medical care. 18 Where the Maclean Report only 
considered local public health services, Dawson thought 
in terms of the problems of co-ordination between them 
and other health care agencies, notably general 
practitioners under the national health insurance scheme 
and voluntary hospitals. If a state medical service was 
developed only on the basis of local authority services 
then serious overlaps, wastage and deficiencies could 
develop between the different health care agencies. 
The positions of general practitioners and voluntary 
hospitals could also by themselves become problematical. 
In 1920 many voluntary hospitals were already 
experiencing considerable financial problems, and the 
general practitioner faced similar hardships if his/her 
clientele were limited to insurance patients in a period 
when income form private patients dropped. Dawson 
considered that it would be potentially disastrous for 
the quality of health care if it was developed on the 
basis of less well qualified local authority medical 
officers than the highly qualified general practitioners 
and hospital consultants. 
The ]Dawson Report offered as a solution to these 
larger problems the concept of a universal system of 
health centres, in which fully co-ordinated provision 
could be made for all. The health centres would be the 
primary means of health care, staffed by general 
18 The Consultative Council on Medical and Allied 
Services, Interim Renort on the Future Provision of 
Medical and Allied Services _(Dawson 
Report) (cmd. 693), PP 
(1920). 
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practitioners, from which patients could then be referred 
to hospital or other forms of care. Implicitly, Dawson 
was advocating a national health service, with all forms 
of health care being brought within one co-ordinated 
system. Dawson was not a lone voice. The Labour Party 
Public Health Advisory Committee was thinking along the 
same lines, and the county medical officer of health for 
Gloucestershire prepared a plan after the First World War 
for how such principles could be applied at a local 
level. Such ideas pre-dated the practical application of 
universal co-ordination in the National Health Service 
Act of 1946 by over twenty years. It may also be pointed 
out that side-by-side with the Dawson Report there were 
also more limited advocacies for an extension of the 1911 
national health scheme, although this was not explicitly 
assumed by the Dawson Report. 19 
There were, therefore, broader options for the reform 
of local government and for the reform of the social 
policies, with which the Ministry Of Health and Neville 
Chamberlain were concerned, in existence in the period 
immediately after the First World War. Whilst the 1929 
Act has invariably been portrayed as a comprehensive 
reform of the structure, organisation, functions and 
finance of local government, the substance of these 
19 See C. Webster, The Health Services Since the War, 
Volume One, Problems of Health Care: the National Health 
Service Before 1957 - 
(1988), chapter two. See also 
F. Honigsbaum, 'Unity in British Public Health 
Administration: the failure of reform, 1926-19291, Medical 
Histor 12,1968, pp. 109-121. Honigsbaum discusses how 
and why attempts to unify local authority and general 
practitioner services failed during the 1920s. 
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alternative proposals and the arguments for them 
suggested the limited nature of the poor law and 
exchequer grant reforms pursued during the 1920s for the 
solution of perceived problems of local government, 
central-local relations and public policy. One may doubt 
the weight to be attached to these alternative policy 
options. Advocates of new sources of local revenue, for 
instance, advanced few practical plans, and generally 
spoke without concern for the complex administrative 
reforms which would also be necessary. Proponents of 
regionalism, as Owen has shown, did not share a coherent 
voice. There were considerable differences over what 
constituted a region and even over whether regional 
government should completely replace existing local 
20 
government, or simply be added as a new tier. 
Similarly, the Dawson Report willfully omitted to 
prescribe a clear role for the local authorities or the 
voluntary hospitals in its advocacy of co-ordinated 
provision, and made no mention of how a reformed system 
would be funded. Further, for all of these policy 
options, immediate opponents from the vested interests 
affected could easily be imagined. 
Yet, it is clear that for government policy on reform 
to have been rationally conceived such alternative policy 
options should have been more systematically considered 
within government. Lindblom specifically suggests in his 
20 See J. R. Owen, 'Defending the County? The 
Reorganisation of Local Government in England and Wales, 
1935-1950' (unpublished PhD. thesis, Bristol University, 
1990). 
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conceptualisation of the rational-comprehensive (root) 
method of policy development that in order to conduct 
rational Policy making government must clarify objectives 
and make comprehensive analysis of all of the policy 
options available for their achievement. 21 This the 
Ministry of Health did not do after the First World War. 
If officials considered alternative options at all they 
were quickly dropped. The question that should then be 
posited is why not. Why and how was a course set fair 
for the 1929 reforms at the end of the First World War 
which precluded debate of alternative policy options, 
some, in the case of the Dawson Report, developed within 
government itself? 
2. TOWARDS A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The views on local government reform in the inter-war 
period discussed above have considerable value in 
revealing that choices, whether, explicitly or 
implicitly, were made in the formulation of reform. 
Dearlove, however, roundly condemns the analysts of 
missed opportunity for still being based in orthodox 
assumptions of the democratic and technocratic nature of 
the modern state and of the consequent imperatives in 
central government in the reform of local government. 
22 
21 See C. E. Lindblom, 'The Science of Muddling Through,, 
Public Administration Review, vol 19, no 2 (1959) 
reprinted in D. S. Pugh ed, Organisation Theorv, Selected 
Readings (1971), pp. 238-255. 
22 See, for example, L. J. Sharpe, 'Theories and values of 
local government', Political Studies (1970), vol 18, no 
2, pp. 153-174. 
84 
In arguing for alternatives to local government reform 
such analysts, according to Dearlove, merely propounded 
different methods for good government in a democratic 
society, and, thus, assumed that central government was 
only guilty of making the wrong choices in reform. The 
persistence of the advocacies for a local income tax, or 
regionalism, or greater local democracy in the late 
twentieth century is evidence of the continued faith 
placed by analysts in the democratic process to improve 
government. Dearlove suggests at a general level that the 
high level of involvement of such analysts in the reform 
debate denies them the necessary detachment to analyse 
the underlying and detailed reasons why, in fact, the 
choices that were made in local government reform in the 
inter-war period, as for any other period, were made as 
they were. 23 
Such detachment, according to Dearlove, involves a 
quest for an alternative rationality in the making of 
local government reform to that of solving the problems 
of local government, central-local relations and public 
policy in a democratic society; a rationality based 
instead in the sectional interests that government policy 
represents, and the way in which local government reform 
may serve those interests. To be fair to the historians 
Dearlove's sweeping condemnation omits recognition of the 
interpretive content of their work which has supplied 
certain answers to how and why the 1929 reforms were 




originated and achieved, and it is to their perception of 
the rationality lying behind the reforms that one must 
first turn. 
The Webbs suggested that the attack on the poor law 
was part of a general attack on the Labour Party by the 
Conservative administration under Stanley Baldwin. This 
was rooted in fears of the spread of the Russian 
Revolution in the early 1920s, the prospects raised by 
the general strike in 1926 and the way in which various 
boards of guardians had illegally helped strikers. Local 
government was reformed, therefore, to reduce Labour 
strength in local government and remove responsibility 
for the poor law to more politically reliable, local 
authorities. 24 
Gilbert finds such an interpretation too crude, and 
instead characterises Neville Chamberlain 
rationaliser, bureaucratic in temperament 
as a 
and more 
concerned with how things should be done than what should 
be done. Hence, Chamberlain reformed the poor law out of 
a desire to see administrative order where chaos was 
prevalent. He was concerned with the organisation of 
services rather than their content. Explicitly this 
suggests a non-political approach to reform. Implicitly, 
however, the values that defined Chamberlain's 
bureaucratic temperament were political in that they 
found alternative approaches to poor law administration 
24 S. and B. Webb, English Poor Law Histor-v, Part II, 
Volume 11 (1929), pp910-912. See also B. B. Gilbert, 
British, Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970), p. 219. 
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taken by the Labour party to be a source of chaos. 25 
Crowther took this line of argument further by suggesting 
that Chamberlain's pursuit of poor law reform in the late 
1920s was implicitly the politically motivated 
preservation of a system of social policy which serves 
26 the interests of one class over another. Branson, a 
supporter of poplarism, identified the favoured class as 
composed of employers and ratepayers. 27 The 
concentration on values that constrain political 
decisions is more subtle than the focus of the Webbs but 
is essentially sympathetic to their line of 
interpretation. Coherent if varied critical 
interpretations of the rationality employed in the 
origins of the 1929 reforms, therefore, exist. 
There are, however, a number of problems in this 
literature. First, there are errors or important 
omissions of fact in the analyses of Gilbert and Branson. 
Gilbert judges that the Labour government of 1924 
"scarcely considered" a reform of the poor law. One may 
judge that their consideration was not important but not 
that it did not happen. More importantly, in his 
description of the composition of the block grant Gilbert 
refers only to compensation for derating and the 
additional amount. The important issue of compensation 
25 Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970), 
pp. 219-235. 
26 M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System 1834-1929 (1981), 
pp. 102-103. 
27 N. Branson, PolDlarism 1919-1925, George Lansbury and 
the Councillors Revolt (1979), p. 223. see also P. A. Ryan, 
, poplarism' in P. Thane (ed), The Origins of British 
Social policv (1978), pp. 56-83. 
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for discontinued grants is omitted. 28 Branson finds 
Chamberlain to be the principal author of not only poor 
law and exchequer grant reform but also derating. A 
reading of any other analysis would show that Winston 
29 Churchill instead had claim to this dubious privilege. 
Secondly, the scope of interpretation is limited. All 
the analyses cited refer primarily to the origins of the 
poor law reform and devote little attention to exchequer 
grant reform. Further, the origins of poor law reform 
are discussed primarily in terms of the crisis in 
unemployment relief during the 1920s, rather than in 
terms of debates about local government structure or 
health care. Other writers, such as Bowen, Sykes and 
Chester, who are otherwise critical of the exchequer 
grant reform, make no effort to consider why such a 
reform was passed. 
Thirdly, in its focus on Neville Chamberlain as the 
principal 'actor' the literature lacks scope in its 
discussion of the origins of the reforms. In particular, 
there is no comprehensive critical re-examiniation of the 
role of the Ministry of Health or of interests involved 
in reform, notably the various local authority 
associations. one should be mindful that the Webbs were 
writing so close to events that the expectation of such 
examiniation is unreasonable, and that the principal 
focus of Crowther's work was different from that of this 
28 Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (1970), 
p. 211 and 230. 
29 Branson, Po-olarism 1919-1925, Georcre Lansbury and the 
Councillors Revolt, (1979), p. 223. 
88 
thesis. However, the limited range of interpretation and 
the lack of comprehensive consideration of the different 
origins of the reforms do serve to reflect how Gilbert's 
analysis remains an inadequate critical response to the 
favourable orthodoxy on the origins of the 1929 Act. 
Consequently, it may be judged that whilst the 
critical orthodoxy on the origins of the 1929 reforms 
provides some stimulus to the debate, it is currently 
flawed as an attempt to provide a cogent explanation of 
the rationality which lay behind the reforms. Either 
problems of fact abound, the focus of interpretation is 
too narrow or issues remain under-researched. These 
flaws need to be corrected. It is important, however, to 
clarify a plausoble theoretical basis to a critical 
empirical re-examination of the origins of the 1929 
reforms. Here also one needs to go beyond the work of 
the Webbs et al, and consider what responses have been 
made by other analysts to Dearlove's call for a quest for 
an alternative rationality in the making of local 
government reform. 
A number of quests have been made based on marxist 
assumptions, which address the rationale for area, 
service, and financial reform. First, Dearlove, himself, 
suggests that the state is dominated by the ascendant 
capitalist class, and that far from being institutions of 
democracy, local authorities are foci of power within the 
state for the control of the capitalist class at a 
local 
level. His broad thesis is that local government reform 
has been directed towards the concentration of local 
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government in areas, in which the control of the 
capitalist class can be best sustained. 30 
O'Connor addresses the question of local government 
reform in terms of service provision. He argues that the 
organisation of the state is determined by the need 
within the state to segregate itself according to the two 
different types of state expenditure made. The first is 
social capital, which is expenditure intended to help in 
the private accumulation of profit. Social capital is 
further sub-divided in to social investment, which 
improves labour productivity, and social consumption, 
which reduces the cost of reproducing labour. The second 
type of expenditure is social expenses, which is 
expenditure made primarily to maintain social 
order/harmony. O'Connor suggests that the state is 
segregated so that services with a primary function of 
social capital are within the orbit of the central state 
and those with a primary function of social expenses are 
the responsibility of the local state, and that local 
government is reformed so as to ensure this balance. 
This is the essence of what has been termed the dual 
state thesis. O'Connor recognises, however, that local 
services with a primary function of social expenses may 
also have functions as social capital. For instance, it 
could be argued that expenditure on education increases 
labour productivity and that on education, housing and 
recreation reduce the costs of reproducing labour. 
30 Dearlove, The Reorcranisation of Local Government, 
part one. 
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However, their primary function in the interests of 
capitalism is to maintain social order/harmony. 31 
The question of financial reform has been addressed by 
Martlew. He is less concerned with why and how functions 
are segregated in the state. Instead he argues that 
attempts to discern different types of state expenditure 
are futile in the face of evidence that all expenditures 
can be perceived as being simultaneously social capital 
and social expenses. Instead he assumes a position in 
which local government takes responsibility for key 
expenditures, and argues instead that financial reform is 
determined by a conflict between the desire to promote 
state spending "in general" and the need to control state 
spending "in general". The former may contribute to the 
interests of capitalism in terms of reproducing labour or 
providing social compensation that assists in the 
maintenance of social order. The latter may also 
contribute to the interests of capitalism by minimising 
fiscal burdens on the productive sectors of the economy, 
thereby maximising the savings available for capitalist 
investment. 
Martlew observes that the conflict within the state is 
played out between the Treasury on the one hand, with 
certain support in local government and elsewhere, and 
the spending departments on the other, again with certain 
support from elsewhere in the state. The former aspires 
to control public spending "in general" whilst the latter 
are a major determinant of the rise 
in public spending 
31 J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973). 
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"in general". This conflict over spending policy is seen 
as a continuous and never-ending process, and one which 
reaches crisis when during a depression in the economy 
both demands of capitalism are at their most intense: 
capitalists are in need of low public expenditure in 
order to provide the potential for new investment; and 
for the sake of social order higher public expenditure is 
required. Martlew's general thesis is that it is the 
outcomes of such public expenditure controversies which 
determine the reform of local government finance. 
The added value of Martlew's work is that it is 
applied to the historically specific circumstances of 
exchequer grant reform in the inter-war period. In his 
interpretation, the Treasury in the 1920s exhibited none 
of the liberal concerns for local government or for the 
creation of a finance system which allowed the poorest 
authorities to meet social need where it was at its very 
highest. Instead the sole interest was the reduction of 
government expenditure so as to minimise the burden of 
taxation on the process of capitalist accumulation. 11 A 
block grant would limit the exchequer's liability and 
place the burden of financing higher spending on the 
relatively less buoyant rates. " However, this presented 
the knock-on problem of making it necessary for local 
authorities to raise their rate demands, which would 
again increase the economic costs faced by producers. 
Hence, agricultural and industrial derating were 
introduced by the Treasury so that the process of 
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capitalist accumulation could not be hampered from any 
part of the state. 
Against this stood the forces in the central and local 
state which favoured expenditure increases. There was 
continued support for percentage grants. However, there 
was also the move towards equalisation of local authority 
resources. This came chiefly from the Ministry of Health 
but also had other supporters which Martlew does not 
elaborate upon. It was in the first place linked to the 
capitalist-inspired aim of maintaining social order in a 
society of increasing expectations. Martlew points out 
"as services became well established minimum standards 
increased and attention increasingly turned to more 
uniform provision. " Martlew claims that the need to bring 
about equalisation was also linked to three other key 
reasons. First, continuing uneven service provision 
might lead to economic distortions in the market 
mechanism. Secondly, the equal provision of services was 
increasingly coming to be seen as a right necessary for 
the legitimacy of the system. Finally, and most 
importantly, local government in some parts of the 
country would simply have broken down; unable to meet 
local economic and social needs and unable to finance the 
ever increasing service obligations imposed by the 
centre. Hence, the thinking in favour of equalisation of 
funding through the employment of a needs based formula 
for the block grant was economic and political as well as 
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social. This aspect of the block grant reform therefore 
satisfied the needs of capitalism in several ways. 32 
Despite the attractiveness of this and Dearlove's and 
O'Connor's conceptualisations of reform, they do, 
however, have considerable problems in explaining why the 
Ministry of Health formulated reform on the basis that it 
did after the War. Dearlove's thesis suggests a valid 
explanation of central government's preference for the 
concentration of local government in the counties and 
county boroughs, which were areas of identified community 
of economic interest, and which were often also areas 
large enough for a concentration of working class 
population to be counteracted by the presence and 
domination of middle class populations. This was in 
contrast to boards of guardians areas, for instance, 
which, as the phenomenon of poplarism had shown in the 
1920s, could be captured by the working class; the poor 
law then being administered in the poor's own interests. 
However, it does not explain why, as a result of socio- 
economic change and the concentration of unemployment in 
certain county boroughs and county areas by the inter-war 
period, government did not perceive a need to reorganise 
local government in to even larger areas, such as 
regions, to preserve capitalist control. 
Similarly, O'Connor's work provides a new means of 
understanding why central government in the 1920s should 
consider the reform of the poor law and health care, both 
Government Finance 32 C. Martlew, 'The State and Local I 
Public Administration, 61 (1983), pp. 127-147. zlýl 
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arguably social expenses, only in terms of provision by 
local government. However, the problem with O'Connor's 
work is that it is formulated with reference to the 
U. S. A. and is barely applicable to the British local 
government experience. it cannot explain why 
unemployment relief and health care were nationalised so 
soon after the 1929 Act. Similarly, it would be 
difficult to argue that roads and planning, consistently 
major responsibilities of local government, were social 
expenses, whose principal objective was to maintain 
social order amongst the working classes. 
Finally, Martlew's analysis is valuable for providing 
a wider context for characterising the institutional 
interests within the state which determined the need for 
reform, and why reform should be delayed whilst the 
different interests came to agreement which was mutually 
acceptable. The problem with Martlew's analysis, 
however, is that its empirical content is almost entirely 
derived from the work of Rhodes and replicates the linear 
description of the development of Policy. Martlew does 
not, therefore, explain why the block grant was promoted 
when other policy alternatives existed which could have 
achieved the control of public expenditure "in general" 
and promoted the equalisation of public expenditure 
through local government, as well as maintaining the 
legitimacy of local government. 
Despite the problems of these marxist models of local 
government reform their assumptions concerning the class 
interest rationality of government policy making present 
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a fundamental challenge to the rational, neutral 
bureaucracy and pluralist polity assumptions present in 
the received orthodoxy. Marxist assumptions are not 
endorsed by the majority of historical and contemporary 
policy analysts, yet the challenge posed by marxist 
analysis has forced them in to the recognition that an 
explicitly theoretical perspective on the role of 
government in society, and the interests which determine 
its behaviour, needs to be taken in order to provide a 
context for understanding why and how government adopts 
certain policy options rather than others. It has also 
provoked them towards reappraisal of the conceptual 
assumptions which implicitly inform the received 
orthodoxy. 
Intellectual responses have essentially focused on the 
revision of the assumptions which inform the received 
orthodoxy. Recognition is made of the complex and 
extensive role played by government in the lives of 
citizens in the twentieth century and that as a result 
the focus of policy making is narrowed down to fewer 
actors, who may be deemed to form an elite. The 
composition of the elite and the interaction of the 
interests embraced within it determine the rationality of 
policy making. Analysis of the post Second World War 
period generally assumes an elite policy making process 
composed of the interaction of government, composed of 
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Politicians and bureaucrats, and interest groups, who 
represent wider interests in society. 33 
One thesis suggests the development of a corporate 
state, where the representatives of capital and labour 
are singled out and incorporated as extra-governing 
institutions in to the central policy making process. 
Liberal corporatists would suggest the intentions 
involved to be that of government attempting to share 
power with key economic interests in order to produce 
policy which reflected wider interests. Radical 
corporatists would, however, suggest a conspiratorial 
intent on the part of government to incorporate key 
economic interests as a means of gaining consent for 
policy which essentially preserved the interests which 
the governing elite represented. Hence, the 
representatives of employers and labour are given power 
and prestige in return for their compliance in government 
formulated policy. Such representatives then control any 
of their members who may form a challenge to the making 
of government policy. 34 The relevance of this thesis 
has been promoted by Middlemas, who characterises the 
inter-war period as one of the emergence of corporate 
bias. This explains the emergence of industrial peace 
and policy consensus in the period after the 1926 general 
strike. 35 Middlemas does not, however, address the 
33 See, for 
Theories of the 
(1987), chapters 
34 See, for 
Political Econo 
35 K. middlemas, 
a summary/ P. Dunleavy and B. OlLeary, 
State, The Politics of Liberal Democracy 
four and six. 
further discussion, W. Grant (ed), The 
of CorDoratis (1985), chapter one. 
Politics in Industrial Society (1979). 
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question of how this context for policy making should 
determine the rationale for local government reform in 
1929. Saunders offers a potential application which 
derives heavily from O'Connor's model of the functional 
segregation of the state. Essentially, Saunders argues 
that policies which are a subsidy to capital (social 
investment) are kept at at a national level, where they 
can be determined by a corporate policy process, and 
policies which are a subsidy to the working population 
(social consumption) are kept at a local level, where 
they are determined by non-incorporated interests such as 
public service clients and small businesses. The 
segregation of the state in this way avoids a conflict 
between long-term corporate strategies and democratic 
accountability to more plural interests. 36 
In terms of applicability to empirical analysis, 
Saunders, theory shares the same appeal and weaknesses as 
O'Connor's model. Whilst one may seek to refine a 
corporatist approach to the 1929 Act there is any case 
serious doubts as to the relevance of Middlemas' theory 
of corporate bias in the inter-war period. Lowe's study 
of the Ministry of Labour refutes much of Middlemas' 
evidence in relation to key areas of industrial and 
employment policy. 37 Further, as Moore's study has 
shown, there was virtually no business or labour interest 
in the form of local government reform in the 1920s. The 
simple but compelling point is that business and labour 
36 P. Saunders, Urban Politics (1979). 
37 R. Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy, The Role of the 
Ministry of Labour in British Politics, 1916-1939 (1986). 
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interests did not commonly understand the intricacies of 
local government and central-local relations, much less 
what was at stake in the choice between various policy 
options. 38 
A more flexible context to the analysis of policy 
making is provided by Webb's conceptualisation of bounded 
pluralism, which suggests a more inter-active 
relationship between the plurality of interests and elite 
government policy makers, but one which nevertheless, 
leaves more power with the latter than the former. Webb 
suggests that actors and interests outside of government 
may represent general calls for policy reform but that 
actors and interests within government determine the 
exact nature of policy response in accord with their 
elite interests. The development of policy may then be 
made with further access given to interests outside 
government, but only those chosen by government. In this 
model, then, the general rationality for reform is given 
by general perceptions of problems in public policy 
raised by the electorate and interest groups but the 
specific rationality for reform is given by the interests 
of government actors, who ensure that policy options 
chosen do not contradict their elite assumptions. 39 
This model of policy making is applied much more 
successfully by inter-war public policy historians. Lowe 
highlights the importance of the social and economic 
38 S. Moore, 'Conservative Party Opposition to Neville 
Chamberlain's Social reforms, 1925-1929' (unpublished MA. 
thesis, Birmingham University, 1984), pp. 202-209. 
39 P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker and A. Webb, Chancre, Choice 
and Conflict in Social Policy (1975), chapter 8. 
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aspirations released by the First World War, and the way 
in which the 1918 Representation of the People Act gave 
many more of the working classes the vote. Compared with 
a pre-war polity in which those in government remained 
dominant in policy making, the advancement of political 
democracy and social expectations created unprecedented 
power for those outside government to determine the 
general policy agenda of those in government. Demands 
for social reform were made at the end of the War and, 
although political apathy set in during the 1920s, the 
perception of social expectations amongst the masses, 
especially during the slump and recession, bore heavily 
upon government. Elected representatives had to take 
note of general calls for reform and directed the 
bureaucracy to respond. 40 
However, so long as political sophistication remained 
low those in government retained power of discretion over 
addressing general calls for reform. Hence, Gilbert and 
Thane and Lowe are in general agreement that, whilst 
government policy after the First World War was 
influenced significantly more by general demands from the 
plurality of interests for reform, actors in central 
government retained power over the formulation of the 
detail of reform. This power was used to ensure that any 
actual reform carried was not contrary to the assumptions 
of the elite within government. This is the essence of 
40 Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy, chapter one. 
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pluralism being bounded by the power of a governing 
41 elite. 
The nature of the governing elite and its aims in 
government policy are, of course, problematical. 
Crowther, concluding upon the work of many others, 
suggests that, with the exception of Neville Chamberlain, 
politicians in government during the inter- war period 
were "either inactive or, like Christopher Addison, not 
42 in office long enough to implement their wishes". 
Hence, an analysis of an inter-war governing elite, which 
formulated the detail of policy, essentially involves one 
of the bureaucracy, or more accurately, one of the senior 
officials in the departments of state. Lowe 
characterises this elite culture in the inter-war period 
as operating within a capitalist consensus. However, the 
homogeneity of approach to policy grew out of shared 
social and educational values, and a common work 
experience. The values of the elite were, therefore, 
propounded on the basis of a network of personal and 
professional relationships, rather than anything as 
explicit as ascendant class goals. The kind of 
prejudices civil servants came to show, Lowe remarks, 
came from "the shared experience of work, fortified by 
life in the south-east in general and in London clubs in 
43 particular". 
41 B. B. Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 
(1970); P. Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State (1982); 
Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy. See, for a discussion of 
their views, M. A. Crowther, British Social Policy, 1914- 
1939 (1988), pp. 11-14. 
42 Crowther, British Social Policy, 1914-1939, pp. 18-21. 
43 Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy, p. 9. 
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Lowe's approach is complemented by Macnicol in his 
study of the emergence of family allowances. Macnicol 
rejects both the notion that the civil service was 
neutral and representative of the plurality of interests, 
and the idea that they were a tool of capitalist 
interests. Rather, the senior civil service was 
predominantly an upper middle class, public school and 
oxbridge-educated elite, which possessed great power and 
used it in ways biased to its own interests and social 
and cultural values. Such values included those of 
independence and self-help, the competitiveness of the 
economy and social consensus; values which were 
implicitly an endorsement of the capitalist consensus but 
not explicitly or functionally so. 44 
Despite such general conclusions upon a bureaucratic 
elite no historian would fail to disaggregate the aims of 
different departments within government. major 
cleavage was formed between those civil servants in 
spending departments charged with formulating policy to 
respond to general calls for reform, which would commonly 
involve increases in public expenditure, and those in the 
Treasury. As Thane and Peden have emphasised, inter-war 
policies had to conform to prevailing views on the need 
for restraint in public expenditure so as to facilitate 
the competitiveness of the economy. 
45 Hence, Treasury 
control, especially during the economy crisis immediately 




of the Welfare State; G. C. Peden, 45 Thane, Foundations 
British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to 
Margaret Thatcher (1985) 
102 
after the First World War and during the slump of the 
1920s and ensuing recession, has been seen as a major 
determinant of how the bureaucratic elite responded to 
general calls for reform. Such control took a number of 
forms. For example, the Treasury gained control over the 
staffing levels and senior appointments in other 
departments. It also sought to reign in the reform plans 
of other departments either after formulation, or before, 
through the finance officers who were newly appointed to 
all of the major spending departments, including the 
Ministry of Health, at the end of the First World War. 
Even within departments analysts are careful to 
disaggregate bureaucratic imperatives. Greenwood and 
Wilson suggest that major cleavages commonly exist 
between different divisions within departments through 
competition over shares in the departmental budget, and 
between generalists and specialists. 
46 The former 
attempt to take a wider view of a department's aims 
whilst the latter attempt to promote the specific aims of 
their task. Public policy historians acknowledge the 
internal dynamics of the workings of the inter-war 
bureaucracy and see these as the essential motor for and 
against change, and for and against particular types of 
change in policy. 
Even if this conceptualisation of the basis for inter- 
war policy making is accepted the vexed question is 
returned to of how to provide an explanatory context for 
46 J. Greenwood and D. Wilson, Public Administration in 
Britain Todav (2nd edition 1989), chapter six. 
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the adoption, in response to general calls for reform 
policies, of one option over another in the making of 
detailed reform policy. An answer is provided by 
Lindblom who suggests that government policy is 
formulated within the bureaucracy by means of the 
successive limited comparisons method. As a result of 
the reality of time constraints in evolving policy, 
objectives are not rigidly defined and so all policy 
options are not rigorously investigated for their 
probable outcomes. Instead, policy change is derived 
only from the limited comparison of existing policy 
alternatives which are themselves merely revisions of 
existing policy. This ensures that policy remains 
compatible with existing bureaucratic imperatives and 
that reform embraces more limited change than more 
radical alternatives developed outside government, which 
also have incalculable implications. In establishing the 
detail of reform, therefore, the bureaucracy makes only 
incremental changes from previous policy. 47 
This model of incrementalism has again been endorsed 
by historians as a means of explaining the style of 
policy making in the inter-war period. Lowe's study of 
the Ministry of Labour suggests that after the First 
World War only small adjustments were made to existing 
policy in response to generally perceived needs. 
48 
Fraser's general study of the study of welfare from the 
47 Lindblom, 'The science of muddling through', Public 
Administration Review, 2, vol 19 (1959), reprinted in 
Pugh (ed), Organisation Theory, Selected Readings (1971), 
pp. 238-255. 
48 Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy, pp. 238-243. 
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eighteenth to the twentieth century uses incrementalism 
49 as an organising perspective. Perhaps most 
importantly, Ashford has already suggested that local 
government reform in the early twentieth century was 
guided by an incrementalist approach; making adjustments 
to local government service responsibilities only when 
local government perceptibly failed. This reactive 
incrementalism characterised inter alia the 
50 nationalisation of unemployment relief in 1934. Other 
studies of inter-war policy, such as Macnicol's, it 
should be noted, show how the alternative to 
incrementalism was complete inaction as the bureaucratic 
elite clung on to existing policy, justifying its success 
against all contrary evidence. 51 
From the above discussion a theoretical perspective on 
the nature of the policy making process in the inter-war 
period may, therefore, be drawn , which is applicable 
both to the formulation and implementation of the 1929 
reforms, and which is distinctive from that which informs 
the received orthodoxy. A governing elite -a 
bureaucratic elite - primarily composed of senior civil 
servants is made the principal actor focus. The 
perspective suggests that, in not being neutral, the 
rationality of this bureaucratic elite was implicitly 
formed by imperatives of its own which, by definition, 
were anti-democratic. it also suggests that the end of 
49 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State 
(1984), pp. xxi-xxx. 
50 D. E. Ashford, The Emergence of the Welfare States 
(1986). 
51 Macnicol, The Cam-oaiQn for Family Allowances. 
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the First World War and accompanying political, economic 
and social change created new conditions in which such 
bureaucratic rationality had to be applied to the 
creation of reform. In the formulation, and indeed, in 
the implementation of reform, there was, nevertheless, 
considerable potential for intra-departmental as well as 
inter-departmental conflict, and the likelihood of an 
incrementalist approach to the selection of policy 
options for reform. However, in an application of this 
perspective to the formulation of the 1929 reforms one 
needs to be aware that the one politician universally 
accepted as active in domestic social policy in the 
inter-war period, Neville Chamberlain, was involved. The 
relationship between Chamberlain and his officials, 
therefore, becomes a particularly important variable. 
The theoretical perspective needs to be taken further 
if a new context for discussing policy formulation and 
implementation is to be fully provided. Webb's theory of 
bounded pluralism suggests that in the development of 
detailed reform actors in government will also commonly 
take account of actors and interests outside of 
government. This may be characterised as the way in 
which the interests of the bureaucratic elite are 
bargained with the plurality of interests. However, it 
appears more appropriate to consider the access given by 
government to outside interests in terms of the access of 
certain interests and the exclusion of others. In the 
management of reform consideration an extension Of the 
preceding discussion would suggest that inter-war 
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bureaucratic imperatives for incremental, and therefore, 
limited, reform would make it rational to access only 
those interests which were in favour of only limited 
reform or against reform of any kind, and to exclude 
interests in favour of greater reform. The management of 
debate in this way would suggest the appearance of 
pluralism, but would, in reality, limit the bounds of 
debate. Further, if the interests accessed, in return 
for a governing role, have the facility to control 
potential opposition to government policy and demands for 
greater change then the arrangements may be perceived at 
an individual policy level in terms of a radical 
52 understanding of meso-corporatism. 
This approach to analysing the 1929 reforms gains 
greater credence from an appreciation of the literature 
on policy networks. According to Rhodes policy networks 
are "complex[es] of organisations connected to each other 
by resource dependencies and distinguished from other 
... complexes by breaks 
in the structure of resource 
dependencies". They involve the inter- action of bodies 
in an agreed policy area at a sub-central government 
level, therefore placing reform debate well beyond the 
orbit of democratic institutions such as Parliament and 
so limiting the access of interests to policy making. 
Included in Rhodes' typology of networks is the inter- 
governmental network, in which policy debate affecting 
52 See G. Jordan, 'Pluralistic corporatisms and corporate 
pluralism', Scandanavian Political Studies, 3, vol 7 
(1984), pp. 137-153; and G. Jordan, 'The pluralism of 
pluralism: an anti- theory? ', Political Studies, xxxviii 
(1990), pp. 286-301. 
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local government is limited to interaction between 
government and the representatives of local government, 
the local authority associations. The representation of 
individual local authorities, service interests and 
public sector unions as well as all non-local government 
actors and interests are explicitly excluded. 53 
The concept of the policy network suggests two 
important points. First, resource inter-dependency is a 
compelling reason for accessing those interests from 
which compliance is essential for the implementation of 
policy. The scope of local government operations by the 
1920s in relation to both public expenditure and service 
provision was such that the inter-dependency of central 
and local government appears a self-evident truth. 
Secondly, the concept suggests how the interests given 
access to reform consideration may be limited to the 
associations representing local government. National 
local authority associations, like other institutions, 
had and have the potential to control the aims of some of 
its members in return for a role in the governing 
process. This extension of the theoretical perspective 
is again distinctive from that which informs the received 
orthodoxy. It suggests that the formulation and 
implementation of the 1929 reforms should also be seen in 
terms of the management of the bounds of wider 
consideration to ensure that the extent of reform was not 
formally or successfully challenged, rather than in terms 
53 R. A. W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall 
(1988), P. 77. 
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of the concept of pluralism. It also suggests rationale 
upon which that management may have been conducted, and 
upon which interests outside the bureaucratic elite were 
served by the 1929 reforms can be understood. 
Individual aspects of this theoretical perspective 
will be returned to and used as a basis for 
reconsideration of the formulation and implementation of 
the 1929 reforms. In the f irst instance, however, the 
concern is to relocate the origins of the 1929 reforms 
after the First World War, not as part of a continuum in 
policy debate stretching back to the official reports in 
which the ideas contained therein were f irst suggested, 
but in the specific circumstances of the post-war 
situation. Inquiry in to the origins of the poor law 
(health care) and exchequer grant reforms in the context 
of the concepts of bounded pluralism and incrementalism 
yields both additions to knowledge and a basis for re- 
interpreting the move towards reform immediately after 
the War. 
3. THE ORIGINS OF REFORM, 1918-1920 
That there was little initiative in the pre-First World 
War department generally responsible for local government 
for reform of local government structure, the finance of 
local government and local social provision has already 
been shown by other historians. The Local Government 
Board has generally been characterised as being plagued 
by inertia, weak in relations with other government 
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departments and represented in Cabinet by ministers of 
limited ability. 54 Furthermore, it is clear that none of 
the potential reforms discussed above were seriously 
addressed. Even consideration of poor law or local 
health services reform was dropped in the wake of the 
division of opinion on the Royal Co=ission on the Poor 
Law. The 1914 Finance bill, based upon the Kempe Report, 
had provided for health services to be provided on a 
block grant basis. Yet, the bill had failed to make 
Parliament and during the War new local health services 
were provided for on a percentage grant basis. Existing 
policy was preserved. The changes wrought by the First 
World War, therefore, had a vital part to play in 
bringing about change in central policy. 
The popular expectations of social reform, released by 
the First World War, led the wartime coalition to set up 
a committee on reconstruction, which in 1917 became a 
ministry, under Dr Christopher Addison. 55 In the search 
for rapid reform proposals the sub-committee on local 
government, chaired by Sir Donald Maclean, was given the 
brief of formulating proposals for a reform of the poor 
law. The decision to set up the committee with such a 
limited brief was made on the basis of poor law reform 
being the only option which had been seriously considered 
before the War and could be developed as practical 
54 R. M. Macleod, Treasurv Control and Social 
Administration, 1871-1905 (1968); F. Honigsbaum., The 
Struggle for the Ministry of Health (1970) . 
55 Background to the creation of this committee is 
provided by K. and J. Morgan, Portrait of a Progressive, 
the Political Career of ChristoDher, Viscount Addison 
(1980). 
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policy. A wider brief may have created lengthy 
deliberations which might not have produced any agreed 
policy. Hence, more elaborate consideration of the 
reform of local government or its services was prevented. 
The reform that was envisaged was one based on existing 
institutions of local government and without wider 
reference to other relief or health care agencies. The 
abolition of the boards of guardians was to be assumed. 
All that the committee was required to do was to sink the 
differences experienced on the Royal Commission on the 
Poor Law of ten years previous, and suggest how the poor 
law should be administered by the local authorities. 
The Maclean Report, published in 1918, made a number 
of basic recommendations, which showed that a compromise 
between the majority and minority positions had been 
reached in order to provide a basis for reform. The poor 
law unions and boards of guardians were to be abolished 
and their responsibilities, institutions, officers, 
property and liabilities passed to the county and county 
borough councils. In line with Minority Report thinking 
poor law services for the sick, mentally deficient and 
children were to be appropriated under other legislation 
and integrated with existing county and county borough 
council services. In addition, the local authorities 
were required to set up prevention of unemployment and 
training committees. These were intended to prevent 
unemployment by rearranging council works and services so 
as to make a demand on local 
labour, help people find 
work through employment exchanges, give educational 
ill 
training and assist in the migration of labour. At the 
same time, however, in line with Majority Report 
thinking, the county and county borough councils were to 
create home assistance committees, which were to 
administer out-relief in a manner consistent with 
principles of less eligibility. 56 
The political imperative of making social reform part 
of party manifestoes after the War led to a unanimous 
endorsement of the Maclean Report as a basis for poor law 
and health care reform. Similarly, there was a 
parliamentary consensus during the creation of the 
Ministry of Health in 1919 that it would clearly be 
inconsistent with the new Ministry's aims to improve 
health care if it had to supervise a considerable amount 
of health provision under poor law principles. 57 Duly, 
Dr Christopher Addison, the first Minister of Health, 
instructed his officials to draw up detailed proposals 
for reform on the basis of the Maclean Report. By 
September 1920 they had produced a draft public health 
and poor law bill. 58 
Consideration of reform along these lines was 
threatened by wider debate about the structure of local 
government. As the Mond memorandum stated in May 1921 
"the existing areas notoriously give rise to anomalies in 
local administration, and it would no doubt be possible 
56 Report-of the Maclean Committee (cmd. 8917) PP (1918). 
57 J. Woodmansee Leland, 'Neville Chamberlain and British 
Social legislation, 1923-19291 (unpublished Ph. D thesis, 
Ohio State University, 1970), p. 277. 
58 For a copy of this draft bill, see PRO HLG 29/262: 
Papers and correspondence relating to various draft bills 
on poor law reform 1918-1927. 
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to argue that no reforms can be fully effective if the 
areas remain unchanged" . Ministry officials, however, 
quickly discounted a larger reform on the grounds that it 
would delay reform based upon the Maclean proposals and 
would arouse considerable hostility from existing local 
authorities. Consequently, they thought solely in terms 
of joint action between local authorities and the 
delegation of functions from upper tier to lower tier 
authorities as the alternative to a more systematic 
reform of areas. 59 
An even greater threat was posed by the deliberations 
of the Consultative Council on medical and Allied 
Services, chaired by Lord Dawson, which had been set up 
under the 1919 Ministry of Health Act. The interim 
report, which the Council produced in the middle of 1920, 
as has already been shown, suggested a much more 
extensive health reform, which was not essentially based 
upon a reform of local government. Health policy 
historians have already established that the reaction 
within the Ministry of Health was to oppose the Dawson 
Report. Addison had started to envisage a role for 
implementation of the Maclean Report in a longer-term 
plans for health care organisation. He wanted to bring 
about a comprehensive health service by two stages: 
first, by the unification of local health services; and, 
secondly, by the extension of national health insurance 
to dependents. In the former case it was important to 
59 Mond memorandum, P-11. See PRO HLG 68/25: 
Miscellaneous unallocated papers on poor law reform, 
1919-1925. 
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Addison that provision was free. The Dawson Report, in 
advocating a general practitioner dominated national 
health service, clashed with both aims. For it 
threatened the role of local government in health care, 
and whilst the Report advocated universal care it did not 
60 suggest that it ought to be free. Similarly, senior 
Ministry officials, pre-eminent amongst which was the 
first permanent secretary, Sir Robert Morant, had also 
started to envisage a role for the implementation of the 
Maclean Report in longer-term plans for health care 
organisation. Morant considered that the organisation of 
health care should follow the precedent of the 1902 
Education Act, which had concentrated provision in the 
county and county borough councils. In the short-term 
poor law health services could be transferred to these 
authorities, and in the long-term even voluntary 
hospitals could come under local authority control. 61 
Consequently, Ministry officials acted to discredit 
the Dawson Report and so end discussion of reform along 
lines contrary to the Maclean Report. Sir George Newman, 
the chief medical officer, happily cited the fact that 
the Dawson Report omitted costings of its proposals. 62 
In the economy crisis in central government after the 
War, therefore, the Dawson Report was not a feasible 
basis for policy. ministry opposition then gained 
60 F. Honigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine 
(1979) , pp. 
73- 75. 
61 C. Webster, The Health Services Since the War, vol 
one, Problems of Health Care: The National Health Service 
Before 1957(1988), p. 20. 
62 Honigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine, p. 77. 
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support from another consultative council on health 
administration, chaired by Ryland Adkins, and whose 
membership interestingly included Neville Chamberlain. 
Its report in September 1920 strongly opposed the Dawson 
proposal to create a new general health authority in each 
area, which threatened a county and county borough 
council role. The Minister and his officials also gained 
support from the Patient's Council, which had been set up 
under the Ministry of Health Act. In November 1920 the 
Patient's Council advocated a comprehensive health 
service under municipal control. Addison wanted to have 
the Patient's Council report published so as publicly to 
63 take the sting out of Dawson's recommendations. 
However, Ministry officials opposed this because it also 
contained proposals to which officials did not wish to be 
tied. Essentially, the Report advocated the provision of 
comprehensive local health care whatever the cost. 
Gaining a reform of local health care, which was allied 
to this aim, would become very problematical given the 
Treasury's views on public expenditure. 
64 
The Patient's Council report was not published, and 
given the shared antipathy of Minister and officials to 
the overall plan outlined in the Dawson Report this too 
was side-lined from the policy debate. By the autumn of 
1920 Ministry officials had effectively limited the 
discussion of health reform again to that based upon the 
Maclean Report proposals, which meant that reform would 
63 ibid, p. 75. 
64 ibid, p. 77. 
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proceed through a reform of local government. They did 
so because a reform of health care based on the reform of 
the poor law and provision by local authorlties was a 
development consistent with the now extinct Local 
Government Board's philosophy of providing social 
services through local government. As Webster argues, 
such a reform could build on existing services and 
institutions which were responsive to central control. 
By contrast, a reform based on the participation of 
general practitioners could potentially involve 
protracted negotiation and be undermined by less than 
universal participation as general practitioners clung on 
to their independence to do fee-paying private work. 65 
Moreover, it should be noted that many of the medical 
experts who worked in the Ministry had gained their 
initial experience as local medical officers rather than 
as general practitioners or hospital consultants, and 
were consequently more knowledgeable of and sympathetic 
to local authority public health care. 
In 1920 officials also started to turn their attention 
to how local government health care could be developed 
after poor law reform. In September 1920 a committee of 
public health officials, led by Sir George Newman, 
contemplated the very great expansion of out-patient work 
in local authority clinics that would follow after poor 
law reform. Such clinics were related only to individual 
services, and provision through them could prove costly. 
65 Webster, The Health Services Since the War, vol one, 
Problems of Health Care: The National Health Service 
before 1957, pp. 18- 21. 
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Whilst they opposed the Dawson Report as an overall 
programme for reform, they adopted the Report's central 
concept of the general health centre. The concentration 
of out-patient work in general health centres could 
reduce material overheads in the long-term. This would 
improve cost-effectiveness, and, by facilitating the co- 
ordination of all local authority out-patient care by 
medical officers, it would also improve the quality of 
services. Consequently, it is clear also that, once 
reform on the basis of the Maclean Report had been 
agreed, ministry public health officials moved very 
rapidly towards a vigorous development of the local 
authority health reform option. The bill for public 
health and poor law reform had to be shelved in October 
1920 in response to Cabinet inertia to reform during the 
economy, meaning that officials had even more time to 
develop policy along these lines for the time when reform 
was more propitious. 66 
The Maclean Report did not contain any proposals for 
the reform of financial central-local relations. Nor was 
there any general political imperative for reform by the 
Ministry of Health. Yet when senior Ministry officials 
met to consider the financial provisions to be contained 
in the public health and poor law bill in January 1920 
67 
they also addressed the grant question as a whole. 
66 See PRO MH 57/137: minutes of the committee on health 
organisation and poor law reform. The membership of 
Newman's committee was composed of F. J. H. Coutts, J-Smith- 
Whittaker, T. Carnworth and Miss J. H. Turnbull. 
67 See PRO HLG 29/260: Poor law reform preliminary 
papers 1906- 1924 vol one, parts I-VI. 
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This was based upon their own perceptions of problems in 
percentage grants. Macleod, the statistical officer, and 
Francis, a senior officer in the poor law division, 
shared an antipathy to percentage grants because they did 
not meet properly the needs of individual local 
authorities. Francis felt that the earmarking of grants 
for particular services was unnecessary as it eroded 
local autonomy and was "the mark of a department which is 
either weak or dictatorially inclined, or both" . The 
power to retain grant as a punishment for local default 
he considered to be of little use and only successful in 
impeding "the attainment of good results by the central 
authority's other powers, namely those of instruction and 
warning. 11 He also felt that they involved a mass of 
correspondence which was of comparatively little use and 
68 wasted the time of civil servants. 
Francis was to the fore in expressing his hope that 
grants could become unnecessary by virtue of developing 
new sources of local income, such as a local income tax. 
Such policy options were, however, expressly not up for 
discussion. Instead in their deliberation of 
alternatives to percentage grants senior officials looked 
no further than at the Kempe Report and the resulting 
Finance bill of 1914. This had advocated the block 
granting of health services, and grant distribution by 
means of a payment per head of population. It had also 
suggested the abolition of the assigned revenues and 
their replacement by a direct exchequer grant, as well as 
68 ibid, Francis to Sir Aubrey Symonds, 15.1.1920. 
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the abolition of grants paid in compensation for 
agricultural derating and tithe rent charge rates. The 
officials outlined a number of options based on these 
earlier proposals. 69 However, all of them were 
discarded. Macleod, himself, suggested a number of 
substantial reasons why no reform of the health grant 
system could be made. 
First, the option to abolish the assigned revenues, 
merge them with health grants, and distribute a 
consolidated health block grant at a uniform flat rate on 
the basis of population met with problems. The grant's 
success, it was considered, would rest on the provision 
of an additional sum of E1,000,000 to guarantee any local 
authority against losses. It was expected that the 
provision of an additional sum would meet with Treasury 
opposition. This option was also criticised on the 
grounds that a grant distributed on the basis of 
population could not take account of the quality of 
population and would, therefore, not be directed to areas 
of greatest need. Even then an alternative option to 
abolish percentage health grants and replace them with a 
needs related single consolidated health grant was 
problematical without rating and valuation reform. 
Without truly uniform rating and valuation it would be 
impossible to have a reliable needs related formula for 
the distribution of the grant to different local 
authorities. 
69 ibid, note of a conference between Symonds, Macleod 
and Francis 8.1.1920. 
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A lesser option of including a new grant to local 
authorities in respect of transferred poor law health 
services, which then received no special grant, and 
distributing the grant on a needs-related basis also met 
with problems. Macleod considered that the Treasury 
would oppose any new health grant on the grounds that 
there had already been a growth in the number of health 
grants during and after the War, and because Austen 
Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had already 
announced that there would be no increase in exchequer 
subsidies in aid of rates for the foreseeable future. 
Macleod set much store by the 1914 Finance bill, which 
would have resulted in an additional E840,000 being 
available for local authority health spending. However, 
he expected that the Treasury would argue that the local 
authorities had already received the money in relation to 
increases in existing grants and the moneys to be 
received under new grants. 
70 
Consequently, even in their limited consideration of 
the finance of local authorities in January 1920 Ministry 
officials soon abandoned ideas of block grant or needs- 
related grant reform on the basis of there being little 
prospect of rating and valuation reform and the 
expectation of Treasury parsimony. Macleod put aside any 
further deliberations over a long-term reform of grants 
and concluded that with regard to poor law reform "the 
problems relating to exchequer grants, which have to be 
considered now, would seem to be limited to those 
70 ibid, Macleod to Francis 12.1.1920. 
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rf 
necessarily arising in connection with the transfer from 
poor law authorities of exchequer grants at present 
71 received by them". In February 1920 the office 
conference considering poor law reform accepted Macleod's 
conclusions on financial provisions, recognising that 
they represented "the bare minimum of legislation 
required" . 
72 Despite the enthusiasm engendered in some 
senior officers by the Kempe Report and the 1914 Finance 
bill for grant reform even this had withered away amidst 
inertia and pessimism about the prospects for reform. 
In this context it may be seen that the true 
authorship of the ministry's block grant reform lay not 
within the Ministry of Health as Rhodes and Stacey have 
suggested. Instead the initiative was provided by the 
Treasury. In a manner similar to the ministry of 
Health's deliberations of social and local government 
reform, their deliberations upon the reform of local 
government finance and central-local financial relations 
had gone no further than the pre-war advocacy of block 
grants. After the War, with the prospects of increased 
local government expenditure and, consequently, increased 
central aid through percentage grants the Treasury sought 
to use the new development of finance officers in 
spending departments to influence those departments to 
take up the block grant principle. Ernest Strohmenger, 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid, report of an office conference convened by Sir 
Aubrey Symonds 3.2-1923. This legislation would have 
entailed merely the transfer to local authority health 
accounts of (a) grants paid to poor law authorities and 
(b) amounts paid in respect of vagrant lunatics. 
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the accountant-general in the Ministry of Health, was 
anxious that the idea of a block grant should not be 
quietly buried by his colleagues. In a memorandum to Sir 
Aubrey Symonds, the second secretary, in February 1920, 
he strongly questioned the assumption that a consolidated 
health grant should require the provision of new money in 
order to gain the acceptance of local authorities who 
might become worse off than they had been under 
percentage grants. He also advised Symonds that "after 
further consideration and informal discussion with the 
Treasury" he was of the view that the grants given under 
the Agricultural Rates and Tithe Rent Charge Acts should 
be abolished and included within a new health block 
grant. An equitable method of distribution could then be 
found for this new grant. Symonds immediately recognised 
Strohmenger's views as deriving from "the attitude of the 
73 Treasury". 
Symonds, response was to instruct Macleod to work out 
the feasibility of creating a general health grant 
including also the other grants mentioned by 
74 Strohmenger. In his subsequent report, however, 
Macleod maintained that, desirable as a block grant was, 
the Treasury could not get one without paying for it. 
First, he cited the 1888 Local Government Act and the 
1914 Finance bill as precedents of the principle that in 
any general adjustment of exchequer grants no local 
authority should receive less grant than before and that 
73 ibid, Strohmenger to Symonds, 11.2-1920. 
74 ibid, Symonds to Macleod, 11.2-1920. 
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all local authorities taken together should receive more. 
He then re-emphasised the necessity of adding E1,000,000 
to the grant to ensure that this happened. Distributed 
on the basis of population, he argued, "the equalising 
tendency which such a grant is now shown to possess is an 
75 additional point in favour of its creation". 
In August 1920 Strohmenger responded by presenting 
Symonds with a draft financial reform to go in to the 
public health and poor law bill. This advocated a 
general grant which would replace the percentage health 
grants, the assigned revenues and the grants made under 
the Agricultural Rates and Tithe Rent Charge Acts. 
Strohmenger's major problem in evolving such a grant was 
to find a basis for giving grants to local authorities 
for local health services whilst at the same time 
preserving the relief given to rural areas under the 
Agricultural Rates Act. He could not find a satisfactory 
basis and had opted as the best alternative for a 
subtraction of E1,000,000 from the total sum of 
discontinued grants and its addition to the rural road 
grants paid by the ministry of Transport. This left 
E6,183,000 for the new general grant in aid of local 
health services "in place of existing grants and such 
further sum as the Cabinet may determine". 
76 
The latter point was clearly important, for 
Strohmenger had decided to meet his colleagues halfway in 
75 ibid, Macleod to Symonds, 19.2.1920. 
76 PRO MH 57/140: Notes for a Poor Law Reform and Public 
Health and Poor Law Repeal bill, August 1920, Strohmenger 
to Symonds 11.8.1920. 
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order to keep the idea of a block grant in reform 
considerations. That the Treasury had accepted the need 
to make short-term bribes to local government in order to 
get block grant reforms and so economise on grant aid 
over the long-term is clear from correspondence between 
Dr Addison and Austen Chamberlain in the autumn of 1920. 
Despite the growing economy crisis Chamberlain was 
prepared to agree that "provided that you do not ask me 
too high a price you may be assured of my hearty support 
in your contemplated reforms". It is, therefore, 
reasonable to suggest that Strohmenger had originally 
accepted the need for a bribe in August with the blessing 
of senior Treasury officials. 77 
Strohmenger, however, added much to the health block 
grant reform proposal that was novel. In August he 
suggested that in order for the grant to be truly 
equitable its distribution had to be based on much more 
than population. He suggested that 7s 6d should be paid 
per head per week on pauper lunatics in each authority, 
and 4d per head in rural district councils towards public 
health expenditure as a whole. By September he had 
started work on a needs-related formula for grant 
distribution and was testing the potential of assessable 
value and number of persons per acre as factors in the 
formula. In September he also advocated that block grant 
should be fixed for five year periods. He suggested that 
77 PRO T 161/1171/S. 3940: Poor law reform propos als 
leading up to draft Poor Law reform bill, 1927, and 
memoranda on public assistance 
1920-1945, Austen 
Chamberlain to Addison, 9.11.1920. 
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the abolition of percentage grants would change the 
nature of departmental work dramatically in the direction 
of decentralisation, and warned that the Ministry must 
keep a power to withhold grant "in the case of a dilatory 
78 or supine authority". 
Strohmenger's broad principles for a health block 
grant were incorporated in to the draft public health and 
poor law bill in August 1920, and although, as has been 
shown, the bill was dropped in October Strohmenger's 
proposals were established as the way forward on 
79 financial reform. The Treasury had successfully 
planted the block grant seed in the Ministry of Health's 
plans for poor law and health reform. This had involved 
considerable efforts on Strohmenger's part to simply keep 
on the table the one reform option which central 
government had considered on financial reform. 
This empirically based discussion of the origins of 
the poor law (health) and block grant reforms in the 
period after the War provides substantive evidence for 
the theoretical perspective developed earlier in the 
chapter. It was not the case that the origins of the 
reforms lay in the neutral adoption by Ministry of Health 
officials of a rationally formed consensus on the need 
for poor law and block grant reform. Rather, it was not 
until after the First World War, in response to pressures 
for reform and political directives, that officials 
broached poor law (health care) or local government 
78 PRO MH 57/140, Strohmenger to Symonds 11.8.1920. 
79 ibid, elaboration of a public health and poor law 
repeal bill by R. W. Harris, 27.8.1920. 
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reform. Even then they based reform on the Maclean 
Report in order to maintain a limited reform, which was 
based on institutions with which they commonly dealt. 
New policy, therefore, incrementally branched off from 
existing policy. The context in which reform 
consideration was initiated, the reasons for the Ministry 
of Health's enthusiastic adoption of poor law reform and 
the willful disregard of alternative policy options 
suggests a rationality for the origins of reform only in 
terms of bureaucratic concerns in response to a new 
political climate. Evidence of the adoption within the 
Ministry of Health of the block grant principle suggests 
an even less glorious move towards reform. Rather than 
adopting the principle as a matter of course, officials 
were prepared to disregard it even before serious 
consideration had begun. Only the Treasury's 
incrementalist response to fears about uncontrollable 
rises in grant aid, consequent upon service expansion to 
meet popular demands, and Strohmenger's skill in 
relations with his colleagues at the Ministry of Health, 
ensured that the principle was adopted. That even then 
the block grant reform and significant parts of the 
proposed health reform still faced the bureaucratic 




THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH PLAN 
This chapter reconsiders the view that reform based upon 
Poor Law and block grant proposals was uncontroversially 
developed within the Ministry of Health between October 
1920 and May 1921; and that the Mond memorandum, written 
in May 1921, remained a true reflection of the 
departmental view on reform, which was then placed before 
Neville Chamberlain in late 1924. It will consider in 
turn the development of poor law (health care) and 
exchequer grant reform over the four year period. The 
basis for reconsideration is provided by further 
observations on the nature of active bureaucracy. The 
previous chapter showed how debate upon reform was 
considered and, in the case of exchequer grant reform, 
instigated primarily at a bureaucratic level immediately 
after the First World War. Political scientists have 
also observed how bureaucratic imperatives even within 
departments are not homogeneous. Different policy 
interests are not only institutionalised in different 
government departments but also in different divisions 
within government departments. Typically, the British 
civil service has also been characterised in terms of the 
divide between generalists and specialists. The former 
attempt to take a wider view of a Ministry's aims whilst 
the latter attempt to promote the specific aims of their 
division. Given that the debate over reform within the 
Ministry of Health in the early 1920s involved senior 
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officials with overall responsibility for the Ministry as 
well as senior officials of the local government and 
public health divisions and the accountant-general's 
office, one needs to inquire whether intra-departmental 
relations also played a part in reform development. The 
results of such an inquiry again both add to and 
significantly revise existing understanding of the 
Ministry of Health's move towards reform in the early 
1920s. 
1. A REFORM OF LOCAL HEALTH CARE 
In October 1920 a departmental committee on health 
organisation and poor law reform was established. Its 
members included Sir Arthur Robinson, Morant's successor 
as permanent secretary, Sir Aubrey Symonds, Sir George 
Newman, Sir Frederick Willis, a principal assistant 
secretary, Ernest Stromenger and M. L. Gwyer, the solicitor 
and legal advisor. The abolition of poor law authorities 
and the transfer of their responsibilities to county and 
county borough councils was assumed. Similarly, it was 
expected that outdoor relief and associated provision 
would be provided by new home assistance committees, and 
that poor law medical services would be appropriated 
under public health legislation. Consequently, the 
committee's development of health care reform was in the 
main concerned with the elaboration of policy on how they 
wished health care to be developed by the local 
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authorities after poor law reform and the unification of 
local services. 1 
Important consideration was, first, given to the 
systematisation of local health responsibilities, which 
had been accrued on a piecemeal basis during the 
preceding years. Five general areas of provision were 
defined. These were general environmental hygiene; 
direct prevention and treatment of disease, which covered 
all of the personal medical health services; control of 
food supply; personal hygiene; and the registration of 
births. County borough councils, as all-purpose 
authorities in their areas, could be expected to be 
responsible for all areas of provision. Questions were 
asked, however, as to how certain of the different 
categories of responsibility should be distributed 
between county council and second tier authorities in the 
administrative counties. 2 By early November it had been 
decided that responsibility for general environmental 
hygiene should remain with the existing statutory 
authorities, which were primarily the second tier 
authorities, and be provided for out of rates. However, 
in practically every other respect health services were 
to be concentrated under the county councils. This 
meant, in particular, that those services which were 
primarily medical in nature, including the isolation 
1. Much of the following discussion is based upon PRO MH 
57/137: minutes of the committee on health organisation 
and poor law reform, October 1920-August 1921. 
2. ibid, committee meeting 28.10.1920, paper CHO 7 (1). 
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hospitals, then a second tier responsibility, should go 
3 to the county councils. 
Doubts were raised about the effect of a continued 
second tier authority role in provision on the attainment 
of efficient health provision within each administrative 
county. Consequently, with regard to second tier 
authority provision it was felt that the minimum size for 
urban areas should be an urban district or borough of 
10,000 population, and that the Minister of Health should 
have a statutory power to combine authorities felt to be 
"too small for the economic and efficient discharge of 
any function" . Doubts were also raised about the effect 
of continued second tier authority provision on the 
attainment of co-ordinated county provision. 
Consequently, it was felt in respect to the services that 
second tier authorities provided that there should be 
general supervisory powers for the county councils. In 
November 1920, it was agreed by the committee that the 
county council should " have power, to control by 
withholding grant aid in case of default by the smaller 
authority, directly to administer the service in respect 
of which there was default and charge the cost to the 
smaller authority.. '4 In addition, it was concluded that 
the county councils should have power to delegate 
functions to the minor authorities on approval of the 
Minister and without need to gain the consent of the 
second tier authority, although 
in such cases the cost 
3. ibid, committee meeting 11.11.1920, paper CHO 
13. 
4. ibid, report of committee meeting 2.11.1920. 
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would continue to be met by the county council so as to 
maintain the required level of expenditure for effective 
provision. Delegation was indeed desirable to ensure 
against the over-centralisation of county health 
services, but it would not contradict the central 
principle of the county council becoming the supervisory 
body for all public health services in the administrative 
counties. 5 
This prescription of a strong county council role in 
relation to second tier authority provision was a new 
departure, and received revision in the Mond memorandum. 
The capacity for county councils to withhold grant in 
case of default was removed, and it was f elt that the 
local finance of delegated services should be met by the 
second tier authorities so as to uphold the principle of 
chargeability and administration not being divorced. 
However, in every other respect the idea of the strong 
county council was kept. The Mond memorandum suggested 
that the county council be responsible for the general 
survey of all health services in the administrative 
county, submit a scheme of provision to the ministry, 
exercise supervision over second tier authorities in 
relation to delegated services and act in place of second 
tier authorities if they defaulted on the provision of 
general environmental health services. Thus, Ministry 
officials developed a clear policy on local health care 
co-ordination, which effectively meant that county 
councils would also take on many of the watchdog 
5. ibid, non-circulated document, unsigned, 8.11.1920. 
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responsibilities previously assumed by the central 
authority. 6 
The Ministry committee perceived that in order to 
secure health care co-ordination by county and county 
borough councils the nature of co=ittee responsibility 
was also important. Ideally the officials wanted the 
local authorities to create one public health co=ittee 
to stress that all services were to be seen in relation 
to one another and so co-ordinated. However, such a 
committee threatened to become very large and in an added 
memorandum to the Maclean Report Harry Pritchard, a 
member of the Maclean Committee and Secretary to the AMC, 
had objected strongly to the Report's suggestion that 
local authorities should be required to set up home 
assistance committees on the grounds that local 
authorities should have freedom to run their own 
affairs. 7 Officials took the view that home assistance 
committees would have to be statutorily required. it 
would only provoke unnecessary opposition if a single 
health committee was also to become a statutory 
requirement. 8 Hence the Mond Memorandum merely stated 
that a single health committee was desirable and would be 
promoted to local authorities. 
9 
Much consideration also went in to the question of the 
composition of local authority health committees, if so 
6. Mond memorandum, p. 12. See PRO HLG 68/25: 
Miscellaneous unallocated papers on poor law reform, 
1919-1925. 
7. Re-oort. of the Maclean Committee (cmd. 8917) PP (1918). 
8. PRO MH 57/137, report of committee meeting, 
11.11.1920. 
9. Mond memorandum, p. 13-14. See PRO HLG 68/25. 
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created. The consultative council on local health 
administration suggested that local authority health 
committees be obliged to co-opt up to 1/4 of their 
membership from people of "special knowledge and 
experience of the business transacted by the 
Authorities". 10 Harris, the committee secretary, 
suggested that as the health committees would have 
responsibility for some insured health services as well 
as public health services after reform, this should be 
reflected in committee composition. He suggested 
representation should be given to insured persons to the 
extent of 3/10. A further 1/10 should be given to the 
medical profession and the remaining 6/10 left for the 
councillors. " The matter was finally discussed in full 
in November 1920. It was decided that where a local 
authority ran public health services through one 
committee there should be council representation of at 
least 2/3. Representation for insured persons should be 
1/5 or 1/4, with two general practitioners being 
nominated by the local medical advisory - council. Where 
health care was provided by more than one committee such 
proportions were to be varied. In their decisions two 
principles were upheld. First, majority representation 
was kept for elected members, and indeed the committee 
decided that co-opted members were not to participate in 
discussions not related to them. Moreover, the exact 
proportions of composition in individual health 
10. PRO MH 57/137, report of consultative council, 
4.9.1920. 
11. ibid, report of committee meeting 8.11.1920. 
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committees was ultimately to be on the initiation of the 
local authorities themselves in the administrative 
schemes they submitted. All of this was written in to 
the Mond memorandum in May 1921.12 
The Ministry Committee turned next to the question of 
how the Ministry would conduct relations with county and 
county borough councils if exchequer support for health 
services were provided through a block grant rather than 
percentage grants. Gone would be the mechanism of 
checking individual items of expenditure before grant 
payment as a means to control local authority provision. 
Instead, the block grant would be paid in advance of 
expenditure, and relations in theory were to be 
predicated on the basis of allowing local authorities 
greater freedom from central control in spending grant 
aid. Yet, from very early on the committee felt that 
however desirable local autonomy might be in principle 
the central department had certain responsibilities which 
it must provide for. In late October the committee 
concluded that "It is clear that the extent of the 
provision cannot be left wholly to local option. With a 
constantly shifting population-and with certain national 
commitments-a system of public health services, under 
the 
general control of the Ministry of Health must 
have a 
large measure of uniformity in the several areas. 
" 
Hence, even under a new grant system which apparently 
allowed for greater local autonomy the officials aimed 
to 
12. ibid, report Of committee meeting 11.11.1920. 
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have a large measure of administrative control over the 
extent and content of local health authority provision. 
From this was born the idea of the local 
administrative scheme. After poor law reform the local 
authorities were to be obliged to submit a scheme to the 
Ministry of Health describing both their existing and 
newly acquired resources and obligations; and their plans 
for future provision in each individual service and the 
co-ordination of all of the health services together. 
This was to be a first condition of the receipt of 
exchequer grant. Consequently, each local authority 
would be reliant upon the acceptance of their 
administrative scheme by the central department for their 
receipt of grant. As a result, it gave the central 
department large scope to reject or amend the content and 
extent of local policy. In many ways it was felt that 
this represented a better form of control for the 
Ministry. Not only would it be less inconvenient and 
time consuming than the detailed expenditure checking 
necessary under percentage grants, but it would increase 
central influence over the planning and co-ordination of 
health services in each local authority in the long-term, 
which had not been possible under percentage grant 
controls. officials were not thinking in terms of giving 
local authorities more autonomy in the spending of grant 
aid, merely a more efficient form of central control. 
13 
The Ministry committee turned finally to the question 
of additional powers and duties for county and county 
13. ibid, committee meeting 28.10.1920, paper CHO 7 (1). 
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borough councils after the enactment of poor law reform. 
There was some debate about the extension of general 
practitioner services. Services provided on the insurance 
principle had existed since the 1911 National Insurance 
Act and were administered by insurance committees of 
county and county borough councils. At the same time 
general practitioner domiciliary services were 
administered by the poor law authorities for those who 
could prove eligibility of lack of means. Poor law 
reform could potentially be used for the extension of the 
general practitioner domiciliary services to other 
clients than those then provided for by the poor law. 
This would mean the greater public employment of general 
practitioners paid for either from an extension of the 
insurance principle or out of public funds. In either 
case the work of insurance committees could be merged 
with that of public health committees. Such debate, 
however, was killed off by the continued desire to stick 
to the least extensive and complex form of reform. 
Getting involved in protracted negotiations with 
representatives of the medical profession could still 
threaten reform of any kind. 14 
The other possibility which arose from poor law reform 
was an extension of state hospital provision. Poor law 
residential institutions, which would be transferred to 
the county and county borough authorities, if 
appropriated under public health acts could become 
general hospitals with an unlimited client remit. This 
14. Mond memorandum, pp. 17-18. See PRO HLG 68/25. 
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held the potential of making the many vacant poor law 
infirmary beds available to patients who were not 
classified as poor. However, Ministry officials were 
anxious to limit the obligations placed upon local 
authorities if they appropriated institutions. If they 
did not then local authorities could become overwhelmed 
by patient demand which they could not afford to meet, 
and in the process the voluntary hospitals, which were 
already experiencing problems, risked becoming extinct. 
Consequently, in the Mond memorandum officials voiced the 
intention to make residential provision for the sick poor 
the only statutory duty placed upon local authorities. 
Otherwise, it was hoped that in provision for the rest of 
the population the local authorities would co-operate 
with the voluntary hospitals in their areas in the 
creation of 
provision. 
an efficient dual system of hospital 
This could include the provision of subsidies 
to voluntary hospitals so as to facilitate good provision 
without placing on the state a permanent responsibility 
of direct provision. 
15 
The decisions on hospital policy as on all the other 
matters discussed above were essentially 
uncontroversially resolved by officials in the creation 
of the Mond memorandum, and remained central parts of the 
poor law (health care) reform plan throughout the early 
1920s. They all appeared again in the proposals for poor 
law reform submitted to the local authorities by Neville 
15. ibid, pp. 18-19. 
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Chamberlain in 1925.16 To a large extent they covered 
technical issues, but in respect of the intention to 
create strong county council powers over second tier 
authorities there was the potential for a significant 
change in central-local relations. Instead of dealing 
direct with the central authority over most issues the 
second tier authorities would be under much closer 
scrutiny from rather nearer at hand. At the same time 
Ministry officials evolved a new form of central control 
in block grant relations with county and county borough 
councils which they clearly intended to provide as much 
control, though of a more general kind, as they had 
enjoyed under percentage grants. The two policies taken 
together suggested that the Ministry could increase 
control over the provision of health care in county 
areas; the ministry could control the county councils, 
whilst the county councils could aid the ministry in 
controlling the second tier authorities. In such a way 
ministry officials added to the recommendations of the 
Maclean Report on the basis of their own imperatives. 
They intended to ensure that local authorities in the 
implementation of the local health care reform would not 
depart from central aims and values in state provision, 
echoing the original bureaucratic motivations for 
sticking to the limited local government option for 
16. For a copy of provisional proposals for poor law 
reform, 1925, see PRO HLG 8/81: Royal Commission on Local 
Government: constitution, functions and relations of 
local authorities, and its work in regard to provisional 
proposals for poor law reform. 
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health care reform on the basis of existing areas of 
local government. 
In developing the health care reform Ministry 
officials were not, however, entirely in consensus. 
Problems arose in October 1920 when it came to Sir George 
Newman presenting the recommendation of his September 
health care committee that the provision of out-patient 
facilities in general health centres be included as an 
extension of health care powers and duties after poor law 
reform. Newman accepted that planning a network of 
general health centres, run by local authorities, would 
require a very detailed survey of population and 
communications. However, provisionally, he suggested a 
total number of five hundred; one for every 60,000 of the 
population. With this went the acceptance that for 
services upon which there was a very wide distribution of 
need, such as infant welfare, there would have to be some 
special centres. These, however, were to be kept to a 
minimum; the committee suggested only thirty. 
17 
At the same time Newman wrote to Robinson endorsing 
the aim of the general health centre as "the right line 
to take" - However, 
he considered that there were two 
options for practical implementation: first, that the 
centre be totally within the confines of one building, 
where out-patient provision for all services would 
be 
made; or, secondly, that subsidiary sections 
be created 
so that individual services would actually 
be provided in 
17. PRO MH 57/137, committee meeting 22.10.1920, paper 
CHO 3. 
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separate buildings, whilst still being associated with 
and administered from the general health centre. 
Newman's personal view was that "No doubt the former is 
the plan to aim at but in view of the fact that we have 
got to assimilate many hundreds of clinics already in 
existence we may find that the latter is the plan which 
will be adopted in many districts.,, 18 
Newman's advocacy of general health centres met with a 
considered response from Ernest Strohmenger. He examined 
options by which the extra proposal for local authority 
general health centres could be funded. His main idea 
was that of funding them on a basis of contributory 
insurance. However, for this to be practicable insurance 
would have to be compulsory and universal. Moreover, he 
calculated the cost of creating a network of centres to 
be approximately E4 million per annum whilst at the very 
most insured people would yield only E2 million. 
Finally, irrespective of such ideas the pauper 
responsibility would always be that of the local 
authorities, and with respect to responsibility for all 
classes of patients in the centres Strohmenger felt that 
"it may be expected that local authorities would have to 
face the burden of practically the whole of it at least 
in the early years. " Consequently, Strohmenger's 
response to the public health division's plans for the 
future of out-patient care was pessimistic. He expected 
the financial situation to worsen in the next year and 
"although Parliament may be induced to find exchequer 
18. ibid, Newman to Robinson, 18.10.1920. 
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money for wide reaching financial reform such as we 
contemplate, it is most improbable that they would agree 
to a new service being forced on local authorities a 
large part of the cost of which would fall on local 
rates". Hence, Strohmenger placed major financial 
considerations in the way of the public health side of 
the reform getting any more ambitious than it had to 
be. 19 
After some delay the committee on health organisation 
and poor law reform, nevertheless, concluded that "it 
would be a mistake of policy not to include provision for 
new services as well as for co-ordination of existing 
services when putting forward a scheme for giving local 
authorities more freedom from control". Therefore, the 
committee agreed to the central aims of Newman's 
committee, and in so doing to the philosophy of the 
public health division on the future organisation of 
20 local authority out-patient provision. In the Mond 
memorandum health centres were restyled consulting 
centres, and it was suggested that all out-patient work 
in relation to venereal diseases, tuberculosis and 
maternity and child welfare could be there concentrated 
at much less cost over the long-term than then which 
pertained in provision through a myriad of single-service 
clinics. In addition, consulting centres could become 
the focus for the general practitioner domiciliary 
services and the services of general practitioners could 
19. ibid, committee meeting 22-11.1920, paper CHO 14. 
20. ibid, report of committee meeting 22-11.1920. 
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be made available for many other specialist forms of 
provision, such as dentistry. The general practitioners 
could preserve their independence by being paid by the 
patient. The main gains would be a more cost-efficient 
way of providing a better co-ordinated and better quality 
out-patient service, and the creation of a focus for the 
interaction of many varied health professionals, who 
would all gain from working with one another. The 
memorandum confirmed Newman's suggestion of 500 
consulting centres. 21 
The policy of consulting centres, however, remained 
controversial, and whilst Newman and senior public health 
officers won the argument between 1920 and 1921, the 
financial arguments against proved more persuasive 
thereafter. The grandiose proposals presented in the 
Mond memorandum were not to be found in the proposals for 
poor law reform in 1925, and not until 1938, with the 
opening of the Finsbury Health Centre, were they 
implemented by a local authority. 22 In the early 1920s 
financial arguments kept health care reform limited to 
the unification and development of existing local health 
care responsibilities. The forces for even greater 
change through the local authority option for health 
reform were held at bay. 
21. Mond memorandum, pp. 15-17. See PRO HLG 68/25. 
22. See PRO HLG 8/81; C. Webster, The Health Services 
Since the War, vol one, Problems of Health Care: The 
National Health Service Before 1957 (1988), p. 8. 
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2. AN EXCHEQUER GRANT REFORM, 1920-1921 
In November 1920 the Ministry committee on health 
organisation and poor law reform addressed the 
development of an exchequer grant reform. By then the 
Treasury had given consent to Strohmenger's solution to 
the problem of preserving relief under the Agricultural 
Rates Acts. El million would be subtracted from the 
discontinued grants and be paid to the county authorities 
through the road fund. Thus Strohmenger's first paper to 
the committee was largely a re-iteration of his September 
proposals with certain ideas now becoming rather more 
firmly established. The proposed block grant stood at a 
figure of E6,750,000 plus "such further sum as the 
Cabinet may determine". Interestingly, he now termed the 
block grant as being in aid of all health and home 
assistance services apportioned amongst health 
authorities. This made no difference to the grant itself, 
but it does show that Strohmenger was expecting some of 
the money to be used to support home assistance and not 
all on health as had previously been the expectation and 
hope. This is perhaps indicative of the growing post-war 
awareness of the financial burdens of the poor law. 
Block grant periods were to be five years. The Minister 
was to have the power of grant deduction "in the event of 
the council failing to provide satisfactory services or 
to administer them efficiently and adequately". This 
provided an important complement in central control to 
that provided by the administrative scheme. Finally, he 
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suggested that the county councils should indeed be given 
the responsibility for making central government payments 
to the second tier authorities, thus concurring with the 
general move towards establishing the county councils as 
responsible for second tier authority provision. More 
detailed plans for the payment of grant to joint local 
authorities, and the payment of interim grants, as well 
as testing for the composition of the block grant 
formula, were still in progress. 
Strohmenger had, however, revised his thinking in 
certain respects. For the first time he related 
financial reform to the strategy necessary to get the 
whole reform package accepted by local government. He 
felt that it was very relevant to central desires for 
"the extension of Health services" that the Ministry 
"clearly bear in mind that local authorities have long 
clamoured for a revision of the present grants". 
Therefore, he made a strong case for block grant reform 
on the grounds of its attractiveness to local government, 
and its consequent ability to facilitate local acceptance 
of poor law reform. He also assumed a maximum addition 
of E3,000,000 as finance then had to take account of the 
intention to promote consulting centres. Strohmenger 
strongly advocated the inclusion of an additional sum in 
the block grant to ensure acceptance of both poor law and 
exchequer grant reform. In particular, he noted that the 
current grants for the poor law and lunacy had been fixed 
since 1888, in which time expenditure on these services 
had risen from E9 million to over E30 million. It was 
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true that on many other services, such as education and 
the police there had been increases in grants "but in the 
aggregate they have been accompanied by, if not directly 
the cause of, increased payment of rates" as well. He 
concluded that even if a very large increase was made in 
central grants in the creation of a block grant it "would 
fail to satisfy the legitimate demands of local 
authorities for existing services and even if it did 
satisfy them it would be no more than enough to carry 
through the financial reform embodied in the scheme 
without the addition of further services. " The transfer 
of poor law functions did, of course, mean that local 
authorities would receive new services. Strohmenger 
concluded, that they would simply become an additional 
burden on the rates and was therefore "quite 
impracticable". The chances, therefore, of just f3 
million new money in the block grant satisfying local 
government was slim. Yet it had to be tried. 
Strohmenger's final comment focused on improving the 
ministry's argument at the margins. "We ought", he said, 
"to aim at securing that any savings consequent on the 
reform shall go in relief of local burdens; the more we 
can do this the better chance we shall have of carrying 
the reforms-. 23 
Such an analysis suggests strongly that after several 
months of investigation of the problems of local 
government finance Strohmenger had come to his own 
23. PRO MH 57/137, committee meeting 22.11.1920, paper 
CHO 14. 
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realisation of the inadequacy of a block grant, even 
including an additional sum and a redistributive formula, 
to solve them. The block grant was at best a partial 
solution, but given the climate of reform it was the best 
that could be proposed. In presenting the block grant 
proposal in such terms, moreover, Strohmenger also 
suggested that the principle of the block grant and the 
additional sum that it would include really represented 
the least that should be done to solve the problems of 
local finance, and was the least that should be done to 
secure local acceptance of poor law reform. Thus, 
Strohmenger attempted to strengthen the case for the 
persistence with even the most limited financial reform 
option of the partial block grant. 
The reason for Strohmenger's defence of his block 
grant proposals soon became clear. Consideration of 
Strohmenger's proposals earlier in 1920 had taken place 
among fellow finance officers and senior officials 
attempting to take a broad view of Ministry aims. 
However, the committee included Sir George Newman, the 
chief medical officer. Hence, the side of the ministry 
most specifically interested in the development of local 
health services was able to voice its opinion. Newman 
had resented Strohmenger's opposition to general health 
centres and now launched a controversial attack on the 
block grant proposal, and the proposed new means of 
central control with which it would be accompanied. 
Newman "indicated the very serious difficulties" which 
would arise in the maintenance of standards in the health 
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services if the form of grant aid was changed. He was 
duly invited to submit his own paper to the committee on 
the subject. 
Newman submitted his paper in late November. He began 
by conceding the "two great advantages" of a five year 
block grant system: that "the state know their liability 
for a relatively long period of time and the onus is cast 
upon the authority of preparing and submitting schemes" . 
However, there were two substantial disadvantages as 
well. First, the removal of the percentage grant in aid 
system would involve the loss of "a valuable 
administrative instrument" by which the introduction of 
services by local authorities could be stimulated. In 
the same way the grant in being paid on an annual basis 
provided "an annual incentive to efficiency". Af ixed 
five year block grant would have neither of these 
advantages. 
Secondly, he scorned Strohmenger's idea of grant 
deduction in cases of mal-provision by a local authority 
as "to be like docking a horse's tail in order to make 
him go forward". In an at least mildly sarcastic section 
he then went on to compare this system under a block 
grant unfavourably to that which pertained with a 
percentage grant. Under the percentage grant system "I 
would attract him by dangling a carrot in front of his 
nose - if it is forward we want them to go 
(and I assume 
that is the case). The one is a vis a tergo and the other 
is a vis a fronte. From an administrative point of view 
I prefer the latter. One 
is able to judge how a local 
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scheme is developing and to guide it accordingly. The 
force of this argument of course depends partly on 
whether National economy and curtailment, or development 
and expansion are considered to be the more important 
desideratum for the time being; and partly on the view 
taken of the degree of responsibility to be assigned to 
the ministry and the authority respectively" . Newman's 
understanding was that "we are planning for expansion but 
on an economical basis". Hence, he clearly felt that the 
continuation of percentage grants was feasible so long as 
too great an increase in local government spending and 
exchequer aid did not occur. 
In outlining these two problems Newman essentially 
suggested that local government could not be expected to 
provide satisfactory health service provision without the 
stimulus of percentage grants and the close control 
facilitated by percentage grants. He also attacked the 
viability of an administrative scheme as the basis of new 
central-local administrative relationships. He doubted 
that this would work for its success was "dependent upon 
the practicability of a local authority knowing how to 
construct its scheme and the central authority being in a 
position to examine the scheme and advise upon it", and, 
even if schemes could be formulated, they were likely to 
be "of the most general and elastic character" . His 
reasoning was based on the fact that both local and 
central government were "without the necessary data for 
ascertaining the needs of an area or the methods of 
provision". To prove his case he looked at the detailed 
148 
examples of maternity welfare, tuberculosis and venereal 
disease. 
With regard to maternity, for instance, there were no 
reliable figures on which to estimate the number of 
marriageable women who would be having a child in any one 
year; and of those who did have children it would be 
difficult to predict who would use the public medical 
service, and then which category patient they would be. 
A particular problem was whether a local authority should 
try and plan for provision for poor mothers given that 
they currently showed no interest, and even if they did 
their numbers would be very hard to predict. His 
conclusion was that without such data or the possibility 
of its attainment "we can only go from step to step, the 
steps differing in different areas owing to various 
social factors". This piecemeal approach was clearly 
more compatible with the employment of percentage grants 
in aid. 
He outlined similar problems in predicting 
tuberculosis needs and formulating a scheme for provision 
five years in advance. Not only would it be impossible to 
predict the number of late and middle cases, but, in 
order for authorities to draft complete schemes, they 
would need to assume widely accepted systems of 
treatment. Currently, this was not possible as "the 
sanatorium system as now practiced is in an experimental 
and evolutionary stage,, in which "medical views vary 
widely and new forms are being continually 
introduced". 
With regard to venereal diseases services such 
had been 
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the difficulty of predicting needs and the level of 
public preparedness to take up local authority treatment 
that even with only 170 clinics currently in existence 
the closing of some of them was now being considered. 
This step was certainly not due to a decline in the 
disease. In addition, syphilis treatment by salvarsan 
and gonorrhoea treatment for women were both in 
experimental stages. 
Newman compared the inappropriateness of utilising the 
administrative scheme idea with regard to health services 
with the case of education. Here administrative schemes 
did work effectively precisely because there was the 
necessary data to estimate needs, and the knowledge and 
experience of methods that had been well tried and 
accepted by all concerned. In preventive medicine he had 
to conclude that there was simply "not yet a sufficient 
body of fixed knowledge and identical medical experience, 
accepted by the whole profession, to make it practicable 
to estimate the needs of an area for 5 years" . In the 
same way government has "not yet had sufficient 
experience of the willingness of the community to subject 
itself to the present forms of early treatment 
suggested". In his summing up Newman was careful to 
indicate that such problems did not make reform 
impossible. However, his own views had been backed up by 
the recent experience of medical officers who had visited 
Norwich, Reading and Blackburn and came back with little 
data worth having. He suspected that , Still more will 
this be true of large County areas". As a result, he 
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argued that "we cannot now draft on behalf of the 
Ministry or expect health authorities to draft for local 
areas, anything like complete schemes for a 5-year 
24 period". 
The strength of opinion presented in Newman's paper 
belies the existing conception that Ministry officials 
neutrally and uncontroversially developed the block grant 
reform in the early 1920s. For the basis of Newman's 
argument was the perception of the block grant as being 
primarily a tool of expenditure control rather than an 
instrument for improving local health services. Newman 
clearly saw Strohmenger's advocacy of a block grant as 
Treasury induced. It was also based on the perception 
that the controls suggested to go with the block grant 
would be of significantly less use in relation to 
influencing local health policies than those which were 
associated with percentage grants. In the latter respect 
it is clear that the idea of the block grant as a means 
of increasing local autonomy was universally absent from 
the private discourse of Ministry officials. Overall, 
Newman's views reflected the public health division's 
desire for no reform of financial central-local relations 
and instead the perpetuation of percentage grants as the 
best means of stimulating and controlling local health 
care development. 
Newman's views were discussed with respect but they 
were not allowed to disrupt the reform package. The 
committee "agreed that the difficulties, which he felt to 
24. ibid, committee meeting 26.11.1920, paper CHO 19. 
151 
exist were not fatal to the block grant system, but 
pointed to the fact that a satisfactory minimum of 
services in the scheme as a whole was all that could be 
secured, and that the schemes submitted by the 
authorities must be brought to the test of the average 
present experience.,, 25 At a later meeting the committee 
formalised its conclusions. It was agreed that in 
assessing local authority schemes "the conditions of 
grant would require such degree of uniformity and 
standardisation only as would be involved in securing a 
minimum of servicesil. In addition, only the minimum of 
efficiency was necessary as a condition for the 
26 continuation of grant payment. 
In short, the other members of the Committee were 
forced to admit that the focus of central-local relations 
under a block grant was only going to allow the central 
authority to ensure the minimum of provision by a local 
authority. This was a very low measure to put on the aim 
of uniform provision, one of the supposedly key aims of 
the block grant reform, and by far inferior to the 
administrative power given by a percentage grant which 
actually enabled the central authority to stimulate the 
local authority to better provision. The only revision 
that the committee felt it could make that began to 
answer Newman's criticisms was that of compelling local 
authorities to make interim schemes so that five year 
25. ibid, report of committee meeting 26.11.1920. 
26. ibid, report of committee meeting 29.11.1920. 
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schemes that then proved ridiculously inadequate could be 
avoided. 
Obviously, the importance of the block grant reform 
for other reasons, and the need to set up a package of 
reform that would get the poor law reform through in 
particular, were higher priorities than the preservation 
of central authority to ensure good provision in the 
localities. Indeed this was confirmed in a meeting of 
the full committee. In late November "it was agreed that 
local authorities would be willing to pay a relatively 
big price to get rid of the Department in details of 
administration, and that this would be secured by the 
block grant system". Clearly, therefore, the block grant 
was seen as a dupe to get the local authorities to accept 
the whole poor law and health reform, which the committee 
had been set up to ensure in the first place. The 
potential costs in terms of, for instance, lost control 
and unsatisfactory local provision, had to be born. 27 
Consequently, Strohmenger's' proposals for a block 
grant, now including an additional sum of E5 million, and 
the central controls to be associated with it were 
included in the Mond memorandum in May 1921 as an 
essential part of an integrated Ministry of Health plan 
to reform the poor law. In the memorandum the arguments 
that made senior officers such as Sir Arthur Robinson 
sympathetic to the block grant in the first place were 
also restated. The block grant would end wasteful 
detailed control Of individual items of expenditure and 
27. ibid, report of committee meeting 26.11.1920. 
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would bring some measure of equalisation of income 
between different local authority areas. 28 By May 
Strohmenger had settled on what he perceived then to be 
the best means of securing this equalisation. He 
proposed that the block grant should be distributed to 
local authorities on the basis of population "but that, 
in every case where the assessable value per head is 
below the average, the basis of the apportionment should 
be increased in the ratio of this deficiency". In making 
this proposal Strohmenger heeded Macleod's advice in 1920 
by committing the Ministry to rating and valuation 
reform, either before or soon after the introduction of 
the block grant to ensure reliable figures assessed on a 
uniform basis. Strohmenger had worked for some time on 
the possibility of the block grant formula taking in to 
account the special incidence of sickness, but he had 
found health statistics an "impracticable" basis for 
modification of the formula. 
The Mond memorandum ended with what the Ministry 
believed were the main selling points of the block grant 
reform. It would substantially decentralise the 
administration of local health services and provide a 
"definite limitation of exchequer liability for a term of 
29 years". Only by reconsidering the evolution of the 
Ministry of Health plan in the early 1920s does it become 
clear that these two aims were the product not of a 
ministry consensus but grew out of conflict in which the 
28. Mond memorandum, pp. 19-24. See PRO HLG 68/25. 
29. ibid, p. 24. 
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voices for the limited reform option of the block grant 
had to shout down the voices against change of any kind. 
3. THE BATTLE FOR GRANT REFORM, 1921-1924 
The Mond memorandum was not presented to Cabinet in 1921 
due to the adverse economic situation, and existing 
literature suggests that serious consideration of the 
proposals made therein did not re-occur until late 1924. 
As has already been shown this was largely true with 
regard to reform of the poor law and local health care. 
It would be a fallacy, however, to believe that the 
controversy over the proposal to introduce a block grant 
within the ministry of Health was resolved in 1921 and 
that it remained the accepted departmental view until the 
prospect of implementation arrived in 1924. Rather, in 
the absence of a will for poor law reform, Strohmenger 
and the accountant-general's office attempted to bring in 
a block grant reform by itself. Conversely, Newman and 
other senior public health officers continued to argue 
against a block grant reform either on its own or as part 
of an inter-related package with poor law reform. This 
battle within the Ministry was played out against a 
changing background of central government attempts to 
bring public expenditure under control in the economy 
crisis of the early 1920s through such mediums as the 
Geddes and Meston Committees. 
The first initiative within the Ministry was provided 
by the internal committee on health and poor law reform, 
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which continued to meet even after the Mond memorandum 
had been written. In August 1921 a meeting led by 
Robinson, Symonds and Strohmenger, senior generalist and 
finance officers, in the absence of any senior public 
health officers, discussed the possibility of bringing in 
a block grant on its own. The proposal was to replace 
the percentage grants for tuberculosis, venereal disease, 
blind welfare and maternity and child welfare with a 
block grant as an "installment of reform". The county 
and county borough councils were to be responsible for 
the distribution of the block grant "and entrusted with 
full control over the detailed administration of the 
30 services". However, the proposal was soon dropped 
after the committee had had discussions with 
H. O. Stuchbury, the senior official responsible for 
maternity and child welfare in the public health 
division, and had come "to the conclusion that any 
legislation for the purpose of bringing about the 
suggested change would provoke opposition not less 
serious than any opposition likely to be encountered if 
it were attempted to give effect to the comprehensive 
31 scheme of reform". 
The source of opposition was not explicitly made 
clear. The Treasury would have supported a block grant 
by itself even had it meant the inclusion of an 
additional sum, for it would have helped limit the extent 
of grant aid over the long-term. Similarly, all the 
30. PRO MH 57/137, report of committee meeting 9.8.1921. 
31. ibid 
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evidence of earlier Ministry consideration suggests that 
it was believed that the local authorities would have 
welcomed a block grant reform by itself in order to be 
rid of petty central controls. Consequently, it would be 
most logical to suggest that Stuchbury was voicing again 
the opposition of the public health division in general 
to a grant reform, and his own opposition to the 
inclusion of maternity and child welfare in the block 
grant in particular. Maternity and child welfare was the 
most recently initiated service and was arguably in most 
need still of the stimulus to development provided by a 
percentage grant. It is relevant to note also that 
senior public health officers now felt no obligation to 
sacrifice their own service priorities on grants for the 
sake of health care development through poor law reform. 
They could focus unambiguously on opposition to a grant 
reform. 
In August 1921 such opposition proved prohibitive to 
reform. However, Sir Arthur Robinson was eager to stop 
inertia over percentage grants from setting in. He 
initiated an inquiry in to the duplication of inspection 
by officers and gave "instruction to the divisions 
concerned and the A-G [Strohmenger] as to the possibility 
of relaxing the detailed control now exercised by the 
32 Department over expenditure on grant-aided services" . 
That the irritation in both central and local government 
over the detailed controls associated with percentage 
grants persisted throughout the 1920s is evidence of the 
32. ibid 
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limited success, if even that, of Robinson's initiative 
in 1921. Yet, the fact that it was attempted at all 
shows that in the search for grant reform Strohmenger and 
the accountant general's office had the powerful support 
of the permanent secretary. 
August 1921 also saw the creation of the Geddes 
Committee, whose brief was to recommend economies in 
public expenditure. The Ministry's evidence to the 
Committee argued against the perpetuation of percentage 
grants and "clearly implied that in our judgement these 
health services have now so far established themselves 
that, as a general rule, they will be maintained and 
extended by local authorities under local pressure" and, 
therefore, no longer needed the financial incentive of a 
percentage grant. 33 This was expressed as a Ministry 
view, but clearly contradicted Newman's view in the 
Ministry committee on health organisation and poor law 
reform earlier in the year. Nevertheless, the Ministry's 
evidence provided the basis for the Geddes Co=ittee to 
recommend the fixing of the health grants for 1922/1923 
at the level of grants paid for 1921/1922, and their 
distribution by means of rationing. This the Ministry 
agreed to, and indeed in February 1922 Robinson was able 
to remark that implementation had been carried out "with 
nothing in the nature of a serious protest from the local 
authorities" and without damaging local provision. 
Furthermore, he commented that "the policy of using the 
33. PRO HLG 52/342: Meston Committee-Block Grants, papers 
of Sir Arthur Robinson, 1922. Robinson to Sir Alfred 
Mond, 25.2.1922., p. 2 
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present financial pressure to bring in the principle of a 
fixed grant has been justified". 34 Fixed grant rationing 
had, therefore, achieved an incremental step towards one 
of the central principles of a block grant. 
Robinson did not, however, perceive f ixed grant 
rationing as a permanent solution to the question of 
grant reform. He informed Sir Alfred Mond, the then 
Minister of Health, in February 1922, that whilst it 
provided a means of controlling grant aid and was not 
unpopular with local government, it still entailed 
detailed checking of individual items of local 
expenditure. "Nor", he continued, "have we solved except 
in the most general way and in regard to parts only of 
the services, the problem of bringing the state 
contribution in to relation with the ascertained health 
needs of the authority or the area. Accordingly, though 
we may have to and may be able to carry on for a year or 
two on the present arrangements, I cannot myself regard 
them as a permanent substitute for the system of 
percentage grants, and the question of such a substitute 
still confronts us". 35 
The Geddes Committee made a further recommendation for 
the permanent abolition of health percentage grants and 
their replacement by a block grant. However, this 
received a cautious response from the ministry. The 
Ministry had a policy of block grant reform set out in 
the Mond memorandum, which Robinson confidently described 
34. ibid, p-5. 
35. ibid 
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as "our departmental view of what the permanent system 
should bell. Yet, a block grant reform carried out in the 
wake of the Geddes Committee was likely to be hasty and 
framed with economy as the highest priority. Moreover, 
the Ministry's block grant policy was, of course, 
"inextricably bound up with a reorganisation of the whole 
system of local government consequent on the abolition of 
the poor lawil . Robinson took it that such a 
"reorganisation is not practical politics now or likely 
36 to be in the near future" . Hence, the Ministry of 
Health in a manner similar to other spending departments 
responsible for percentage grant relations with local 
authorities did not endorse the Geddes reco=endation for 
a block grant. This conflict resulted in the creation of 
the Meston Committee in 1922 to further investigate the 
grant question. 
The Ministry again adopted a cautious approach. it 
was prescribed by the desire to safeguard the integrated 
poor law-exchequer grant reform plan. Robinson kept this 
out of the terms of reference of the Meston Committee, 
and adopted a minimalist approach to giving evidence. 
Officials would merely describe the principles of 
existing health grants and would only volunteer views on 
what they felt ought to be the principles which guide all 
central grants after the local authority associations had 
given evidence, and only when specifically asked to. 
However, Robinson was obliged to write to all senior 
officers asking them to prepare evidence. This provided 
36. ibid, p. 6. 
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a new opportunity for the public health division to argue 
their case for the continuation of percentage grants and 
the dropping of a block grant reform either on its own or 
in association with poor law reform. 37 
H. A. de Montmorency, the senior official responsible for 
tuberculosis, was particularly upset by the Geddes 
Report's damning description of the percentage grant as a 
, 'money spinning device". On the contrary, he claimed, it 
"has undoubtedly proved effective in aiding the 
development of the services to which it has been applied 
and it is permissible to assume that no other form of 
financial assistance would have given equally 
satisfactory results" . He also suggested that removal 
now of a percentage grant could have adverse 
consequences. "Local authorities are under no statutory 
obligation to make any provision at all, and there is 
ground for fearing that, in some areas at all events, the 
withdrawal of the percentage grant would be followed by 
an appreciable relaxation of local effort and a 
consequent reduction in the standard of provision". He 
admitted that provision in some areas was clearly 
inadequate and felt that "it would be unfortunate if the 
Department were permanently deprived of the power to 
stimulate backward authorities to a policy of greater 
efficiency". 
De Montmorency then went on to question the 
appropriateness of a block grant to funding tuberculosis 
services. "The state", he felt, "cannot regard the 
37. ibid, Robinson to Maclachlan and Stuchbury 17.2.1922. 
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problem of tuberculosis as a mere aggregation of local 
problems towards the solution of which it need make no 
other contribution than that of an annual financial 
dole". The service was still in its infancy, and its 
development had been retarded by the effects of the War 
and the post-War economies. Consequently, he felt that 
local authorities "will require for some time to come the 
expert guidance which a central department is in a 
position to supply", guidance that could be best given in 
a system of central-local relations based upon percentage 
grants. 
At the same time he criticised the concept of having 
fixed grants for five years in relation to aiding local 
tuberculosis services. To fix such grants on an 
equitable basis would require knowledge of the cost of 
treatment, the incidence of the disease in different 
areas, the extent of local provision, and the nature of 
the service provided. De Montmorency pointed out that 
prices had been unstable since the First World War and 
could be expected to remain so. Thus the cost of 
treatment over a five year period could not be predicted 
with any certainty. Similarly, there was little way of 
telling whether new forms of treatment, such as the 
village settlement, would come in and replace residential 
treatment. Finally, he suggested that the evaluation of 
the extent of local provision, and the creation of a 
uniform standard of provision throughout the country was 
38 
impossible since there were such "wide variations". 
38. ibid, minute by de Montmorency 10.4.1922. 
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A. B. Maclachlan, the senior official responsible for 
venereal disease services, agreed with his colleague. 
There were great variations in the provision of both 
tuberculosis and venereal disease services, which could 
be best made good by the continuing stimulus and close 
control provided by percentage grants. He believed that 
the formula for distribution of a block grant would 
always be grossly unfair unless some account was taken of 
local expenditure and the local incidence of venereal 
disease. Like de Montmorency he perceived the block 
grant as principally a money saving device, and if forced 
to advise change from percentage grants preferred even 
the continuation of the temporary system of fixed grant 
39 rationing to a block grant. 
Maclachlan and de Montmorency received further support 
from Stuchbury, who argued strenuously against the 
inclusion of maternity and child welfare under any 
proposed block grant. It could not take account of the 
great variations in types of work, costs of each item of 
work, the degree of voluntary agency involvement, the 
cost of food and milk, and the complexity of capitation 
grants. As it would be fixed for periods of five years 
nor could it respond to the great variations in local 
need for financial assistance. For, he claimed, "M &- CW 
expenditure is to a certain extent explosive and 
intermittent: a widespread outbreak of measles will close 
the centres and day nurseries and fill the hospitals and 
necessitate largely increased payments for nursing: the 
39. ibid, minute by Maclachlan 10.4.1922. 
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cost of milk rises steeply with a local strike or trade 
depression etc". 
Stuchbury also cast doubt on the redistributive aim of 
the block grant. He accepted that if a grant was 
allocated on the basis of helping all local authorities 
to meet health provision standards prescribed by the 
Ministry then it would perhaps be right to allocate grant 
on the basis of expenditure "with additions for backward 
districts". However, such a grant would also entail 
"deductions for the more active districts, which it would 
be difficult to justify in practice". Indeed Stuchbury 
dismissed all potential factors, including population and 
assessable value, as a valid basis for a block grant 
formula. For they would not prove logically consistent 
between different residential areas. He was personally 
of the view that any new basis for grant distribution 
"must give results as near as possible to the present 
allocation on expenditure, if it is to be acceptable to 
local authorities", which suggested that even if a reform 
was implemented it should not really change anything. 
At the same time as attacking the appropriateness of 
aiding local maternity and child welfare services through 
a block grant, he actively endorsed the continuation of 
aid through a percentage grant. Much had been said about 
the percentage grant encouraging extravagance. Yet, so 
Stuchbury argued, this was not the case with maternity 
and child welfare. Under the 1918 Maternity and Child 
Welfare Act the Minister had been given powers to prevent 
extravagance, which had been duly used. He argued that 
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"it will be difficult to get local authorities to fill up 
the numerous gaps in their schemes without such an 
inducement as the percentage grant affords". In 
particular "opportunities for development often occur 
suddenly and unexpectedly", such as the bequeathment of a 
house as a maternity home. In these cases "unless the 
Department was in a position to promise an addition to 
the grant the offer might be lost". He also argued the 
importance of percentage grant funding to the continued 
encouragement of voluntary society provision in local 
areas. Without the assurance of a grant for half of 
their expenditure from local authorities their 
40 involvement may be undermined. 
The arguments of Stuchbury as well as those of De 
Montmorency and Maclachlan in relation to the 
disadvantages of block grant funding and the advantages 
of percentage grant funding for securing local health 
development in accord with Ministry aims were endorsed by 
Sir George Newman in his paper in May 1922. He felt that 
the advantages of continuing with percentage grants had 
been put "very clearly and fairly". He himself felt that 
"for new services such as school medical service, 
tuberculosis, venereal disease and maternity and child 
welfare in which local authorities require both incentive 
and detailed guidance I doubt if/ under existing 
circumstances of local government, there has been a 
better system than grants in aid. I doubt if any other 
system would have been workable or able to "deliver the 
40. ibid, minute by Stuchbury 17.3.1922. 
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goods" in view of the absence of statutory compulsory 
powers". 
However, Newman, alive to the strong forces massing in 
favour of a reform of grants, searched for a compromise. 
He accepted that percentage grants tended to encourage 
unequal standards in provision and that economy in grant 
aid was a legitimate aim of government. Hence, he 
endorsed the continuation of the fixed grant rationing 
system as a compromise that would retain the essential 
percentage basis whilst making the desired changes, and 
"without upsetting the local authority unduly or 
seriously disturbing the medical services, either in kind 
or degree". He also made encouraging comments about the 
introduction of a block grant but stressed that this 
should be an option which should be introduced in the 
slightly longer-term once the local health services, most 
of which were recent in origin, had got off the ground 
under the aegis of percentage grants or rationed fixed 
percentage grants. He helpfully suggested that the 
concept of a block grant "should receive our continuous 
41 
attention during the next two or three years". 
Newman's efforts to produce a compromise and delay a 
block grant reform, however, came up against equally 
strong lobbying from Strohmenger. He replied to 
Robinson's request for views on which to base evidence 
for the Meston Committee with a new plan to bring in a 
block grant for the public health services on 
its own. 
In a paper of April 1922 he argued for an omnibus grant 
41. ibid, minute by Newman 15.5.1922. 
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to be voted for all grant aided public health services to 
the equivalent of the aggregate public health grants 
voted for 1922/1923. He felt it "essential that one 
grant only should be given in order to obtain some 
elasticity between the services and, further it would 
involve a substantial re-organisation of the office, 
especially of the medical division". In other words, 
Strohmenger intended that under an omnibus grant detailed 
central control would largely disappear. He also 
suggested that the grant would be fixed for three years. 
The grant would be distributed to individual local 
authorities in line with existing grant aid, although 
this would remain provisional until detailed inquiries 
had been carried out on local health provision during the 
next two years. He clearly meant that the grant should 
in due course be distributed on the basis of greater 
knowledge of local authority needs. However, herein also 
lay the origin of central control by means of survey to 
give officials the necessary information on which to 
ascertain whether local authorities were using grant aid 
wisely. Strohmenger's proposal was overall essentially a 
block grant for health services based on present levels 
42 
of expenditure. 
At the same time Sir Arthur Robinson came under 
pressure from Sir George Barstow, the Treasury official 
responsible for local government finance. In late May 
Barstow sent Robinson his notes for ministerial briefing. 
These showed that the Treasury aim was to reduce central 
42. ibid, minute by Strohmenger 21.4.1922. 
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finance to local authorities through the introduction of 
a block grant to cover all local authority grant-aided 
services. The overriding priority of the Treasury's 
desire for expenditure control is born out by his 
statement that the whole point of a block grant was "to 
get rid of the disastrous inducement to expenditure which 
the knowledge that only a percentage will require to be 
paid for locally brings to the local authority", and that 
"it would be a matter of comparative indifference to the 
Treasury" upon which basis the block grant was then 
distributed to local authorities. Barstow, however, was 
aware that at that time such a block grant "would excite 
very strong local opposition. In seeking the ideal 
solution from the exchequer point of view, we might lose 
the whole game". Consequently, he concluded that for the 
time being the Treasury would be "content with 
stereotyping grants at figures no higher than they have 
already reached and thus stemming the rising tide of 
government grants". This appeared to give some basis for 
believing that Strohmenger's proposed omnibus health 
grant might receive Treasury support. 
43 
Consequently, Robinson, ignoring the statements of 
Newman and the senior officials of the public health 
division, recommended Strohmenger's "very suggestive 
44 
memorandum" to Sir Alfred Mond in May 1922. The 
immediate response was encouraging. Douglas Veale, 
Mond's personal secretary, informed the Minister on the 
43. ibid, copy of Barstow's notes for briefing Churchill 
before meeting Lord Meston 27.5.1922. 
44. ibid, Robinson to Mond 25.2.1922. 
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content of all the internal Ministry discussion since the 
beginning of the year. He expressed his objections to 
the percentage grant system and found Stromenger's 
proposal for an omnibus grant and its method of 
allocation "attractive" and "worthy of consideration". 
Yet, Veale subsequently advised Robinson to take the idea 
no further with Mond until after the parliamentary 
recess. 45 Clearly, the Minister did not consider reform 
a matter of urgency, and indeed this evidence is 
consistent with later comments made by Robinson to 
Neville Chamberlain that Mond was not the most zealously 
reforming or conscientious of ministers, and was often 
hard to locate. 
Nevertheless, senior officials of the ministry of 
Health were now attempting to promote a new proposal for 
interim grant reform. It excited renewed defence of 
percentage grants from senior public health officials. 
Sir Thomas Hughes of the Welsh Board of Health, and 
previously a member of the Kempe Committee, expressed 
concern over the possible implementation of an omnibus 
health grant in Wales. In particular, he was concerned 
that the grant reform would jeopardise the Board's 
agreement with the King Edward VII Welsh National 
Memorial Association, under which the latter provided 
tuberculosis services. 
46 Back in Whitehall, Sir 
Frederick Willis, Chairman of the Board of Control, which 
was attached to the ministry of Health and was 
45. ibid, Veale to Robinson 31.5.1922. 
46. ibid, Sir Thomas Hughes to Robinson 28.6.1922. 
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responsible for local authority mental deficiency 
services, argued against the inclusion of the mental 
deficiency grant in the proposed grant. Mental deficiency 
had only been a responsibility of local authorities since 
1914 and very little had been done before 1918. Even 
since then encouragement to spend had been followed by 
retrenchment and there were very wide variations in 
development. The service was still in its infancy and 
Willis believed that the percentage grant was still 
needed to stimulate activity. Moreover, there were very 
great variations in the cost of maintaining patients in 
institutions, as this was generally based upon co- 
operation with local charities. If a uniform grant were 
to be introduced the central contribution to the local 
cost of patients would frequently be either too low or 
too high. Neither the extent or content of provision had 
settled down sufficiently to support the idea that the 
necessary central aid could be predicted and put in to a 
fixed consolidated health grant. 
47 
New papers were also written by Maclachlan and 
Stuchbury to Robinson in July 1922. Stuchbury heeded the 
warning of Mosse, the Ministry of Health official who was 
serving as secretary to the Meston Committee, that Lord 
Meston was interested in instances of local authority 
extravagance in the usage of percentage grants and 
how 
they were dealt with. He revealed that eight 
investigations of local authorities had recently been 
made, which had shown that there was considerable 
47. ibid, Sir F. J. Willis to Robinson 30.6.1922. 
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extravagance in three cases; Bradford, Nottingham and 
Stepney. In each case the very conduct of the 
investigation or central pressure had remedied the 
extravagance. Hence, he upheld his earlier claim that 
financial control was not only potentially better under a 
percentage grant than a block grant but was indeed a 
reality. 48 Sir George Newman appeared now to have 
accepted reform, but the tenor of his comments in a 
minute of late June suggested that he was no willing 
participant in the Ministry consensus for an omnibus 
health grant. He clearly found it irritating that the 
proponents of any block grant policy should assume that 
it would carry with it a reduction in the medical 
supervision of local authority health services. On the 
contrary, he felt that "obviously we should be saved a 
certain amount of detailed consideration of expenditure, 
but that would not absolve us from an adequate 
supervision of medical and health questions". Thi s he 
mentioned to "avoid misunderstanding. '. 49 
The flurry of internal papers arguing against 
Strohmenger's omnibus health grant were received by 
Robinson without enthusiasm. Willis, paper on mental 
deficiency was handed on to Strohmenger, who reacted by 
suggesting that there was "no insuperable difficulty in 
abandoning the percentage grant even in this case". He 
suggested that, simply, the local authorities would be 
obliged as with other health services, to make a scheme 
48. ibid, Stuchbury and Maclachlan to Robinson 8.7.1922. 
49. ibid, minute by Newman 29.6.1922. 
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of mental deficiency needs for the next three years 
together with an estimation of cost. The Board of 
Control would then do the same for each local authority 
on the basis of accounts and inquiries and on the 
assumption of the need only to maintain the existing 
service without expansion or retrenchment. The final 
grant would then be equivalent to 1/2 of the assessments 
made by local and central government with the addition of 
a capitation payment each year on the actual excess 
number of new urgent cases over deaths and discharges. 
The grant would then become subject to the same 
conditions as the consolidated grant. 50 
Strohmenger remained firm on his grant proposal and 
suggested that it would be distributed to local 
authorities in accord with local need as much as 
possible, even though he recognised that this would not 
be perfect until rating and valuation reform had also 
been undertaken. 51 Robinson remained behind Strohmenger 
and the proposal for an omnibus health grant formed the 
main text for the Ministry's draft evidence to the Meston 
Committee in July 1922. The grant was to be a 
consolidated health grant equivalent to the aggregate of 
grants voted for 1922/1923. From this a single 
consolidated grant would be given to each local authority 
which was roughly consistent with what they were then 
currently receiving. To gain the grant local authorities 
would have to submit schemes of work for the next three 
50. ibid, Strohmenger to Willis 7.7.1922. 
51. ibid, Strohmenger to Robinson 8.6.1922. 
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years to the Ministry, which were to embody economies 
where possible but should also contain provision for 
essential developments. The Ministry would then have the 
power to make grant assessment according to its opinion 
of the scheme, and would continue to consider grant 
levels with reference to inquiries in to local authority 
and voluntary agency work. Robinson's triumphant 
conclusion to the draft was that "under this system, 
control of detail centrally would to a large extent 
disappear", but good local provision would be ensured 
through periodical inspection and audit. 52 
However, by August Ministry officials had got cold 
feet. As a result of a further paper by Robinson in 
which he laid out the pros and cons of the percentage 
grant system and the principles of the grant reform 
contained in the Mond memorandum a meeting was held 
between Robinson, Newman, Strohmenger and Stuchbury. A 
whole series of questions were posited about the working 
of percentage grants in practice, which suggested that 
the officials, particularly Robinson, had become wary of 
making grand policy for grant reform in the absence of 
detailed knowledge of that which they were seeking to 
replace. Robinson announced at the end of the meeting 
that he needed "clear guidance on the existing facts 
examined on the spot and reported on with the various 
standpoints of administration, medicine and finance". 
52. ibid, Ministry of Health evidence to the Meston 
Committee on exchequer grants in respect of locally 
administered services. Draft circulated amongst Ministry 
of Health officials by Robinson 4.7.1922. 
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Duly a one year programme of inspection of the 
tuberculosis, maternity and child welfare and mental 
deficiency services provided in a number of local 
authorities was laid out. Stuchbury was made responsible 
for its administration. Newman and Strohmenger were to 
put forward nominees to inspect the financial and medical 
issues involved. 53 
In effect this meeting had witnessed Robinson drawing 
the Ministry back from the brink of proposing a health 
block grant without poor law reform to the Meston 
Committee. It may be that Robinson had simply become 
uncertain of the correctness of such a reform in the 
absence of detailed knowledge. However, the lack of 
solid support from his Minister, and the logic of the 
Mond memorandum that a block grant brought in at the same 
time as poor law reform was vital to the latter's 
successful acceptance by local government, must have both 
featured very heavily in his thinking. In this context 
the creation of new lines of inquiry in to the working of 
percentage grants may be seen as a means of ending the 
conflict amongst senior officials whilst still keeping 
the ministry committed in principle to a block grant as 
laid out in the Mond memorandum, to which Robinson was 
personally committed. The Ministry's advocacy of a 
partial health grant, but one only allied to poor law 
reform, was the one which was finally put in evidence to 
the Meston committee in 1923. 
53. ibid, untitled paper and discussion notes by Robinson 
11.8.1922. 
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As has already been shown the Meston Committee 
achieved little in the way of progression towards reform, 
and between 1923 and 1924 Ministry officials did not 
reconsider its position on grants. Evidence of the one 
year programme of inspection in to the working of 
percentage grants is not traceable. However, when 
Neville Chamberlain took office in late 1924 and 
expressed his willingness to carry poor law reform 
internal Ministry discussion was renewed. The of f icial 
Ministry advocacy of a block grant allied to poor law 
reform was contained in the Mond memorandum, but it is 
clear that the persistent opposition of Sir George Newman 
and other senior public health officials to a block grant 
reform had helped to undermine the Ministry's commitment 
to the memorandum. Strohmenger, writing to Sir Arthur 
Robinson and Sir Aubrey Symonds in December 1924 on the 
subject of poor law reform, reminded them that they had 
reserved the question of the financial effect of the 
proposals for further discussion. He duly set about 
convincing them that block grant reform was necessary by 
detailing the results of a speculative analysis of the 
financial cost to the exchequer of the transfer of poor 
law services and their administration under public health 
and other acts if a system of percentage grants was 
retained. Here it is important to note that such 
services under poor law authorities did not rank for 
grant aid. If they were transferred to county and county 
borough councils and appropriated under other legislation 
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then they would become eligible for percentage grant 
aid. 54 
Macleod had made the first calculations and concluded 
that reform on this basis would cost the exchequer an 
additional E9,456,000 a year in percentage grant aid. 
Two reductions of this figure were possible. If, as a 
result of this increase in grants there was an equivalent 
decrease in county and county borough rates then grants 
under the terms of the 1923 Agricultural Rates Act would 
fall by E256,000. More significantly, if the exceptional 
grant for pauper lunatics remained on the basis of 4s per 
head after transfer to the local authorities rather than 
become based instead on 50% of net expenditure, which was 
the grant aid that the local authorities enjoyed, then 
the overall increase in exchequer grant aid as a result 
of poor law reform could be reduced to E6,330,000.55 
Francis had considered that "there seems good ground for 
accepting all the data postulated by Mr Macleod". 
However, he felt that the county and county borough 
councils would make a strong case for provision for 
transferred pauper lunatics to be based on the same 
system of percentage grant aid as their existing 
lunatics. The Ministry would find it very difficult to 
construct an argument in opposition. Hence, Francis 
suggested that the cost to the exchequer 
in additional 
percentage grant aid consequent upon poor 
law reform 
would most probably be up around 
E9,000,000. Francis 
54. PRO HLG 68/25, Strohmenger to Symonds and Robinson 
2.12.1924. 
55. ibid, Macleod to Francis 12.11.1924 
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found this figure "startling" and further stated that 
"once the general principle of transferring work from the 
poor law authorities to grant aided authorities is 
admitted, I am disposed to think that the charge on the 
state would prove to be greater rather than less than the 
56 estimated amount". 
Macleod did some further calculations based upon 
limiting the potential for pauper education services 
being allowed to rank for grant aid if appropriated under 
education acts, which slightly reduced the extra cost to 
the exchequer of poor law reform. He also calculated 
that if there were no appropriation of transferred poor 
law services under public health or education acts then 
the extra cost to the exchequer in percentage grant aid 
would be down to a total of E2,750,000. However, were 
this to happen much of the social content of the poor law 
reform would be lost. Only by appropriation could local 
services be unified and provided at a better standard for 
the whole community. 57 
Consequently, in his paper in December 1924 
Strohmenger stated that "without elaborate separation of 
accounts and imposition of onerous conditions the 
transfer of the duties and powers of the guardians and 
the consequential absorption in to the ordinary services 
of the local authorities of the poor law duties so far as 
they were covered by these services would add materially 
to the present percentage grants from the exchequer so 
56. ibid, Francis to Strohmenger and Sir Aubrey Symonds 
13.11.1924. 
57. ibid, Strohmenger to Symonds and Robinson 2.12.1924. 
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far as the services were state-aided". He also felt that 
it was probably inevitable that there would be extensions 
of existing services which would ultimately make the 
figure of additional cost more in the order of Macleod's 
initial estimates rather than his later ones. He 
continued by stating that "whatever the figure may be it 
seems almost certain that it will be so considerable as 
to make the cost of transfer of the poor law by itself 
almost prohibitive and to constitute an extremely strong 
case for poor law reform to be accompanied by some 
measure of financial reform". He believed that the 
positive arguments in favour of a block grant reform had 
been very well made in the Mond memorandum, and the 
analysis of the cost of a poor law reform based upon the 
continuation of percentage grants had merely confirmed 
the overwhelming weight of argument from an exchequer 
point of view in favour of poor law reform being 
accompanied by a block grant reform. It was not only a 
good thing in itself but was the only financially viable 
option by which the Ministry could get the poor law 
reform on to the statute books. 58 
Strohmenger advocated a block grant reform based upon 
the proposals included in the Mond memorandum to Robinson 
and Symonds which they duly accepted. The integrated 
poor law-block grant reform plan was presented whole to 
Chamberlain later in the month, and the Mond memorandum 
proposals for a block grant were to be found re-iterated 
in Chamberlain's poor law reform proposals circulated to 
58. ibid 
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local authorities in 1925. However, as has been shown, 
the presentation of these proposals to Chamberlain did 
not represent the mere promotion of a Ministry view which 
had remained unchallenged and gathering dust since 1921. 
Certain aspects of the poor law (health care) reform had 
been novelly formulated within the Ministry and had 
aroused certain intra-departmental controversy. But this 
was as nothing compared with the block grant. The block 
grant reform option had aroused considerable controversy 
within the Ministry of Health both before and after the 
creation of the Mond memorandum. The accountant- 
general's office and the chief medical officer, backed up 
by the public health division, had been in semi- 
continuous conflict, and there had been numerous attempts 
to initiate a block grant on its own which were foiled by 
the public health division. In late 1924 the battle for 
a block grant reform was still being waged and was only 
won by Strohmenger through his sheer tenacity to win the 
argument and so achieve that which the Treasury had 
wanted since the end of the War. Ironically, 
Strohmenger's victory within the Ministry of Health was 
not to be rewarded with enactment for another five years 
because of the Treasury's greed for a block grant to 
cover all local authority aided services. 
That Strohmenger had still to win the case for the 
block grant reform in late 1924 raises the question of 
why he no longer had the unequivocal support of 
the 
permanent secretary, Sir Arthur 
Robinson. In 1921 and 
again in 1922 he had stressed 
his adherence to block 
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grant reform related to poor law reform. However, in 
August 1922 he had put a stop to Strohmenger's plan for 
an omnibus health grant on its own despite having been 
initially in favour, and the fact that the question of 
grant reform as part of poor law reform had apparently 
been left open for resolution by Strohmenger in late 1924 
suggests that even Robinson's support for a block grant 
reform as part of a larger reform had wavered. As will 
be shown in the next chapter that the block grant 
remained part of the reform package owed much to the 
political imperative of Neville Chamberlain, and the 
position taken by Robinson and other officials on both 
poor law and exchequer grant reform changed in response 
to the changing attitudes of the local authority 
associations. it is to the forces acting from outside on 
the making of policy within the bureaucratic elite that 
the thesis now turns. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REFORM 
The first part of this chapter reconsiders the view that 
the liberal reformist motivations of Neville Chamberlain 
combined with his political acumen was instrumental in 
achieving the enactment of the reforms developed within 
the Ministry of Health in the early 1920s. That 
Chamberlain was a skilful politician who finally helped 
to win reform in Cabinet is not to be doubted but his 
liberal reformist motivations should come more under 
scrutiny. The basis for such inquiry is provided by the 
extension of the theoretical re- conceptualisation of the 
rationality and neutrality of civil servants to that of 
politicians. Chamberlain's pursuit of poor law reform in 
the late 1920s has been characterised already by Crowther 
as implicitly the politically motivated preservation of a 
system of social policy which serves the interests of one 
class over another. 
' It should, therefore, be asked if 
Chamberlain's motivations for pursuing reform, and then 
the limited reform options chosen by the Ministry of 
Health, should be characterised as stemming from shared 
values, aims and approach to policy with the bureaucratic 
elite; and whether Chamberlain should be merely seen as a 
highly competent cipher of that elite's aims. Moreover, 
Crowther's assessment suggests the need for further 
inquiry in to the party political motivations of Neville 
1. M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System 1834-1929 (1981), 
pp. 102-103. See also M. A. Crowther, British Social Policy 
1914-1939 (1988), p. 49. 
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Chamberlain in promoting reform. Similarly, it must also 
be asked whether perceptions of the values and aims of 
politicians influenced the bureaucratic response to 
political efforts to carry reform. An investigation of 
answers to these questions is made in the first part of 
the chapter. 
The second and third parts of the chapter reconsider 
the view that Chamberlain and the Ministry of Health 
achieved reform that met the plurality of interests. 
This is based upon the observation of political 
scientists that those within the governing elite have 
power over the access to be given to interests outside 
government to the reform process. The management of 
wider debate that this facilitates allows those within 
government to ensure that reform proposals do not go 
further than they would like, whilst at the same time 
being able to appease major interests, suggesting the 
achievement of reform in the general interest. The 
explicit intention to appease those interests, which have 
the power to control the voice of those not catered for 
by reform, would suggest the presence of corporatist 
arrangements at an individual policy level. Such 
observations suggest how reform may not be made 
successful in terms of the whole plurality of interests 
through fully open negotiation and compromise. Rather 
reform is only made successful in terms of a limited 
number of interests through a still relatively closed 
process of negotiation and compromise. Successful 
appeasement of the interests given access to policy 
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influence gives resulting policy only the appearance of 
full pluralism. 
This line of inquiry is further based upon the theory 
of the inter-governmental network, which provides a 
rationale for why and how specifically the local 
authority associations may be taken account of and 
accessed in to the formulation of reform. The 
application of the concept of the inter-governmental 
network to the inter-war reform process appears 
appropriate, given the high level of financial and 
service inter-dependence between central and local 
government. This suggests an important additional basis 
for inquiry in to those interests which were allowed to 
influence local government reform in the 1920s, and the 
implications they had for the nature of the final 
reforms. This basis for inquiry is fully removed from 
the high politics focus of previous major commentators, 
such as Dilks. 
1. THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE FOR REFORM 
The context to Neville Chamberlain's pursuit of local 
government reform may be seen in a similar context to 
that which governed the bureaucracy's shift to policy 
reform in the early 1920s. The first stimulus to reform 
development was provided by general perceptions of 
expectations for reform outside government, and changed 
perceptions, therefore, of the response that political 
parties should make in order to win votes. This came 
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initially before the First World War, when the majority 
of the working classes were excluded from the franchise 
but, nevertheless, the Liberal party were gaining 
considerable electoral success from policies of social 
2 reform. Moves were made within the Conservative party 
to develop social reform policies which were consistent 
with party philosophy but could compete. The Unionist 
Social Reform Committee was established in 1910 in order 
to evolve long-term policies. The proposals that the 
Committee evolved were considered radical by the 
Conservative party leadership at the time and efforts 
were made to distance the party from close identification 
with them. The party essentially remained committed to 
principles of laissez faire. However, the Committee 
became a breeding ground for party reform ideas and 
politicians who considered their implementation vital for 
maintaining electoral success. Prominent amongst these 
3 
was Neville Chamberlain. 
Conservative perceptions of the need to be seen as a 
party of social reform grew even stronger in the period 
after the First World War. The extension of the 
franchise to include many more of the working classes 
provided the potential for the rise of the Labour party 
both at a national and local government level. Indeed 
Labour captured control of an increasing number of local 
authorities, particularly boards of guardians and non- 
2. See J. R. Hay, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare 
Reforms, 1906-1914 (1975). 
3. For a brief discussion see J. Ramsden, The Making of 
Con irtv Policv, The Conservative Research 
DelDartment Since 1929 (1980), pp. 12-23. 
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county borough and urban district councils, and in 1924 
formed their first government. 4 They did so on the basis 
of an even greater commitment to social reform than that 
exhibited by the Liberal party before the First World 
War. In response the renamed Unionist Reconstruction 
Committee became after the War the largest and most 
influential grouping within the parliamentary 
Conservative party. Chamberlain, by then, was one of its 
most prominent members, and indeed in 1925 became its 
chairman. The party leadership, however, remained cool 
on social reform. In February 1924 Chamberlain made note 
in his political diary of the feelings of the rank and 
file in the party "who were getting very impatient at our 
5 lack of a social programme". When the party regained 
office under Stanley Baldwin in late 1924 Chamberlain 
recognised that the opportunity must be taken then to 
undertake Conservative social reform in order to maintain 
the party's electoral position and prevent Labour getting 
in again. In November 1924 he remarked in a letter to 
his sister that "unless we leave our mark as social 
reformers the country will take it out of us hereafter". 6 
It is in this context that one should see Chamberlain's 
decision to take the office of Minister of Health in the 
Baldwin administration. Whilst not wishing to denigrate 
4. For the details of Labour successes in local 
government see J. S. Rowett, 'The Labour Party and Local 
Government: Theory and Practice in The Inter-War Years 
(unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1980), 
appendix. 
5. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 2/21, Political diary 
entry 6.2.1924. 
6. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/458, letter to Ida 
Chamberlain 1.11.1924. 
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entirely Chamberlain's personal commitment to social 
reform for the good of the people, he, nevertheless, to a 
large extent sacrificed the prestigious position of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, for a position in which he 
felt he could secure social reform for the long-term 
electoral good of his party. It was clear, also that 
success in this sphere would considerably enhance his own 
political reputation. 
Chamberlain was, therefore, as much a pragmatic 
politician who recognised his party in government should 
make the same positive reaction to general calls for 
social reform that the post-War coalition government had 
made, and on which basis the Ministry of Health had had 
to make policy throughout the early 1920s. In a similar 
way to Ministry officials, Conservative debate of social 
reform before 1924, in which Chamberlain took the main 
lead, was undertaken in an enclosed party environment, 
ensuring that policy could be developed that maintained 
principles of Conservative party philosophy. These 
included the preservation of the principle of self-help 
in all state provision, and provision made on an 
economical basis that did not place undue burdens on the 
taxpayer. Such principles were closely in accord with 
those adopted by civil servants, and so constituted the 
basis for a governing elite that went beyond the higher 
echelons of the bureaucracy. Such shared values and aims 
ensured that the policy options chosen for reform within 
the party, therefore, commonly branched off from existing 
government policy, which was imbued with those values and 
186 
aims. The full range of options for local government, 
central-local relations and social reform was not 
systematically investigated. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that 
Conservative reform policies had much in common with the 
policy options for incremental change, chosen within the 
Ministry of Health and the Treasury. One of the main 
proposals of the Unionist Social Reform Committee before 
the First World War was a reform of the poor law, in 
which it was suggested that guardian responsibilities 
should be passed to the county and county borough 
councils. In the administrative counties, however, 
whilst the county council was to be the overall 
responsible body, boards of guardians were to continue as 
committees of district councils. This was put forward as 
consistent with the Conservative principle for adaptation 
of existing systems of social policy, which were 
considered to uphold self-help, rather than provision for 
wholesale changes, which could have uncertain effects on 
Conservative aims in social policy. 7 Chamberlain, as a 
Conservative reformer, was made further aware of the 
potential of a poor law reform for the improvement of 
health care by his service on the Consultative Council on 
Local Health Administration in 1920. The integration and 
co-ordination of local health services in county and 
county borough councils offered a means of improving 
7. Unionist Social Reform Committee, Poor Law Reform. A 
Practical Programme (1912) 
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health care through greater efficiency rather than new 
and permanent state expenditure. 8 
Chamberlain's adoption of the poor law (health care) 
reform option for social reform in 1924 originated from 
this parallel consideration of reform. He also shared 
the Ministry of Health's aim to carry this reform without 
a reform of local government areas. He held a similar 
sympathy for county borough administration having been a 
former mayor of Birmingham himself. Whilst being 
perceived by many as a minister biased towards the 
activities of county boroughs he also developed a high 
regard for county councils. He noted in October 1926 
after a trip to Devon County Council that "I am impressed 
by the activities of the county council. They are much 
better than I thought and quite capable of doing whatever 
is put upon them". 9 He considered county councils to be 
generally "competent" with the exception of Holland 
(Lincolnshire), which he thought ought to be amalgamated 
with Kesteven (Lincolnshire) as it "seems to have none of 
the gentry class and in consequence is poorly 
administered". 10 This judgment carried the implicit 
assumption that other county councl s were "competent" 
precisely because they were governed by members of the 
county gentry, and, therefore, could be largely trusted 
8. PRO MH 57/137: minutes of the committee on health 
organisation and poor law reform. Report of the 
Consultative Council on Local Health Administration 
4.9.1920. 
9. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 2/28, Ministry of 
Health provincial visits 1925-1927, Devon 13-15.10.1926. 
10. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/547, letter to 
Hilda Chamberlain 31.10.1926. 
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to conduct local government in terms of the same values 
and assumptions as central government. This largely 
bears out Crowther's analysis. Given the decision to 
conduct reform using existing institutions of local 
government, county and county borough councils presented 
themselves as the most politically reliable authorities 
to administer the poor law in line with the values of the 
bureaucratic elite and the Conservative party, ie to 
preserve a social policy designed to promote self-help 
against the forces of poplarism which threatened greater 
reliance on the state. 
Chamberlain's approach to social reform using existing 
institutions . of local government was governed by 
imperatives similar to those which prejudiced the 
Ministry of Health's policy development. Other reform 
options were, consequently, not properly considered. 
Indeed, in private he acknowledged the limited nature of 
the poor law (health care) reform. In stark contrast to 
the rhetoric he used in introducing the poor law reform 
in the House of Commons in 1928, Chamberlain made an 
admission in a letter to his sister in 1925 of the small 
adjustment to existing policy which the poor law reform 
would make. He wrote of his discussions on poor law 
reform with Sir Aubrey Symonds "If we follow on present 
lines it will be rather a gradual progress than a drastic 
operating of present arrangements. In fact I think it 
would mean very little alteration in the country, the 
change operating more in the towns". Here he spoke with 
hopeful regard to the operation of out-relief more on 
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poor law principles, and the potential for hospital 
appropriation. " 
Whilst no specific proposals for reform of the finance 
of local government were made within the Conservative 
party, Chamberlain easily adopted the block grant reform 
in 1924 also out of shared assumptions with central 
bureaucrats. He was as keen on minimising the cost to 
the taxpayer and ratepayer of social programmes as much 
as possible. For example, in a letter in October 1925 
Lord Salisbury wrote to Chamberlain against percentage 
grants, "the bribe of half to be paid by government is 
alluring, dangerous and leads to damnation ... [it] has 
produced a very high standard but it is death to economy. 
That I know is your conviction". Chamberlain was, 
therefore, a natural backer of Strohmenger's block grant 
for health services in order to control public 
expenditure. 12 
An indication of how much Chamberlain's promotion of 
poor law and block grant reform in late 1924 is to be 
seen in terms of shared motivations and approach to 
policy as his civil servants is given by the differences 
in treatment given by ministry officials to Chamberlain 
and his predecessor, the Labour Minister of Health, John 
Wheatley. Chamberlain made his first consideration of 
reform when briefly Minister of Health in 1923. In 
September 1923 Sir Arthur Robinson urged his statistical 
11. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/477, letter to 
Ida Chamberlain 14.3.1925. 
12. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 7/18/15, Salisbury to 
Chamberlain 24.10.1925. 
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officer to revise the figures for the block grant reform 
"as soon as possible" . 
13 There are, unfortunately, no 
more traceable records of policy discussions in 1923, but 
it is clear from the rapidity with which Chamberlain 
championed the programme for reform in late 1924 that he 
developed a very clear understanding of what he wished to 
do, and what his officials considered possible. 
The urgent response to Chamberlain's attempt at 
consideration of reform in 1923 is to be contrasted with 
the dilatory response given to John Wheatley's attempt at 
reform in 1924. Wheatley took the view that unemployment 
had overloaded the capacity of boards of guardians to 
cope with the amount of assistance required. From a 
Labour point of view the most important thing was to 
reorganise the poor law as a whole to ensure that need 
was being met. This was a priority both in terms of the 
party's social philosophy and its electoral constituency. 
Duly, Wheatley went to Cabinet as early as March 1924, 
stating that he was "anxious to deal with this question 
as expeditiously as is possible in the circumstances". 
He continued, "I want to rescue my Department from an 
embarrassing situation and to pave the way for that 
reorganisation of the system of public assistance which 
is called for by members of all parties". In the absence 
of any considered party policy on local government 
reform, he advocated reform on the basis of the Maclean 
13. PRO HLG 68/26: Poor law reform. Organisation and 
functions of local authorities. Grants in aid of local 
authorities. Memorandum September 1923. 
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Report, but suggested that there should be an all party 
conference to debate the question. 14 
Such a conference was held in April but proved 
abortive due largely to the non co-operation of the other 
parties. However, discussions were held in the Ministry 
throughout the late spring and early summer. In August 
Wheatley reported to Cabinet that he and Ministry 
officials had "devoted much time and thought to the 
consideration of this question" and focused on four 
options. These were the Maclean proposals, proposals for 
the complete reorganisation of public assistance along 
the lines of the 1909 Minority Report. the reform of the 
London poor law only, and a poor law reform in London 
which formed a part of a larger reform of London local 
government as proposed by Labour MPs during the year. 
Under Labour, therefore, the consideration of local 
government reform and the reform of public assistance 
went wider than at any point since the end of the First 
World War. Perhaps as a result of Labour's desire to 
show themselves fit to govern, or as a result of 
persuasion by officials, Wheatley pressed the Cabinet to 
introduce reform on the basis of the Maclean option. 
15 
The Cabinet then consented to a Cabinet Committee, which 
a few days later agreed to Wheatley's proposals. 
Ministry of Health officials were duly instructed to draw 
up proposals for reform based upon the assumption of the 
abolition of the guardians and the transfer of their 
14. PRO Cab 23/cP 173(24), 17.3.1924. 
15. PRO Cab 23/CP 429(24), 6.8.1924. 
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functions to other public authorities. Departmental 
papers on Ministry consideration from this point are no 
longer available, but one document shows that in August 
the Mond memorandum was pulled out and the figures 
updated from 1923.16 
The important point to note is that this is the first 
evidence of Ministry officials providing Wheatley with 
the Ministry plan for reform. No previous steps had been 
taken to update figures voluntarily or cut out all other 
policy debate by immediately recommending the reform plan 
to Wheatley earlier in the year. They had waited upon 
Wheatley and supplied a detailed reform plan only when he 
had requested a reform plan based on the Maclean 
recommendations. This suggests that at best they were 
performing as neutral ciphers of their political master's 
wishes. If not, one could also argue that they took the 
view that the Labour Government was a minority one, whose 
days in power were numbered from the start. 
Consequently, it was not worth the sweat and toil of 
working on a reform which the minister would not be able 
to implement. However, at the worst, it suggests that 
officials, suspicious of Labour's social philosophy, and 
worried by the alternative reform options put up by 
Wheatley during 1924 which were not in sympathy with 
their aims, were obstructive. They were unenthusiastic to 
have their reform proposals introduced by a Labour 
Minister for fear of an incompetent introduction or for 
16. PRO HLG 68/25. Update of the Mond memorandum, 
8.8.1924. 
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fear of their development along lines contrary to their 
own wishes. The very real way in which senior civil 
servants in the Ministry had given Wheatley little active 
assistance in considering local government or social 
reform is shown by the fact that when Chamberlain came 
back to office late in the year, after brief 
consideration of the block grant reform, senior Ministry 
officials fairly fell upon Chamberlain with reform 
proposals based upon the Mond memorandum. Here was a 
Minister who the Ministry did feel they could trust. 17 
To suggest that he was merely welcomed by the Ministry 
of Health as one of their own would, however, omit the 
important additional motivations for poor law and 
exchequer grant reform that Chamberlain developed in the 
years after 1924. The point has already been made that 
Chamberlain perceived county and county borough councils 
as more reliable administrators of the poor law in line 
with central aims than the boards of guardians. The 
potential for poplarism could be significantly diminished 
and the attainment of out-relief on the principle of less 
eligibility significantly increased. However, from 1926 
Chamberlain developed more explicit party political 
motives for a reform of the poor law. The rise of the 
Labour party to take control of a number of boards of 
guardians in the early 1920s was bad enough, but the 
Labour victories at the 1926 municipal elections 
convinced Chamberlain even more of the threat that the 
17. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/460, letter to 
Ida Chamberlain, 12.11.1924. 
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rise of Labour at a local government level posed. In a 
letter to his sister, Ida, in November 1926, he wrote, 
"If it wakes us up now it will have been worthwhile for I 
see in the Labour attack a deliberate intention to seize 
local power to commit local bribery in one form or other; 
it can be done with tram fares or house rents or even gas 
and electricity charges as with out relief, and secondly 
they admit frankly that a Labour majority in the councils 
will create a more favourable atmosphere for carrying out 
the acts of a Labour government, an ominous suggestion in 
view of the way they behaved in some places during the 
general strike. More than ever I am disposed to think 
that I shall have to get powers to "west ham" local 
authorities". 18 
By the latter comment Chamberlain referred to the case 
where he had suspended an elected board of guardians for 
administering the poor law in a manner contrary to his 
wishes and replaced them with appointed nominees. These 
sentiments expressed with a reference to local government 
in general suggest Chamberlain's willingness to subvert 
local democracy in order to displace Labour from local 
bases of power so as to erode the potential for Labour 
success at a national level as well. From 1926 onwards 
Chamberlain's promotion of poor law reform was much more 
active. In this context reform may be seen specifically 
as a measure designed to concentrate local government in 
the county and county borough councils, where Labour had 
18. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/548, letter to 
Ida Chamberlain, 6.11.1926. 
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had far fewer successes in the 1920s and had much less 
potential for success in the future. Such was his desire 
that he shrugged off calls for the disqualification of 
the pauper vote in poor law authorities, arguing that 
this would become superfluous once a poor law reform had 
been carried, for paupers were disqualified from county 
and county borough council elections. 19 
Chamberlain also developed party political reasons for 
the promotion of the block grant. He saw in it the 
potential for a cheap necessitous areas policy, where the 
necessitous areas could receive greater assistance but, 
except for the additional sum in the block grant, largely 
at the expense of richer authorities. This would meet 
the electoral need to be seen to be doing something about 
the problems of the depressed areas, without undermining 
the basic philosophy of the Baldwin Government to keep 
public expenditure on a tight reign. Such political 
reasoning meant that Chamberlain fought strenuously to 
preserve the intention to carry the block grant reform 
against all threats. For instance, in July 1926 the AMC 
sent a memo to Chamberlain which severely criticised the 
reform proposals and Sir Arthur Robinson "was for 
throwing overboard the block grant system at once" . In 
the absence of continued bureaucratic will, Chamberlain's 
own reasoning in favour of a block grant kept it in the 
reform package and forced revision of the reforms to be 
19. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 2/21, Political diary 
entry, 28.3.1926. 
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20 undertaken on that assumption. In March 1927 he 
remarked bleakly on the Cabinet's decision then to allow 
him to consider reform only on the basis of poor law 
reform that "it leaves me without a necessitous areas 
policy,,. 21 His conviction to have one ensured that in 
the final compromise with Churchill in 1928 which 
achieved reform the block grant was part of the proposals 
put before Parliament. 
Consequently, alternative motivations may be ascribed 
to Chamberlain's active promotion of the poor law (health 
care) and exchequer grant reforms which locate him as a 
member of a closed world of elite policy making and as an 
active proponent of social reform to stave off Labour 
electoral success at both a national and local level. It 
may also be seen that the reasons for his commitment to 
the reforms, especially in relation to exchequer grants, 
where bureaucratic enthusiasm waned, were more 
instrumental in gaining their achievement than some 
historians have previously allowed. 
THE CREATION OF POLICY AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 
Politicians obviously had considerable access to the 
making of policy in the central bureaucracy, and as well 
as stimulating the consideration of reform could shape 
20. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/537, letter to 
Hilda Chamberlain 25.7.1926. 
21. Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/566, letter to 
Ida Chamberlain 12.3.1927. 
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and influence its progress. Access given to other 
interests outside of the bureaucratic elite was 
distinctly more limited. Indeed in the period between 
1918 and 1924 the Ministry of Health successfully 
insulated their reform consideration from all bodies 
which might suggest alternatives, such as the Meston 
Committee. Otherwise policy was made privately within 
the confines of the Ministry of Health. However, from 
the start Ministry officials were concerned about the 
views of those local authorities on whom they were 
dependent for the successful implementation of their 
proposed reforms, the county boroughs and county 
councils. This formed part of a new approach to 
including the local authority associations, which 
represented their interests, in the discussion of reform. 
The AMC council report for 1918 noted in relation to the 
1918 Ministry of Health bill that "as a rule, when a 
Government bill is introduced nothing of a definite 
character is known of its provisions until after it has 
been read a first time and printed". on that occasion 
local authority association representatives were included 
in discussion of the bill long before it reached 
Parliament. 22 The development of formal relations after 
the First World War were accompanied by those of a more 
informal, but arguably no less important nature. A golf 
match between senior Ministry of Health officials and 
provincial town clerks, for example, was held annually 
22. AMC council minutes, 16.5.1919, p. 116. 
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23 from 1923. No access was given to local authority 
associations in relation to proposed reform of the poor 
law and exchequer grants immediately after the War but a 
precedent had been set with the Ministry of Health bill. 
Ministry officials were mindful of local authority 
opinion for the time when a bill would be in preparation 
and they would be given access. Reform had to be shaped 
with the interests of the local authorities in mind. To 
see how ministry policy was shaped in the early 1920s, 
therefore, necessitates analysis of local authority 
association views. 
With respect to such views it is important to note the 
structure of local authority association decision making. 
In the case of the CCA formal decision making powers were 
vested in its executive council, on which all county 
councils were represented. The executive council 
commonly established committees to consider particular 
issues, the committees, reports forming the basis for 
executive council debate. In the case of the AMC powers 
were again vested in a council, but representation 
thereon was more complicated. In 1919 it was decided 
that the five county boroughs with the largest population 
should as of right have representation on the council. 
After the 1921 census these were Birmingham, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield. They retained 
privileged representation throughout the inter-war 
23. See, for example, Munici-gal Review (1936), p. 196. 
The report reviewed the match position. After fourteen 
matches the score was 7-5 to the Ministry, with two years 
matches drawn. 
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period, as did the city of London. Beyond these, members 
competed for representation, a further thirty five places 
being reserved for county boroughs and forty places for 
non-county boroughs. The principal standing committee 
of the AMC was the law committee, on which the town 
clerks of the five biggest county boroughs again had a 
permanent place, the other places being up for election. 
They were also guaranteed representation on ad hoc 
committees established to consider individual issues, and 
on all committees and sub-committees they were allowed 
more votes than ordinary members. This was felt to be in 
accord with the greater funding of the AMC which the big 
five made. Despite moves for one member one vote during 
the inter-war years the structure of representation 
within the AMC created in 1919 persisted. 24 
(i) THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES, THE MACLEAN REPORT, AND POOR 
LAW (HEALTH CARE) REFORM BEFORE 1924 
Local authority association discussion initially took 
place in the wake of the proposals of the majority and 
minority reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws, published in 1909. The first off the mark with a 
considered response was the CCA. It is to the county 
councils that attention shall, therefore, first be 
turned. 
In January 1911 the executive council of the CCA 
endorsed the report of the specially convened poor law 
24. See AMC council minutes, 12.12.1919, pp. 208-210. 
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committee, which had sat under the chairmanship of Arthur 
Chapman, member for Surrey County Council. This agreed 
with the general consensus of the 1909 reports that poor 
law administration should be reorganised as the present 
units of administration were often too small and because 
it was "very undesirable" to have more than one 
independently elected authority with rating powers in the 
area of an administrative county. It agreed also that 
the best authorities for supervision were the county and 
county borough councils. In the main the CCA then went 
on to agree with the Majority Report's advocacy of a 
transfer of the poor law with the principle of less 
eligibility intact. It concluded a plan that the county 
councils could administer the transferred services 
through a county poor law committee, which would 
determine policy on institutional relief, and determine 
and ensure relief rates, which were to be decided in 
individual cases by district poor law boards. 
However, there were important riders to the CCA policy 
which had more in common with the desire to break up the 
poor law, first shown in the Minority Report and included 
in the later Maclean Report. Only here the CCA was 
stating the special preferences of county council 
feeling. First, they wanted all grades of mental 
deficiency taken out of the poor law and placed with the 
other responsibilities of the county councils lunatic 
asylums committees. They then wanted all direct 
responsibility for mental deficiency and lunacy taken 
away from county councils and given to a central 
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government department instead, leaving local committees 
the power only of inspection. This was an important 
early indication of local authority antipathy to this 
sort of health care work. No other specific provisions 
were made for transferred health services, but the relief 
of unemployment and education were also singled out. In 
the former case it was again the feeling that direct 
responsibility should rest with central government with 
the local authority only helping out in temporary cases. 
This was again a clear indication that the counties had 
no desire to administer a heavily burdened system of poor 
relief. For poor law schools unification with others 
under the jurisdiction of the education committee was 
25 felt to be the best way forward. 
The CCA position on poor law reorganisation in 1911 
undoubtedly provided some encouragement to the later 
Maclean Committee. The county councils were apparently 
prepared in principle to take the poor law, although had 
some preferences towards breaking it up. However, the 
response to the Maclean Report in 1919 -1920 revealed 
deeper concerns amongst the county councils than 
previously shown. In 1919 the reconstituted poor law 
committee of the CCA, again under the chairmanship of 
Chapman, requested the feelings of all county councils. 
In November 1919 the committee reported to the executive 
council the fact that on the whole the county councils 
were very unenthusiastic about reform. Of fifty-nine 
25. CCA circular to county councils, vol Iii-Iv (1910- 
1911), pp. 18-20. Report of special meeting of CCA 
executive council 24.1.1911. 
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councils nineteen had not bothered to supply information 
at all. A breakdown of the reaction to the Maclean 
Report of the remaining forty may be seen below: - 
(1) No Definite Opinion: Eight 
Berks, Bucks, Cornwall, Lincs (Kesteven), Soke of 
Peterborough, Somerset, East and West Suffolk. 
(However, East Suffolk did state "the view that county 
councils have at present as much work as they can 
undertake", and in Kesteven and Somerset the council was 
evenly divided over the desirability of the abolition of 
the guardians). 
(2) Acceptance: Nine 
Breconshire, Carmarthenshire, Denbighshire, Derbyshire, 
Durham, Flintshire, Middlesex, Notts and Surrey. 
(Both Breconshire and Middlesex stipulated certain 
conditions). 
(3) Partial Acceptance: Thirteen 
Bedfordshire, Cheshire, Cumberland, Derbyshire, 
Gloucestershire, Hants, Isle of Ely, Lancashire, Lincs 
(Lindsey), Northants, Warwickshire, and the East and West 
Ridings. 
These councils either preferred existing accommodation or 
did not accept some of the Maclean Report proposals. 
They stated which of the existing and transferred duties 
they were prepared to fulfill. These were: - 
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Institutional care of sick 6 
Domiciliary care of the sick 4 
Care of m. d. 's and lunatics 10 
Care of the aged 2 
Non-med home assistance 1 
Education and child maintenance 9 
Vagrancy and unemployed 2 
Assessment 5 
In addition Bedfordshire was willing to supervise 
public health, and Derbyshire administer work under the 
Vaccination Acts and the registration of births and 
deaths. Several authorities had different suggestions on 
assessment. Only three answered the question on co- 
option: Cheshire was against and Hampshire and 
Northamptonshire were both of the opinion that increa sed 
facility to co-opt was a good thing ). 
(4) Total Objection: Ten 
Devon, Dorset, Herefordshire, Hunts, Isle of Wight, Kent, 
Norfolk, Sussex (East), Westmoreland and Worcestershire. 
The facts and figures reveal that there was very 
little unqualified support for the Maclean Report 
proposals. Apart from the indifference of those who did 
not reply, which can be interpreted in a number of ways, 
and the hedged antipathy of those who declined to give a 
firm opinion, it is clear that there was root and branch 
opposition from at least 1/6 of county councils and 
sizeable opposition from another 1/6. In particular, 
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responsibility for home assistance, care of the aged, and 
vagrants and the unemployed was very unpopular, with that 
of institutional and domiciliary care of the sick not 
being greatly less so. 
The members of the CCA poor law committee, 
nevertheless, were inclined towards acceptance of the 
majority of the Maclean Report and, despite the manifest 
opposition from many councils, made recommendation to the 
executive council to that effect at the November meeting. 
Moreover, the committee drew particular attention to 
their opinion that "wide areas are essential for the 
efficient and economical administration of institutions". 
thus giving the strongest possible support to the 
transfer of poor law health services and their subsequent 
unification with county services. The one area where a 
priori agreement existed against the Maclean Report was 
on training and the prevention of unemployment. This was 
duly voiced again. However, the added strength of 
feeling against assuming responsibility for home 
assistance could not be ignored either. Consequently, 
the committee recommended that home assistance provision 
by the county councils "would not be economical" and 
"should therefore be carried out within the 
administrative county areas by responsible minor 
authorities". Moreover, the latter would be financially 
responsible for the entire cost of home assistance 
duties. 26 
26. CCA official Gazette (January 1920), pp. 9-10. 
Reports of CCA executive council meetings, 16.10.1919 and 
12.11-1919- 
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It is clear that both the recommendation of acceptance 
of the bulk of the Maclean Report and the rider on home 
assistance were highly controversial at the November 
meeting. Chapman, Sir Ryland Adkins and Henry Willink 
led a heated debate of the poor law committee report 
which proved inconclusive, and the executive council 
resolved to postpone decision until the government made 
their next step. However, at the annual general meeting 
of the CCA in March 1920 the issue was brought back on to 
the agenda by Henry Willink. In the ensuing discussion 
the division of opinion became clear. Willink himself 
shared others' concern at the "relaxation" in the 
implementation of the poor law, which had led to heavy 
increases in public expenditure over the last few decades 
with no discernible decline in the numbers receiving 
public benefits. He felt that "at such a time as the 
present, with this habit of large expenditure warping us 
all" any reform that may lead to even greater expenditure 
and further weaken the stimulus towards independence and 
efficiency was irresponsible. Considering that the 
Maclean proposals actually intended to transfer a large 
part of the poor law in to a part of public provision 
that was intended to be popular he felt that such 
increases in expenditure and erosion of individual self 
sufficiency should not simply be feared but expected as a 
consequence of these proposals. 
He then addressed the specific question of health 
reorganisation. He accepted the need for consolidation 
of local bodies in principle, but in practice felt it 
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essential that the poor law remained unified. Its break 
up would, moreover, lead to far worse inefficiencies. 
First, people in the same family may well get categorised 
in different classes, leading to overlapping of provision 
from different committees. Secondly, he felt that the 
cost of moving people around the county from existing 
mixed institutions to specialist institutions would be 
high. However, most importantly with regard to poor 
relief, he felt that a chain of command that went from 
district committee to county home assistance and finance 
committees before reaching full council would not only 
involve great expense but also tend to over-bureaucratic 
administration. Moreover, to have a strong county 
council would tend to erode the initiative of local 
officials, and similarly, to have strong district 
committees would erode the aim of theoretical unity in 
county council administration. His essential point was 
that to make reorganisation of home assistance workable 
in practice would inevitably mean the loss of some of the 
advantages which had been stated in its defence. 
Willink, of course, had easy recourse to support. The 
November report, he said, "certainly does not indicate 
any enthusiastic readiness on the part of county councils 
to approve the proposals". He then went on to give his 
own explanation. "The fact is that most councils feel 
that they already have quite as much to do as they can 
manage; and it is probable that feeling, even more than 
reasoned objections, weighs with many persons. " 
Consequently, he voiced the argument against reform on 
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the grounds of county council expressed interests. 
Further, he re-iterated the common view that the poor law 
should be a "properly unified system administered on the 
sound principles of 18341, and if it were to be broken up 
he argued that it "cannot tend to economy of expenditure, 
to greater efficiency of administration or to the general 
good. " Weighing heaviest in favour of his arguments 
against any sort of reform was the widespread antipathy 
in county council government to the assumption of 
responsibility for poor out-relief, or home assistance as 
it was to be called. 
Willink was opposed forcibly again by Sir Arthur 
Chapman, who was determined to get the CCA to accept the 
Maclean Report in principle. Because of a lack of 
sources his full reasons remain unclear, but although he 
was equally concerned at the possibility of any 
additional expenditure he was persuaded of the logic of 
the Maclean proposals. He felt the county councils could 
and should administer the transferred services, in 
particular the health services. In this he was voicing 
the opinion of his own council, Surrey, who had supported 
the Maclean proposals in November. it is clear that 
Chapman was a respected major figure on the executive 
council and his opinion carried weight, but he was 
concerned to get a compromise that would please more 
members. As a result he again proposed the motion that 
home assistance and employment not be taken on, and 
should instead become the financial and administrative 
responsibility of borough, urban and rural district 
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councils, reports of course still being made to the 
county council. After a lengthy debate acceptance of the 
Maclean Report with this amendment was resolved and duly 
published. 27 
As a result, by the spring of 1920 the Ministry of 
Health was made well aware of the fact that although the 
bulk of the Maclean Report was officially accepted by the 
CCA, they faced outright official opposition on the 
question of receiving home assistance duties as 
recommended by Maclean. In addition, with many county 
council figures moving in government circles, it was not 
hidden to officials that behind the official acceptance 
of the bulk of the Maclean Report lay a lot of opposition 
that also had to be overcome if reform was to be made 
practicable in the counties. 
The reaction of the AMC, representing county borough 
and non-county borough feeling, was also problematical. 
Due warning of opposition against any erosion of powers 
was given by the secretary of the AMC, Harry Pritchard, 
who as a member of the Maclean Committee had signed the 
eventual report but added a significant accompanying 
memorandum. In the memorandum he opposed two ideas in 
the report which he felt undermined county borough 
council autonomy: first, that of co-option; and secondly, 
that of obliging the recipient authority to create a home 
assistance committee. With regard to the former, he saw 
it as a basic right of a democratically elected body to 
27. CCA official Gazette (April 1920), pp. 56-64. Ad 
verbatim report of the CCA annual general meeting, 
24.3.1920. 
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determine the personnel of its committees itself. The 
compulsion of co-option took away that right. With 
regard to the latter, again he saw it as the right of 
elected local authorities to organise its work as they 
saw f it. If they faced compulsion, he felt that "not 
only will unnecessary difficulties be placed in the way 
of councils in the performance of onerous duties, but 
there is the real fear that the new statutory committees, 
and particularly the home assistance committees, will be 
regarded as the old poor law authority under a new name. " 
More importantly, Pritchard also served notice of the 
AMC's support for the non-county boroughs against the 
proposal to transfer all guardian health services in the 
administrative counties to the county councils. He 
admitted that in the majority of cases institutions were 
best administered by the county council so as to be 
available for the whole area. But in some cases this 
would not be true. In particular, infirmaries would be 
most efficiently utilised if they were transferred to the 
town council where in use. Moreover, "as regards medical 
assistance" he wrote HI entirely dissent from the 
proposal that this should be given by the staff of the 
county medical officer of health, except in the cases of 
certain boroughs and urban districts, which are 
apparently to be regarded as exceptional" . Many borough 
and district councils had been executive health 
authorities for many years, and generally speaking their 
administration had been at least satisfactory. 
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In conclusion, he was "convinced that the proposal to 
have two health authorities, viz., the county council and 
the borough and district council, both administering the 
Public Health Acts and both dealing to a large extent 
with the same persons would lead to much friction and 
dissatisfaction and to unnecessary expenditure". He 
ended, therefore, by arguing against the detail of the 
proposed transfer of guardian functions on the grounds of 
the Maclean argument itself. Generally, efficiency and 
economy in the new unified services in the counties would 
not be best attained under the Maclean proposals but by 
the framing of individual schemes within each 
administrative county by the county council in 
conjunction with minor authorities. 28 
In 1918 the AMC council initiated further 
consideration of the report by the law committee, under 
the chairmanship of Sir Robert Fox, town clerk for Leeds. 
This duly reported its recommendations in January 1919. 
In contrast to the CCA, the committee assumed the 
abolition of the boards of guardians and did not consider 
the premises for reform worthy of further debate. This 
is Perhaps indicative of the fact that at this time the 
AMC had few hopes of actually being able to initiate or 
reject legislation. Their role was simply to gain 
incremental successes by virtue of the debating of 
details. Neither did they consider it worthwhile to 
ballot the members of the AMC on their individual 
28. Re-gort of the Maclean Committee (cmd. 8917), PP 
(1918), accompanying memorandum. 
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reactions to the Maclean Report. Instead AMC policy was 
made totally in the context of council members on the 
recommendations of certain senior figures who manned the 
law committee. 
The committee's report totally endorsed Pritchard's 
criticisms. The issues of compulsory new committees and 
co-option with nomination by outside bodies were both 
discussed with grave concern. A close reading of the 
Maclean Report had further revealed that the proposed new 
home assistance committee, as well as the proposed 
employment committee, on county borough councils would 
have statutory duties and executive powers invested in it 
by legislation. Other committees of council were given 
executive powers by the council. As a result, councils 
were able to guide the policies of different committees 
in conjunction with one another. If the H. A. C. were to 
be vested with powers by outside bodies it would become 
largely an independent authority, simply administering 
over larger areas than previous boards of guardians which 
would make council finance and the co-ordination of 
policies very difficult. Co- option with nomination by 
outside bodies they felt simply to be a 11 return to the 
exploded idea of representation of interests with its 
undesirable implications, and is a direct blow at the 
democratic constitution of the council and their 
responsibility to the whole body of citizens. " 
Particular concern was voiced at the effect of the 
proposals on the larger non-county boroughs, who had the 
most responsibilities for health provision. The 
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committee concluded "that the proposed transfer to county 
councils would cause the utmost confusion, with endless 
duplication of effort and resultant expense in boroughs 
of this class. " Consequently, the committee specifically 
recommended that transferred guardian health services 
where appropriate should be allocated to these larger 
boroughs. 29 
The law committee report was adopted in full by the 
AMC council and was to remain official policy until 1925. 
As with the CCA, Ministry of Health officials in 1920 
could comfort themselves with the fact that the AMC had 
accepted the Maclean Report, but again there was 
opposition on important elements of the proposals. In 
particular, to the problem of county council opposition 
over assuming responsibility for home assistance there 
was now added the problem of AMC dissent over the 
apportionment of health responsibilities in the 
administrative counties, upon which as has been shown 
above there was some CCA sympathy. Clearly, the reform 
of the poor law and the reorganisation of health care in 
the administrative counties along the lines of the 
Maclean Report faced major stumbling blocks in the local 
government world. Devising proposals that would also win 
consent from the bodies responsible for their 
implementation, who were now gravely suspicious, was one 
of the major tasks facing the Ministry of Health 
internal 
committee in late 1920. 
29. AMC council minutes, 23.1.1919, pp. 42-53. 
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(ii) THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND FINANCIAL CENTRAL-LOCAL 
RELATIONS REFORM BEFORE 1924 
Local government pressure for the reform of exchequer 
grants dated well back before the First World War. The 
first priority had always been that of larger grants 
rather than changes in their nature. The desire for 
grants to be related more to needs was important but 
generally secondary. The basic problem was that local 
government had taken a large share of the growth in state 
intervention since the late 19th century. Local 
authorities felt that for many of the services that were 
deemed by both the 1901 and 1914 Reports to be of 
national importance they received too little national 
exchequer grant aid. This placed too great a strain on 
local sources of revenue, especially in high areas of 
service need which, as has already been noted, were 
generally the poorest. 
Consequently, in evidence to the Kempe Committee, both 
the CCA and the AMC had advocated large increases in 
several exchequer grants. 30 When Lloyd George's 1914 
budget contained proposals that met these hopes, within a 
reorganisation of the basis of central finance, they were 
highly delighted. On the cessation of war it was to this 
eve of war plan that attention again quickly turned. 
However, the AMC alone took the initiative as many of its 
members were faced with even greater financial burdens 
30. ReDort of the De-oartmental (Kem-oe) Co=ittee on Local 
Taxation (cmd. 7315), PP (1914), paras 28-32. 
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after the war. At the behest of Leicester county borough 
council, in June 1919, the association decided to press 
the government to reintroduce the proposals without 
delay. 31 
There followed a steady stream of parliamentary 
questions throughout 1919 to both Addison and Austen 
Chamberlain, which continued in to 1920. The predominant 
themes were the demands for more money and the 
distribution of grants on a more equitable basis. The 
ministerial answers all assured the questioners of their 
hopeful intent to meet these demands but answered that no 
definite plans could be laid before Parliament at the 
current time. By November 1920, with no government 
proposals for reform forthcoming, individual county 
boroughs were producing their own plans. Some suggested 
that local authorities were experiencing grave financial 
problems. Chester county borough proposed "that the cost 
of national services administered locally should be paid 
for out of national funds" and not draw in any way upon 
the local rate. Others suggested that the position of 
subjugation with respect to the minutiae of central 
control added insult to the injury of starved funding. 
Worcester county borough, for instance, proposed the 
abolition of all government grants and suggested instead 
that "every local authority shall be entitled to receive 
from the government an agreed proportion of its annual 
expenditure, and to apply the same in aid of the amount 
raised locally, in such a manner as the local authority 
31. AMC council minutes, 19.6.1919, p. 185. 
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thinks fit, within the powers by law conferred on the 
authority.,, 32 Other proposals for reform took a more 
global view of the problems facing local government. 
Lowestoft and Harrogate councils framed a joint motion to 
the AMC council which argued that such problems "are 
mainly caused by the unsound financial and constitutional 
system on which the Local Government Act, 1888, is 
based. 11 They called for nothing less than a complete 
reform of local government. 33 
None of these proposals, however, became official AMC 
policy. The majority of members of the AMC council were 
too well aware of the economy constraints on central 
government. In the CCA this was even more the case. 
Indeed the only post-war CCA demand for greater central 
funding came with just such a recognition of central 
problems. 34 This is not to say, however, that the local 
authority associations did not give some clear indication 
to the Ministry of Health of what long-term grant system 
they wished to see. The AMC again took the main 
initiative. In 1919 the AMC council instructed its law 
committee to undertake an in-depth study of local health 
administration. This produced important confirmation of 
the majority view on what was the best form of central- 
local relations. With regard to financial relations, in 
the short-term, the accumulation of percentage grants for 
different branches of the health services was found to be 
32. AMC council minutes, 18.11.1920, p. 75. 
33. AMC council minutes, 11.3.1920, p. 17. 
34. CCA Official Gazette (April 1920), p. 85. Report of 
CCA executive council meeting, 10.3.1920. 
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very beneficial, but the report expressed the hope that 
they "might possibly be superseded by a general block 
grant when public opinion had been sufficiently 
educated. " Similarly, in the long-term the report 
advocated that central administrative control be along 
the lines of paragraph 69 of the 1914 Report, which gave 
local authorities freedom from detailed expenditure 
control and therefore greater local autonomy. This was 
completely consistent with the framework for central- 
local relations associated with a block grant. The whole 
of the report, including these recommendations, was duly 
ratified by council. 35 
By contrast, there was no clear county council 
position on exchequer grant reform until November 1922. 
Indeed, the CCA did not begin an exhaustive examination 
of grants until March 1921, when a special exchequer 
grants committee was set up under Sir Arthur Chapman 
consequent on a paper read by him at the annual general 
meeting. 36 The report found in favour of the creation of 
a block grant system. However, certain qualifications 
were stipulated. First, no local, authority was to lose 
grant income through reform. Secondly, the committee 
feared that the grant could become unfavourably 
disproportionate to the cost of provision to the local 
authority if it were fixed for too long a period. 
Therefore, they recommended that the vote for a block 
grant period be no longer than three years. Further, 
35. AMC council minutes, 19.6.1919, p. 157-167. 
36. CCA official Gazette, (April 1921). Report of CCA 
executive council meeting, March 1921. 
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they recormended that no additional responsibilities be 
placed upon local authorities during the period covered 
by the vote unless additional central funding was 
provided. Fourthly, they required that re-examination of 
the working of a new grant scheme should come at the 
earliest possible time. The principal qualification 
imposed, however, was the demand for 11 a definite 
guarantee that the meticulous supervision of detail by 
government departments which has hitherto prevailed shall 
cease.,. 37 
The CCA committee Is views were becoming known towards 
the end of Ministry deliberations in the preparation of 
the Mond memorandum in May 1921. One can reasonably 
speculate, then, that ministry officials through 
professional contacts were amongst those who believed 
that the post-war county council position was more or 
less consistent with pre-war support for a block grant 
and greater local autonomy. Thus, senior Ministry 
officials perceived both county borough and county 
councils as being in favour of reforms realisable through 
a block grant. it is in this context that one may see 
the decision to include a block grant reform in the Mond 
memorandum as an offsetting inducement to local 
authorities to accept poor law reform, which, as shown 
above, ministry officials already knew to be unpopular. 
The inter-related reform plan rested on the assumption of 
37. CCA official Gazette (November 1922). 
executive council meeting, November 1922. 
Report of CCA 
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the universal popularity of the block grant principle in 
local government. 
However, in November 1922, when the special 
committee's report was finally debated by the CCA 
executive council, only the suggestion that the 
meticulous supervision of detail by government 
departments should be abandoned enjoyed wide agreement. 
At an acrimonious meeting it was resolved that the 
percentage grant system, with this proviso, was to be 
preferred to the committee's advocacy of a block grant. 38 
The Ministry's assumptions of local authority views on 
exchequer grants were further undermined by evidence 
given to the Meston Committee in late 1922. The AMC and 
the Institute of Municipal Treasurers as expected were in 
favour of a system of fixed grants for public health 
services for periods of up to five years. The 
representative for both, Arthur Collins, felt that such a 
system would give elasticity, make grant reflect need and 
facilitate a proper comparison of local authority 
performance, allowing the Ministry to judge whether high 
spending local authorities were in fact inefficient. 
Collins added further that "it may be possible that the 
gradual levelling down of the expenditure of high 
spending authorities and levelling up of the standard of 
performance of backward authorities might pave the way 
for the adoption of some sort of national standard of 
performance, and some sort of uniform grant per unit such 
as that suqqested in the Ministry's original scheme". 
38. ibid 
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The split in county council opinion, however, was fully 
revealed to the Meston Committee. Six county councils, 
represented by Sir Arthur Chapman, had passed resolutions 
in favour of fixed grants to be revised annually. Yet, 
Mosse, the secretary to the Committee, reported that "the 
majority of the county councils and the urban and rural 
district councils are opposed to fixed grants". Their 
objection was based upon fears that meticulous control 
would not in fact be dispensed with, that they would be 
pressed to incur additional expenditure during the fixed 
period, which would fall on the rates, and "that progress 
would be checked, or progressive authorities 
39 penalised". 
Mosse's own view was that the county council 
opposition to block grants was not serious nor based upon 
rational argument. Rather, it reflected "a sort of 
hereditary repugnance to fixed grants which may be traced 
to experience of the assigned revenues system, and to an 
imperfect understanding of the alternative systems 
40 proposed". Yet, it provides an important context for 
understanding why Sir Arthur Robinson's support for a 
block grant began to subside in 1923. If it was not to 
be a means of gaining local authority support for poor 
law reform and indeed would be actively opposed by them, 
then there was little argument for its continued 
inclusion in the Ministry's plans for reform. It would 
appear logical to suggest that it was as a result of this 




that the grant question remained open within the Ministry 
in 1923 and 1924, only to be concluded by Strohmenger's 
strong argument in favour of sticking to a block grant 
reform in late 1924. It provides further explanatory 
evidence of why Robinson was so quick to urge the 
abandonment of the block grant reform when the AMC also 
started to argue against it in 1926. 
It is apparent that the power of local authority 
opinion over senior Ministry of Health officials was 
indeed substantial, helping to stimulate both the advance 
towards and near retreat from the advocacy of a block 
grant reform. The block grant in both 1924 and again in 
1926 was only kept on the blocks by influences within 
central government from outside the Ministry of Health, 
namely, the Treasury's influence through Strohmenger, and 
Neville Chamberlain's own political imperative for a 
cheap necessitous areas policy. This did mean, however, 
that in the open debate with the local authority 
associations after the publication of the reform 
proposals in 1925, senior ministry officials could look 
forward to what Robinson succinctly described as a 
"struggle" both in relation to poor law and exchequer 
grant reform. 41 
41. PRO HLG 8/81: Royal Commission on Local Government- 
constitution, functions and relations of local 
authorities, and its work in regard to provisional 
proposals for poor law reform. Sir Arthur Robinson to 
Neville Chamberlain, 19.3.1926. 
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THE REVISION OF REFORM AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 
The reform proposals published in 1925 were based on the 
Mond memorandum of 1921. At their core lay the intention 
to transfer poor law responsibilities wholesale to the 
county and county borough councils. In the counties, 
county councils would be allowed considerable discretion 
over delegation of responsibilities to second tier 
authorities but would retain overall financial and 
administrative control. In addition the county councils 
were be to given general supervisory and controlling 
powers over second tier authorities with respect to the 
latter's existing public health responsibilities. No 
indication was given, however, as to the intentions with 
regard to co-option on to county or county borough 
committees responsible for implementing the reforms. The 
intention to introduce a block grant along the lines 
indicated in the Mond memorandum was announced, the 
formula for distribution remaining solely based upon 
population and assessable value. No mention was made of 
any additional sum to be included in the grant. The 
proposals were more in the nature of a general summary of 
intent than a detailed elaboration of what bill clauses 
may be. 42 
The Ministry of Health's approach to the promotion of 
these proposals had much in common with that of the 
42. ibid, copy of provisional proposals for poor law 
reform, 1925. 
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immediate post-war period. Senior officials were anxious 
to insulate their proposals from further debate. Within 
government they were ably protected by Chamberlain, who 
refused to allow the Barstow Committee, or the Cabinet 
Committee, set up in 1928 as a result of Churchill's 
derating initiative, to reopen discussion of essential 
principles of reform. Whitehall policy makers also 
remained aloof from the observations of local government 
academics and the Labour Party, which as Rowett has 
shown, did not in any case have a systematic local 
government policy of its own to promote. 43 However, once 
the Ministry's reform proposals were published in 1925 
they were considerably more vulnerable to attacks from 
beyond Whitehall. 
Indeed, just as the Ministry's limited reforms were 
crucially promoted by the political imperative for reform 
in the person of Neville Chamberlain, they also faced 
after 1925 political forces against change of any kind. 
In sharp contrast to the fortunes of internal Ministry 
forces against change in relation to exchequer grants, 
which continued to express their views unsuccessfully in 
the late 1920s, these political forces had considerable 
44 power. It has already been well described by a number 
of historians how rural guardians opposed poor law 
reform, and their support from Conservative backbenchers 
43. Rowett, thesis. 
44. For evidence of continued support within the Ministry 
of Health for percentage grants in relation to local 
health services see, for example, PRO HLG 29/262: Papers 
and correspondence relating to various draft bills on 
poor law reform 1918-1927. Sir F. J. Willis to Robinson, 
9.6.1926. 
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threatened to derail reform altogether, but it would be 
entirely wrong to characterise the concessions made by 
Chamberlain in 1927 and included in the 1929 Act in order 
to stave off this opposition as meaningful but not 
threatening to the principles of the reform. Moore has 
shown convincingly how the concessions with respect to 
co-opted representation on public assistance committees, 
the statutory requirement of guardians committees in 
administrative counties, co-opted representation on 
guardians committees and the maintenance of domiciliary 
medical relief by guardians committees served to 
undermine the aim of unity in local health 
administration. For they ensured that former guardians 
would have a key role in administration after reform, 
allowing them the facility to prevent the appropriation 
of poor law services under public health acts, a 
phenomenon of the 1930s described by Abel-Smith. The 
concession in respect of domiciliary relief mitigated 
against having all poor law medical services concentrated 
at a county level. 
45 Thus the exercise of forces within 
the political elite against change meant that the poor 
law (health care) reform was in part at least inherently 
flawed. 
ministry officials also had to deal with the potential 
intervention of the Royal Commission on Local Government, 
chaired by Lord Onslow, which by early 1926 was looking 
towards the second part of its inquiry in to the 
45. S. Moore, 'Conservative Party Opposition to Neville 
Chamberlain's Social reforms, 1925-1929' (unpublished MA 
thesis, Birmingham University, 1984), p. 184-201 
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structure, areas and internal organisation of local 
government. In this respect the Ministry was more 
successful in insulating the reforms from external 
influences. In February 1926 Onslow wrote to 
Chamberlain, offering the Royal Commission as a mediator 
in the discussions over the poor law and block grant 
46 proposals. Robinson advised Chamberlain against 
accepting a role for the Royal Commission in both January 
and March 1926, suggesting that the proposals represented 
a significant reform "and the handling of it can only be 
by you,, . 
47 Chamberlain concurred, and on Robinson's 
advice, directed the Royal Commission, in their inquiry 
into local government structure and areas, towards the 
issue of second tier authorities rather than that of 
county and county boroughs, whose continued existence was 
a given assumption of the 1925 proposals. This ensured 
that the Ministry's proposals would not be rediscussed or 
influenced by the many varied interests and opinions 
48 represented on the Royal Commission. 
It is apparent that Onslow also backed off from 
pushing for a Royal Commission role. In February it was 
reported to Robinson that Onslow had withdrawn his offer 
as a "result of a conversation with Sir E. Turton, who 
would, he gathers, support, the suggestion, and may put 
it forward as an inspiration of his own, as one more 
means of obstructing the reform proposals". 49 Turton, an 
46. PRO HLG 8/81, Onslow to Chamberlain, 12.2.1926. 
47. ibid, Robinson to Chamberlain, 19.3.1926. 
48. ibid, Robinson to Chamberlain, 4.6.1926. 
49. ibid, Heseltine to Robinson, 25.2.1926. 
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M. P and a member of the Royal Commission, was also a 
senior member of the CCA Executive Council. New 
consideration by the Royal Commission had obviously been 
targeted by the CCA as an ideal delaying tactic which 
could help to kill reform. This episode was symptomatic 
of the fact that the key focus for the development of the 
reforms lay in the relations between the Ministry and the 
local authority associations. To this battleground the 
revision of the reforms was otherwise effectively 
limited. Conflict arose both in relation to poor law 
(health care) and exchequer grant reform. 
(i) THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND POOR LAW (HEALTH CARE) 
REFORM, 1925-1929 
In March 1920 the CCA executive council had been the 
scene of considerable dispute over the proposals 
contained in the Maclean Report, and had only confirmed 
its acceptance of poor law reform on the basis of home 
assistance becoming a second tier responsibility. Even 
then county councils had expressed their varied 
reluctance to the taking over of certain transferred poor 
law health services. In response to the publication of 
Ministry of Health proposals the CCA appointed a special 
poor law committee in October 1925, again under Sir 
Arthur Chapman, to reconsider the position. The 
committee suggested an enthusiastic response. Its 
members happily supported the idea of county councils 
having a supervisory and controlling role over second 
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tier authorities in the provision of health services, and 
of assuming responsibility for all transferred services. 
In this latter respect, they suggested that county 
councils had become altogether more modern and prominent 
in county government since the War. Further, they 
accepted that public assistance and health services were 
better co-ordinated over a larger area of cost. The 
Ministry's proposals further allowed county councils to 
delegate both health and public assistance 
responsibilities to second tier authorities, thus 
enabling county councils the discretion to make their own 
arrangements for administration. Such arguments echoed 
the approach promoted by Chapman in 1920. In February 
1926, in sharp contrast to this previous bruising 
encounter, the executive council endorsed the approach. 50 
It is perhaps not surprising that on this part of the 
reforms, at least, the Ministry from the start received a 
favourable hearing from the CCA. For with regard to the 
administrative counties it considerably enhanced the 
status of county councils. In particular the concept of 
the county council as supervisor and controller on behalf 
of central government was too attractive to allow a 
carping response to the Ministry's proposals. The CCA's 
general endorsement of the administrative reform remained 
constant thereafter. Nor is it surprising then that what 
appealed to the CCA met with considerable hostility from 
the AMC. County boroughs generally accepted the transfer 
50. CCA official Gazette, (March 1926) , pp. 78-83. Report 
of CCA executive council meeting, 17.2.1926. 
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of poor law services in their areas to their 
jurisdiction, and the members of the AMC as a whole were 
content that the 1925 proposals had dropped the idea of 
co-option. However, the AMC also represented the non- 
county boroughs, who solidly opposed the Ministry's 
proposals for reform in the administrative counties. In 
November 1925 the AMC Council recorded its displeasure 
that all poor law health services should be transferred 
to the county councils, with delegation left to their 
discretion. Non-county boroughs had a long history in 
the public health field, and it was considered that at 
least those non-county boroughs which were elementary 
education and maternity and child welfare authorities 
should as of right receive poor law health services in 
their areas. The Council also considered that the 
proposal for general county council control over the 
health services was "open to the gravest objection" . 
County council powers had previously been restricted to 
the receipt of medical officer reports and some default 
powers. What was suggested now appeared to strike at the 
very independence of non-county boroughs, and aroused 
enormous confusion and uncertainty on their part. 
51 
For their part senior Ministry officials expected a 
bad reaction from non-county boroughs. The' Maclean 
Report had left the door open to the larger non-county 
boroughs becoming poor law authorities. The Ministry's 
proposals in 1925 soundly slammed it shut, and made the 
addition of the county council's supervisory and 
51. AMC Council minutes, 26.11.1925, p. 243. 
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controlling role, which had not been at all expected by 
local government. The principal aims of the proposals 
were to ensure that health administration was unified 
over the largest area of charge and to promote county 
councils as the means of monitoring second tier 
provision, particularly with regard to the smaller 
districts. It was not envisaged that county council 
control would really have any relevance to the larger 
second tier authorities. 52 Yet, officials were not 
prepared to compromise with the essential principle of 
the strong county council. Rather, they approached the 
issue from the perspective of really wanting to make the 
role of the county council even stronger. In March 1926 
Francis remarked in an internal memorandum that "it was 
unfortunately inevitable that county boroughs should 
become poor law hospital authorities, but the mischief 
and crippling of the county administration would be 
substantially increased by the enlarged concession to the 
non county borough" . 
53 Hence, ministry officials looked 
to make as little compromise with the interests of non- 
county boroughs as possible. 
From December 1925 in letters to Harry Pritchard, the 
secretary to the AMC, Robinson consistently rejected 
further AMC arguments that non-county boroughs should 
52. See, for example, PRO MH 57/138: Poor law reform 
proposals-reactions of AMC and Ministry of Health-AMC 
dealings-November 1925-December 1926. Minute of meeting 
between Neville Chamberlain, Ministry of Health officials 
and AMC deputation 21.7.1926. 
53. PRO HLG 29/262: Papers and correspondence relating to 
various draft bills on poor law reform, 1918-1927. 
Memorandum by H. Francis, 5.3.1926. 
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become poor law authorities, and clarified the extent of 
county council control envisaged. It was intended that 
it should cover second tier authority health services, 
both grant aided and not. This would include the power 
to apportion and withhold grant out of the block grant to 
maternity and child welfare authorities, a more general 
power for county councils to make representation to the 
Minister in regard to defaulting authorities, and a 
statutory responsibility for the Minister to act upon 
representations. This could lead to three possible 
outcomes: complete transfer of cost and administration of 
a second tier authority service to the county council; a 
temporary transfer; or the transfer of administrative 
responsibility to the county council with cost remaining 
with the second tier authority. With respect, in 
particular, to the idea of the county council having 
power over grant apportionment to second tier authorities 
it is clear that Robinson was bringing in by the back 
door an important power which had originally been 
rejected in Ministry of Health discussion in 1920.54 
The AMC reacted angrily. A deputation to Robinson in 
March 1926, led by the Lord Mayor of Birmingham, argued 
bitterly against the enlargement of county council 
powers, claiming that it was clearly ridiculous that 
county councils should have large powers over such non- 
county boroughs as Luton, Bedford and Cambridge, which 
had populations comparable with some county boroughs. It 
54. PRO MH 57/138, Robinson to Pritchard 15-12-1925 and 
21.4.1926. 
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might not be the intention of the proposals to allow 
county councils to interfere with such authorities, but 
their wording allowed for that possibility. 55 In June 
1926 the AMC council adopted the report of a special 
committee, which suggested that the Ministry had acted 
poorly in defining what county council powers should be 
when such a matter should properly have been left to the 
Royal Commission, and questioned the ability of county 
counci s to exercise such powers when they had little or 
no direct experience of such services as water supply, 
sewerage and refuse disposal. The report concluded that 
the adoption of the proposals "would tend to introduce 
resentment and bitterness in the relations between the 
two classes of local authorities" . If powers over non- 
county boroughs were to be increased at all they should 
be with respect to the Ministry and not county 
councils. 56 
The expression of urban authority resentment reached a 
climax at an AMC meeting with Neville Chamberlain in July 
1926. After a cautious and reasoned speech by Harry 
Pritchard Alderman Wright of Lancaster roundly condemned 
the proposals and ended by saying that " we only want you 
to know that throughout England the non-county boroughs 
are up in arms on this question" . Chamberlain robustly 
defended the aim to have only county councils as poor law 
authorities in county areas, as they covered the greatest 
area of charge. With regard to county council-second 
55. ibid, minute of AMC deputation, 24.3.1926. 
56. AMC council minutes, 30.6.1926, p. 169. 
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tier relations Chamberlain remonstrated that the 
proposals had been misinterpreted. "All we had in mind", 
he said, " was to strengthen up those [existing county 
council] powers and make them effective where they have 
up to the present proved ineffective". He did not 
envisage detailed county council control, and concluded 
that the non-county boroughs had over-reacted. In 
replying in this way Chamberlain, however, failed to 
appreciate the very real way in which the proposals 
represented another victory for county against town in 
the assumption of public responsibilities, and the 
tendency within the Ministry to promote the powers of 
county against town in the responsibilities which they 
already assumed. 57 
The confrontational approach taken by the AMC 
deputation in the July meeting, nevertheless, provoked a 
spirit of limited compromise on the part of Chamberlain 
and senior officials. They held smaller meetings with 
AMC representatives in the late summer of 1926 and 
promised to reconsider the proposals. 
58 This resulted in 
circular 805, issued to local authorities in June 1927. 
This maintained the principle of transfer of poor law 
services to county councils in the administrative 
counties but allowed for delegation to second tier 
authorities. Essentially, the proposals in this respect 
57. PRO MH 57/138, minute of meeting between Neville 
Chamberlain, ministry of Health officials and AMC 
deputation 21.7-1926. 
58. ibid, for example, meeting between Neville 
Chamberlain, Ministry of Health officials and AMC 
representatives 29.7.1926. 
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remained unchanged from 1925, and were to remain so in to 
the 1929 Act. Moreover, the powers of county councils 
over second tier authorities were more rigidly defined. 
A communication from the Ministry of Health in November 
1926 had signalled the end to the attempt to term the 
county council as the general supervisory and controlling 
authority for county areas. Existing county council 
powers were merely given more effect in law, and applied 
only to the statutory duties of second tier authorities. 
In addition, by November 1926 the Ministry had agreed 
that the apportionment for second tier maternity and 
child welfare authorities should be taken out of the 
block grant and be paid separately. The county council 
was, therefore, to have no power over the payment or 
withholding of grants to second tier authorities. This 
appeased the larger non-county boroughs who had little to 
fear from the mere strengthening of existing county 
council powers. 59 
When the local government white paper was published in 
June 1928 the AMC reaction was far more muted in respect 
to the poor law (health care) reform. 
60 The non-county 
boroughs had accepted their failure to become poor law 
authorities as of right in return for the foiling of 
Ministry ambitions to promote the county council beyond 
the status originally suggested by Maclean. 
61 The county 
59. See AMC council minutes, 24.11.1927, pp. 225-235. 
60. Pro-oosals for reform in local government and in 
-financial relations 
between the Exchecfuer and local 
authorities (cmd. 3134), PP (1928). 
61. See, for example, PRO MH 57/147: Poor law reform 
1926-1927, Secretary's papers. Minute of meeting with 
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councils and county boroughs, meanwhile, remained 
variously enthusiastic and ambivalent about their future 
62 role as major health and poor law authorities. Whilst 
ministry aims with respect to the reform of local health 
administration had been severely undermined by the 
intervention of feeling in the Conservative party, they 
had been effected to a considerably lesser extent by the 
negotiations with the local authority associations. 
(ii) THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND GRANT REFORM, 1925-1929 
Whilst the poor law (health care) reform produced 
separate and differing reactions from the CCA and AMC, 
involving some conflict of interests, the grant reform 
proposed in 1925 precipitated very similar responses. 
Officially the CCA came in to line with the AMC in 
accepting the principle of block grant reform. At a 
meeting in February 1926 the executive council accepted 
that a relaxation of detailed central control was 
unlikely except in the event of the introduction of a 
block grant, and as it was now an integral part of the 
Ministry's plans they should accept it. However, the 
executive council stated clearly that the conditions 
outlined by the committee chaired by Sir Arthur Chapman 
in 1921 should be met before full acceptance of the 
deputation from Non-County Boroughs Association, 
30-11.1926. 
62. See PRO HLG 8/88: Royal Commission on Local 
Government- local authorities, administration and 
finance. Note prepared by Sir Edward Forber, deputy 
secretary at the Ministry of Health, for Neville 
Chamberlain, 25-10.1928. 
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63 Ministry's reform was made. In the summer of 1926 the 
case that no county council should lose income in a 
reform, existing grant aided commitments that had been 
entered in to should be provided for, extra grant should 
be provided for new obligations and that there should be 
an early revision of the block grant was made forcibly to 
Ministry officials. At the same time the AMC, which had 
been officially in favour of the block grant principle 
since 1919, voiced concern about the prospect of some 
county boroughs being worse off in grant aid as a result 
of the redistributive nature of the block grant. There 
was no explicit promise in the 1925 proposals of an 
additional sum which could guarantee local authorities 
against loss. As they stood the 1925 proposals suggested 
that as a result of the formula, which was at this time 
still solely based upon population and assessable value, 
the necessitous areas would be subsidised at the expense 
of grant aid to richer local authorities. The report of 
a special committee to the AMC council in June 1926 
suggested that the block grant scheme was "a penalty upon 
progressive authorities", who had responded 
enthusiastically over many years to the stimulus provided 
by percentage grants, and built up vast and modern 
services. Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and 
Newcastle, for example, all stood to lose a great deal by 
the reform. 64 
63. CCA official Gazette (March 1926), pp. 78-83. Report 
of the CCA executive council meeting, 17.2.1926. 
64. AMC council minutes, 30.6.1926, p. 169. 
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As a result the AMC council joined the CCA executive 
council in lobbying for safeguards. In addition in June 
1926 the AMC council suggested that there should be 
additional grant aid with regard to transferred poor law 
services, and that any additional grant aid to poorer 
local authorities should be made outside the proposed 
block grant. Two deputations in July 1926 expressed AMC 
solidarity with the CCA position, and expressed dismay 
that central government should wish to make a permanent 
adjustment to the grant system against the interests of 
its principal partners in local government just because 
of temporary difficulties in the finance of 
administration in poorer areas. Chamberlain made 
sympathetic noises in the summer of 1926 and made it 
clear that he would introduce the block grant system more 
gradually, beginning with a three rather than a five year 
period, and would seek in his dealings with the Treasury 
to gain the additional sum which would guarantee the 
richer authorities against grant aid loss. 65 Despite 
this the AMC and CCA remained unsympathetic to the 
essential principle of the formula basis to the block 
grant. In October 1926, for instance, the AMC Council 
passed a resolution calling for the distribution of a 
block grant to be based on levels of local expenditure. 
This envisaged a percentage grant set for periods of 
years and would not essentially erode the grant basis of 
local authorities who had been served well by percentage 
65. See PRO MH 57/138, minutes of meetings between 
Neville Chamberlain, Ministry of Health officials and 
representatives of the AMC, 21.7.1926 and 29.7.1926. 
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grants. The AMC believed necessitous areas should be 
subsidised through additional grants from central 
government and not from within the existing pool of grant 
aid. 66 This made explicit what had been previously 
implicit in the conditions they had made on the 
acceptance of the block grant principle, that the local 
authority associations' aim was to have the block grant 
as a fixed grant on an expenditure rather than 
redistributive basis. 
The positions of the AMC and the CCA on the block 
grant did not essentially change between 1926 and 1928 
when plans for legislation were finally brought forward. 
Despite Chamberlain's offer of an additional sum of E5 
million to guarantee against loss in the first five years 
of the block grant they remained gravely concerned about 
authorities who could potentially lose as a result of the 
redistributive intentions of the block grant. A CCA 
deputation in October 1928 suggested that in the long- 
term agricultural counties stood to lose a great deal and 
looked for a guarantee against loss for fifteen years. 
Chamberlain accused one of the CCA's principal speakers, 
Sir Percy Jackson of the West Riding of Yorkshire, of 
wanting only to secure the financial interests o is own 
authority whilst allowing the financial interests of 
other county councils to be allowed to go "rip" . The CCA 
also shared the AMC's view that compensation for derating 
should be separated from the block grant. Compensation 
should be paid to individual authorities in accord with 
66. AmC council minutes, 28.10.1926, P. 219. 
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their individual losses rather than allowed to be 
redistributed according to need to poorer authorities in 
the block grant. Chamberlain retorted to the CCA October 
deputation that this was tantamount to "cutting the baby 
in half" which inevitably "would extinguish its life". 
He looked rather to "trim the baby's hair". 67 
Essentially this is how Chamberlain and his senior 
officials responded between late 1928 and early 1929. To 
placate the interests of authorities who stood to lose 
gran income as a result of the introduction of a block 
grant Chamberlain endorsed the additional sum as a means 
of guaranteeing against loss, and further provided for 
additional grants which would ensure all local 
authorities a minimum gain over their 1929 grant aid 
position equivalent to Is per head rate income. In 
addition he gave up the plan of introducing full formula 
distribution immediately and allowed for its more gradual 
introduction. This meant that local expenditure would 
remain the principal basis for grant distribution until 
1937 and would not be fully phased out until 1947. In 
addition Robinson superintended the evolution of the 
minimum proportion formula which tied the aggregate level 
of block grant for each block grant period to levels of 
local spending. 68 The concessions were published in 
67. PRO HLG 43/2: Local government reform, CCA 
deputations. Minute of meeting between Neville 
Chamberlain, Ministry of Health officials and 
representatives of the CCA, 18.10.1928. 
68. See PRO HLG 43/2, Robinson to S. M. Johnson, secretary 
to the CCA, 28.10.1928. 
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January 1929. 69 The reaction from the local authority 
associations was reluctant acceptance. The AMC council 
committee's view that they could expect little more from 
the government was endorsed, and in mid-January the CCA 
committee "decided to recommend the executive council to 
accept the Minister's concessions as being the best 
70 alternative apparently available". 
Chamberlain and his senior officials, therefore, won 
consent from the local authority associations to the 
reform of exchequer grants. However, as has been shown, 
it is inappropriate to characterise this consent as being 
based in the happy appeasement of the associations' aims. 
Even as the exchequer grant reform was being passed on to 
the statute books the associations remained profoundly 
unhappy that compensation for derating had been included 
within the block grant. In late 1928 they had also made 
a bid for the minimum proportion formula, which tied the 
aggregate block grant for each period to aggregate levels 
of local spending, to be implemented with regard to 
individual local authority block grant apportionments 
based on individual levels of expenditure. 
71 More 
prosperous local authorities, who exerted decisive power 
within the local authority associations, this being by 
virtue of the nature of representation on the council and 
main committees in the case of the AMC, clearly wished to 
69. Local Government Bill, Amendments to -nart VI of the 
bill -oro-gosed by the Ministry of Health after discus. sion 
with the local authorities (cmd. 3257) PP (1929). 
70. AMC council minutes, 8.5.1929, pp. 87-88; PRO HLG 
43/2, S. M. Johnson to Sir Arthur Robinson 10.1.1929. 
71. PRO HLG 43/2, joint statement of CCA and AMC, 
22.11.1928. 
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retain local expenditure as the principal basis of grant 
aid even within the block grant. Whilst Chamberlain's 
concessions had helped the local authority associations 
to save face, they still did not essentially meet their 
root alms. 
Chamberlain and his officials, therefore, largely beat 
off the challenge from the local authority associations 
against a change in the essential basis of grant aid in 
the introduction of the block grant. Yet, it would also 
be inappropriate to applaud them for doing so as a 
defence of the essential redistributive aim of the block 
grant, and, therefore, of the financial interests of the 
poorer local authorities, which seemed to have been lost 
in the associations, own deliberations. For the 
concessions made to the richer authorities in 1928-1929, 
as well as failing to meet their true aim of an 
expenditure-based block grant, fatally undermined the 
ability of the block grant to help poorer authorities. 
As a result of making the introduction of formula 
distribution gradual, and until 1937 only 25% of the 
basis for block grant distribution, poorer authorities 
could expect little targeted relief in the short-term. 
Local authority equalisation through the block grant 
option appeared a distant and uncertain utopia. In 
short, the deal struck by Chamberlain over the block 
grant in early 1929, generally praised in terms of the 
retention of the essential principles of the proposals 
whilst balancing the interests of all concerned, should 
be viewed as one that ensured the reform fell between the 
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stools of percentage and redistributive grants. it 
pleased no-one and in particular left poorer local 
authorities highly vulnerable to financial crisis for 
some time to come, a prospect of which poorer local 
72 authorities were only too well aware. 
(iii) THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND 
THE BLOCK GRANT FORMULA, 1925-1929 
The inadequacy of the block grant reform to meet the 
needs of poorer authorities was further compounded by the 
nature of the block grant formula. Sources in relation 
to the accountant- general's office's consideration of 
the factors to be included in the formula are more 
abundant for the early 1920s than for the late 1920s. 
However, certain key themes in Ministry consideration can 
be identified. First, Ernest Strohmenger, who remained 
as accountant-general until 1930, had established as 
early as 1920 that the formula should distribute the 
grant in accord with population and that this should then 
be modified by an indicator of the quality of population, 
which suggested relative population needs. In 1920 
Strohmenger had focused on assessable rateable value per 
72. See, for example, The Times, 9.10.1928, p. 7. This 
contains a report of a meeting of north-east local 
authorities, namely, Durham County Council and 
Darlington, Gateshead, Middlesborough, South Shields, 
Sunderland and West Hartlepool county boroughs. They 
expressed their doubts over the efficacy of even the 
original ministry block grant proposals to achieve the 
desired grant distribution in relation to need, and 
commented on the lack of representation of their 
interests by the CCA and AMC. 
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head as the sole indicator of the quality of population. 
national average of assessable rateable value per head 
could be established. Where a local authority fell below 
the average block grant apportionment could be increased 
to make up for the deficiency. In such a way block grant 
could be distributed in accord with need. 73 
At that time the determination of rateable value was 
made by a large number of local assessment committees. 
This raised two problems for the use of rateable value as 
a formula indicator. First, the creation of figures for 
rateable value was not made on a uniform basis, 
suggesting the likelihood of inequitable results in block 
grant distribution. Secondly, as long as power over the 
assessment of rateable value was in local hands there 
remained the potential for assessment to be made in 
accord with local interests in order to maximise the 
apportionment of block grant. The reform of rating and 
valuation was, therefore, essential to its utility to the 
block grant formula. After assuming office in late 1924 
Neville Chamberlain took up the mantle of reform laid 
down by previous ministers of health. In 1925 
Chamberlain introduced a bill which would have made 
borough and district councils local assessment 
authorities under the direction of the Board of Inland 
Revenue. This aroused considerable local opposition and 
crucially the Board of Inland Revenue pulled out of its 
intended role. Whilst local assessment was successfully 
concentrated in certain authorities, the only means of 
73. See chapters two and three. 
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securing uniformity in local valuation established by the 
1925 Rating and Valuation Act was a central valuation 
committee, which was a 
enforcement body. 74 
promotional rather than 
Chamberlain's failure to secure a system of uniform 
rating and valuation had important implications for the 
development of a block grant formula after 1925. 
Assessable rateable value per head could not be relied 
upon as the sole or even main indicator of local need in 
the formula. More than anything else Ministry officials 
were wary of potential local abuse of rateable value 
statistics to undermine fair distribution. This 
prevailing assumption of local behaviour also then 
underlay Ministry consideration of alternatives to 
rateable value per head as indicators of need. The level 
of local unemployment was an obvious choice, yet in its 
insertion in to the formula it was decided that only 
nationally derived figures would be used. The proportion 
of unemployment was, therefore, only to be measured in 
terms of the insured workforce. The uninsured unemployed 
who received assistance from poor law authorities were 
excluded on the grounds that local authorities would be 
able to massage their statistics of unemployed poor in 
order to distort the unemployment indicator in their 
favour. Similarly, the number of dependent children also 
presented itself as an obvious indicator of local need. 
Here, Ministry officials preferred to use statistics of 
74. See G. Rhodes, Evidence in AiDiDendix Six of the ReDort 
of the (Lavfield) Co=ittee of Inguiry in to Local 
Government Finance (cmd. 6453), PP (1976), pp. 107-109. 
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the number of children under five, which, like figures 
for population as a whole, could be discerned from the 
Registrar-General's estimates, rather than the number of 
children in free elementary education for the reason that 
the number of the latter could be influenced by local 
education policies. 
These indicator selections had at best questionable 
claims to best represent local needs. The exclusion of 
poor law figures meant the omittance of a significant 
measure of the number of unemployed in a given area. In 
addition, it could be argued that the level of unemployed 
poor was in principle a much better indicator of local 
need than the insured unemployed, for the former better 
reflected the extent of unskilled workers in a given 
area, and thus lower levels of personal working class 
income. The number of children under five indicator was 
also open to much criticism. In October 1928 the AMC 
protested that it could just as easily reflect local 
prosperity as poverty. Chamberlain robustly rejected 
this criticism but the evidence was not conclusive on 
either side. Moreover, it could be argued that in 
principle the number of children in free elementary 
education was a much better indicator of need, as it 
suggested the number of families unable to afford to pay 
for education. Its potential relevance as an indicator 
was enhanced by the fact that education was becoming an 
increasingly major spending item for local authorities. 
75 
75. See HLG 8/88, Note prepared by Sir Edward Forber for 
Neville Chamberlain, 25.10.1928. 
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Nevertheless, unemployment and the number of children 
under five were chosen as indicators of need and placed 
in to the formula with population. To these was added a 
weighting for the population per mile of road. This was 
a relatively reliable indicator of relative local needs 
and was derived again from national figures. Rateable 
value was retained as the final factor in the formula, 
but being the only factor derived from local figures was 
much reduced in importance from Strohmenger's original 
proposals of 1920. Overall, it can be argued that this 
cocktail of factors produced a formula that was not an 
ideally created basis for the distribution of block grant 
to the areas which needed it most. It was flawed by the 
failure of the 1925 Rating and Valuation Act, the 
inadequacy of government and local government statistics 
which this failure so cruelly exposed and the subsequent 
centralist assumptions which ensured the selection of 
questionable indicators of need. 
The formula for block grant distribution may be 
further criticised on the basis of arguments put forward 
by Chester. First, Chester argues, that the 
redistributive aim was always going to be blighted by the 
fact that the block grant embraced also the aim of 
compensating local authorities for rate and grant aid 
losses. Whether the formula successfully targeted grant 
aid to authorities with higher need was, therefore, 
totally dependent on whether on the part of the block 
grant upon which it operated it yielded more grant aid 
than simple compensation would achieve. Chester suggests 
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that because the range of indicators that the Ministry 
used in 1929 were so limited and, indeed, so questionable 
population w as made the principal factor in the formula. 
Distribution primarily on the basis of the quantity 
rather than the quality of population was always likely 
to lead to highly inconsistent outcomes in relation to 
the aim of meeting local need. Chester also suggests 
that a major deficiency of the 1929 block grant formula 
was its lack of negative factor weightings, although this 
may be seen as more of a post hoc judgment than something 
upon which contemporary debate turned. 76 
To their discredit, however, the local authority 
associations were chiefly concerned during 1928 with the 
forecasts of how much the block grant formula would 
direct grant away from local authorities which had done 
well under expenditure-based percentage grants rather 
than how well it would direct income towards high need 
areas. The AMC, for example, with the exception of its 
argument over the children factor and its detailed 
questioning of the mathematical weightings attached to 
each factor in the formula, concentrated on an attempt to 
place a sixth factor in to the formula. This was a 
weighting for the twenty five local authorities with the 
highest rates. Such a weighting would only have had a 
coincidentally 
authorities. 
beneficial effect on poorer local 
In principle it would have added a measure 
of local expenditure to the basis of the formula, and so 
76. D. N. Chester, Central and Local Government: Financial 
and Administrative Relations (1951), pp. 256-280. 
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represented a further attempt by the local authority 
associations to erode the redistributive intent of the 
formula. Sir Edward Forber, the Ministry deputy 
secretary, roundly condemned the proposal, writing in 
October 1928 that "it is entirely contrary to one of the 
fundamental aims of the government scheme, viz, to 
encourage thrifty administration by eliminating 
expenditure entirely from the distribution of grant aid. 
Once expenditure were accepted as a factor for any part 
of the grant it would inevitably tend to become once 
again the predominant if not the only measure of need". 77 
Such a defence of the redistributive aim of the block 
grant by a senior Ministry official, of course, remained 
tarnished by the inherent weakness of the formula to 
realise that aim. The local authority associations did, 
however, seek and win the concessions of a review of the 
working of the block grant formula at an early occasion, 
and the institution of five yearly census to keep the 
population indicator up to date. Whether they did this so 
as to ensure that the block grant was achieving as best 
as possible the aim of distributing grant to areas of 
need, as commonly assumed, must now be open to serious 
question. It would be more appropriate to suggest that 
the more prosperous authorities, primarily represented by 
the local authority associations, were anxious to retain 
a watching brief over the block grant to ensure that the 
major part of the grant aid which they had gained under a 
77. HLG 8/88, Note prepared by Sir Edward Forber for 
Neville Chamberlain, 25.10.1928. 
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system of percentage grants continued to be received 
under the new block grant regime. 
The analysis of the development of the block grant 
formula in the late 1920s and the response of the local 
authority associations completes the reconsideration of 
the achievement of reform. Such reconsideration suggests 
that views on the role of Neville Chamberlain as well as 
Ministry of Health officials in the formulation of the 
reform need to be revised. Chamberlain had strong party 
political reasons for promoting reform, which grew 
stronger in office. Moreover, his compliance with 
ministry plans for reform grew out of parallel 
considerations within the Conservative party, based on 
similar values in the approach to social reform. The 
political nature of these shared values was revealed by 
the very different way in which the Ministry treated with 
Chamberlain and his Labour predecessor, John Wheatley. 
Finally, the importance of Chamberlain's own reasons for 
promoting reform was revealed, in particular, in relation 
to grant reform, where but for his desire for a cheap 
necessitous areas policy Ministry officials would have 
dropped proposals in 1926. 
It is also clear that in the formulation of reform 
Ministry officials and Chamberlain showed little desire 
to meet the full plurality of interests, instead managing 
reform debate within limited bounds. In the early 1920s 
Ministry officials insulated their reform proposals from 
all external forces except for the local authority 
associations, who represented the authorities on whom 
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they would be reliant for the implementation of the 
reforms. The elaboration of shifts in the associations 
opinions goes a long way towards explaining shifts in 
ministry intentions between 1919 and 1924. 
From 1925 the formulation of policy was forced to take 
account of the views of rural Conservative backbenchers, 
but principally Chamberlain and officials again confined 
policy discussion access to the CCA and the AMC. The 
interests which would be appeased by the reforms were, 
therefore, inherently limited. The fact also that the 
Conservative backbenchers and the local authority 
associations primarily represented interests threatened 
by the reforms meant that their appeasement would be to 
the detriment of the original aims of the reforms. This 
was duly the case with regard to the prospects for alms 
in regard to local health care, which the Webbs 
themselves pointed out. 78 It was also the case with 
regard to the redistributive aim of the block grant. In 
the latter case, in addition, central incompetence in 
not carrying rating and valuation reform, allied to 
bureaucratic imperatives and poor representation of 
poorer local authorities in so opposing meant that the 
block grant formula was unlikely from its inception to 
achieve its redistributive ends. Consequently, the 
potential for success of what were from the start limited 
options for the reforms of health care and local finance 
78. S. and B. Webb, English Poor Law Historv, Part 
Volume 11 (1929), p. 990. 
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was further eroded in the reform formulation by a bounded 
pluralist policy process. 
Further, the implications of placing an additional sum 
in to the block grant, and of providing for additional 
grants to prevent local authority losses, which had also 
been forced by the local authority associations, for the 
success of the block grant as a grant aid control were 
not a matter of debate but it is questionable as to why 
not. The final aim of the 1929 reforms of securing 
through grant reform greater local autonomy seemed 
assured of success. However, even in 1929, there were 
critics in local government who suggested that local 
autonomy and lax central control could lead to a decline 
in standards of local health provision. Sir Arthur 
Robinson's private comment to A. N. Rucker, Chamberlain's 
private secretary, in response to the suggestion that the 
Minister's powers ought to be strengthened further was 
simply to say that local authorities would very 
reasonably object to this under my minister and you can 
yourself easily inquire what it might mean under a Labour 
minister. 79 Further bureaucratic suspicion of the Labour 
party, therefore, left the criticism to be tested. In 
1929 the optimism for successful implementation of the 
reforms in terms of all of their prescribed aims, 
recession ahead or not, was built on shifting sands. 
79. PRO MH 55/9: Papers relating to the consideration of 
the clause in the 1929 Local government Act as to power 
to reduce grants when services are unsatisfactory. 
Robinson to Rucker, 21.1-1929. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHEQUER GRANT REFORM 
This chapter reconsiders, first, the view that the block 
grant introduced in 1929 proved during the 1930s to be an 
effective means of controlling exchequer grant aid, and. 
secondly, the view that the block grant was an effective 
means to redistribute grant aid more towards the poorer 
local authorities, which was eroded only by the serious 
effects of the recession. The second part of the chapter 
also examines the view that the investigation in to the 
working of the block grant formula between 1935 and 1937 
yielded a further improvement of the block grant's 
redistributive capacity in the light of the experience of 
the recession years. The reconsideration is based 
primarily on the paucity of previous research and the 
more critical approach to implementation which 
conclusions on formulation suggest is appropriate. In 
particular, analysis of the bureaucratic, political and 
local authority association inputs in to the formulation 
of the block grant has already revealed why and how the 
block grant contained inherent defects as a means of 
grant income redistribution, which the recession then 
served only to exacerbate. Similar analysis of policy 
inputs in terms of the concept of an inter-governmental 
policy network in relation to the revision of the block 
grant formula in the mid-1930s appears a necessary 
complement. Finally, the chapter considers the view that 
the experience of the implementation of the block grant 
251 
during the 1930s, both in terms of grant aid control and 
grant income redistribution, endorsed the principles of 
block grant reform in 1929 as a model for future reform. 
1. TREASURY CONTROL AND THE BLOCK GRANT 
The block grant had three elements: compensation for 
derating; compensation for discontinued grants; and an 
additional sum. At first sight, the block grant appeared 
to represent a large increase in grant aid to local 
government. This was, however, principally due to the 
element of compensation for derating. Although paid to 
local government it was seen as a subsidy to industry and 
agriculture and, therefore, should be omitted from a 
consideration of whether the block grant assisted in the 
control of grant aid to local government. Attention 
instead should be focused on the second and third 
components of the block grant. The second component of 
the block grant was the compensation for discontinued 
grants. It covered fewer local authority aided services 
than the Treasury would have liked. Indeed many elements 
of the block grant merely consolidated fixed items such 
as the assigned revenues and the agricultural rates 
compensation grants. ' However, the block grant still 
held the potential to limit grant aid for local authority 
health and road services. By fixing grant aid for 
1. For an endorsement of the limited nature of the block 
grant in 1929 see R. Jackman, 'Local Government Finance', 
in M. Loughlin, M. D. Gelfand and K. Young (ed), Half a 
Centurv of Munici-nal Decline, 1935-1985 (1985) pp. 161- 
163. 
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periods of years the exchequer intended to make savings 
against what grant aid would have been had central 
percentage grants continued to rise annually in accord 
with local spending. The third component, the additional 
sum, E5 million p. a. in the first block grant period, did 
represent an increase in exchequer aid to local 
government, but had been assumed by the Treasury 
throughout the 1920s to be a necessary bribe to local 
government to accept the block grant, which would be 
rapidly cancelled out by the savings in relation to 
health and road grants. 2 
During the 1930s the expectations of the Treasury in 
respect to the second and third components of the block 
grant were, however, cruelly denied. Indeed, it is 
ironic that it was as a grant aid control that the 
unforecastable defects of the block grant reform were 
exposed by the recession. In 1930 the block grant was 
set at E45.1 million p. a. for the three years 1930/1931 
to 1932/1933. In 1931, in response to the recession, the 
new National Government considered it essential to impose 
economies in government expenditure so as to reduce the 
burdens on the economy and so facilitate rapid recovery. 
A call for economy was extended to local government and 
indeed many local authorities imposed their own economy 
policies ahead of the Ministry of Health circular. As a 
result aggregate local authority spending on percentage 
and specific grant-aided services dropped for the first 
2. See, for example, PRO T 161/248/S. 26701: Control of 
local authorities by government departments, 1924-25 and 
1929. A. Hurst to Sir George Barstow, 30.1.1925. 
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time since the First World War. Spending reductions were 
maintained in both 1931/1932 and 1932/1933, with the 
result that associated grant aid was also reduced. 3 At 
the same time the Government imposed emergency cuts in 
teachers and police salaries in a similar manner to those 
imposed on the recommendation of the Geddes Committee a 
decade before. The emergency situation made such cuts 
acceptable in local government. 4 
The effect of these events was to show the advantage 
of the flexibility of percentage and specific grants to 
respond to public expenditure crises. They could go down 
as easily as they went up. In these circumstances the 
fixity of the block grant for three years proved a 
positive handicap to limiting or reducing grant 
expenditure. For each of the two years 1931/1932 and 
1932/1933, therefore, the exchequer was pumping in to the 
local authorities at least f5 million more than if there 
had been no reform of exchequer grants and the former 
grants had continued. On top of this additional grants 
paid in the first grant period totalled f-421,436. In 
addition, it is reasonable to assume that if the former 
health percentage and road grants had still been in use 
they would have fallen in proportion to the fall in the 
aggregate amount of grants outside the block grant. 
Consequently, the exchequer was also providing an extra 
sum to local government equivalent to the difference 
3. See B. R. mitchell and P. Dean, Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics (1962), p. 415. 
4. See, for example, J. Stevenson, British Society 1914- 
1945 (1984), pp. 306-317. 
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between the fixed compensation for grants in the block 
grant and the hypothetical level of grants had they still 
been in existence. (see figure 2) In sum, the block grant 
represented a subsidy to local government in the region 
of E6-7 million p. a. in the early 1930s, an amount 
equivalent to over 5% of all government grants, and this 
in years of falling prices. The block grant rather than 
serving as a negative grant control acted as an 
unintentional counter-cyclical spending device during the 
worst years of the recession. 
Figure 2 The Block Grant and Total Exchequer Grant Aid 
to Local Government, 1930-1939 
YEAR (ending) TOTAL GOVT GRANT (fm) BLOCK GRANT (Em) 
1930 107.8 - 
1931 130.2 45.1 
1932 126.6 45.1 
1933 120.5 45.1 
1934 121.6 45.3 
1935 125.0 45.3 
1936 132 .9 
45.3 
1937 135.6 45.3 
1938 136.1 47.2 
1939 140.2 47.2 
(Source: B. R. Mitchell and P. Dean, Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics (1962), p. 415) 
........................ 
At the same time problems in the ascertainment of the 
value of formula factors meant that throughout much of 
the first block grant period it became difficult to make 
255 
anything other than provisional block grant 
apportionments to individual local authorities. By 1932 
it had become clear to senior Treasury officials that 
this manner of implementation had on balance led to more 
over-payments than under-payments. Further, there were 
strong Ministry of Health arguments that immediate 
correction in the year following overpayment would lead 
to a serious dislocation of the financial policies of 
some of the local authorities concerned. Thus, with 
regard to Glamorgan in 1931 and Durham in 1932, the 
Treasury was prevailed upon to make good its losses by 
staggered reductions of grant. Such technical 
difficulties in implementation merely served to reinforce 
the emerging realisation that the block grant was not the 
panacea to all the ills of central grants that the 
Treasury had previously thought. 
5 
Senior Treasury officials fought to minimise exchequer 
losses made because of the block grant by a number of 
means. All of these suggested the primacy of central 
public expenditure control against the financial 
interests of local government. The first part of the 
damage limitation exercise, begun even before the block 
grant had been officially introduced, involved the non- 
payment of remanet grants. These were the grants 
in 
respect of health and road services, and local taxation, 
that still remained to be paid in 1930/1931 for the 
5. PRO T 161/1228/S. 33386/4: Local government reform, 
financial relations between the exchequer and local 
authorities, January 1931-May 1939. Alford (Ministry of 
Health) to Beresford (Treasury), 2.1.1931 and 30.3.1932, 
and Beresford to B-W-Gilbert (Treasury), 18.4.1932. 
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financial year 1929/1930. They totalled E1,982,000. In 
January 1930 A. W. Hurst, a principal assistant secretary, 
pointed out the opportunity provided by the clause in the 
Act which stipulated that the full amount of the block 
grant for each year should be paid in the year with 
respect to which it was being paid. Hurst suggested that 
the clause made the full amount of the block grant a 
ceiling to the exchequer's annual liability. Therefore, 
he "saw no reason why we the exchequer should be called 
upon to pay in 1930 not only the balances of grants due 
in respect of 1929 but also a full year's block grant 
under the new system. We, therefore, propose to 
aggregate all the outstanding balances and only to pay so 
much of the new block grant on account each year as would 
with these outstanding balances make up a full year's 
total of the new grant ". The strategy which in effect 
entailed the postponement of the payment of the remanet 
grants indefinitely was approved by Sir Richard Hopkins, 
then controller of supply and finance. He saw it as "the 
best policy to carry the liability forward as long as we 
can". 6 
In October 1930 Ernest Strohmenger, by then deputy 
secretary at the Ministry of Health, informed the 
Treasury that the strategy to withhold all of the remanet 
grants risked considerable opposition from the local 
authority associations. He proposed that the sting be 
6. PRO T 161/1228/S. 33386/3: Local government reform, 
financial relations between the exchequer and local 
authorities, December 1929 to November 1930. A. W. Hurst 
to Mr Upcott 2.1.1930, and R. N. V. Hopkins comment on 
Hurst's paper 2.1.1930. 
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drawn out of any lobby for complete payment by placating 
those authorities to whom the remanet grants were most 
important. Accordingly, it was decided that where the 
remanet represented more than 1/12 of a local authority's 
block grant income only 1/6 of the remanet would be held 
back by the Treasury. Strohmenger firmly believed that 
this would stave off opposition whilst still allowing the 
Treasury to keep back approximately fI. 68 million 
indefinitely. 7 His calculations proved correct. Indeed, 
there is evidence which proves that the remanet grants 
remained unpaid as late as 1936, and there is no clear 
evidence that the debt to local government was made good 
even after that date. 8 
In the early 1930s the successful strategy with regard 
to remanet grants gave Treasury officials some comfort 
against the knowledge of the block grant's aggregate 
subsidy to local government and the unavoidable 
phenomenon of over-payment of grant in respect of 
individual authorities. It did not, however, in any way 
compensate for the fact that the block grant during its 
first period failed to reduce or halt the growth in 
exchequer grant aid to local government. Indeed it 
operated in rather the opposite way. This experience led 
to a second strategy to minimise the failure of the block 
7. ibid, E. J. Strohmenger to A. W. Hurst 15.10.1930. 
8. PRO T 161/1228/S. 33386/4, correspondence between 
S. H. G. Hughes, by then accountant -general at the Ministry 
of Health, and B. W. Gilbert, of the Treasury, November- 
December 1936. Hughes suggested that the remanet be 
finally be paid as part of new arrangements concerning 
the road fund. Gilbert replied that "if and when we 
have 
to deal with these remanets, it will as I see 
it, have to 
be done through the ordinary block grant vote". 
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grant as a grant aid control. This involved a minimalist 
approach to the setting of the block grant for its second 
period. In 1933 the amount for the additional sum, the 
one flexible component of the grant, was set strictly in 
line with the minimum proportion formula laid down in the 
1929 Act. This was done in spite of heated Parliamentary 
debates early in 1933 in which Labour MPs in particular 
condemned the government for not using the block grant 
mechanism to make some additional subsidy to the local 
authorities who were in deep financial crisis as a result 
of the cost of public assistance to meet the enormous 
increases in unemployment. 
9 
Any Treasury euphoria over this approach to the block 
grant in its second period was quickly dispelled, 
however, in June 1933 by a one-off supplementary 
Parliamentary vote of E500,000 to help local authorities 
in distressed areas in England, Scotland and Wales. Sir 
Edward Hilton Young, the Minister of Health, had not been 
persuaded by the arguments of the distressed areas to 
increase grant aid through the block grant but had been 
unable to justify no extra assistance, even given the 
constraints of public expenditure policy-10 More 
importantly, perhaps, the minimalist approach to the 
aggregate level of the block grant, however, failed to 
turn the block grant in to a success in the second grant 
Period either. For the period 1933/1934 to 1936/1937 the 
9. Parl. Deb., 1932-33,274, cols. 1617-1681. 
10. PRO HLG 30/43: Unemployment-equalisation of burden. 
Edward Hilton Young to Lord Mayor of Manchester, 
22.6.1933 . 
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additional sum was set at E5.3 million, increasing the 
block grant slightly to E45.3 million. During the second 
period local spending, and, therefore, grants outside the 
block grant, rose again, especially in 1935/1936 and 
1936/1937. (see figure 2) Here it is reasonable to assume 
that had the former health percentage and road grants 
still been in use they would have risen in proportion to 
the rise in the aggregate amount of grants outside the 
block grant. In this context the exchequer stood to make 
grant gains on the basis of the difference between the 
fixed compensation for health and road services grants 
and the hypothetical level of the grants had they still 
been in existence. However, at the most such gains were 
in the region of f2-3 million p. a. between 1935 and 1937. 
This was more than cancelled out by the E5.3 million of 
new money being paid each year through the block grant, 
and the E206,556 paid in additional grants. 
Consequently, even in the second grant period the block 
grant still proved to be a greater expense to the 
exchequer than if there had been no grant reform at all. 
Treasury despondency was intensified when in March 
1936 the estimated figures for local rate and grant-borne 
expenditure for 1935/1936 were received. It was upon 
these figures that the variation of the additional sum in 
the block grant in the third period between 1937/1938 and 
1941/1942 would be based. The upturn in local spending 
in the critical base year of 1935/1936 meant that even 
if 
a minimalist approach was taken to the increase 
in the 
additional sum in line with the minimum proportion 
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formula then the additional sum could be expected to 
increase by some E4.5 million to take the block grant as 
a whole towards E50 million p. a.. B. W. Gilbert, a 
principal assistant secretary at the Treasury, described 
the news as "a real shock both to the Ministry and the 
Treasury" . 
11 The extent of the shock to the Treasury was 
fully revealed at the end of the month when Neville 
Chamberlain, by then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
informed the Minister of Health, Sir Kingsley Wood, that 
"it sets a severe limit to any other addition I can 
contemplate to the general cost of the social 
12 services". 
The setting of the block grant for the third period 
was made from the beginning on the assumption of a 
minimalist approach to the additional sum. This was not 
expected to augur well for the utility of the block grant 
as a grant aid control. However, senior officials at 
both the Ministry of Health and the Treasury manoeuvred 
in 1936 to make what gain they could from the boon to 
local government finance that the increase in the 
additional sum would represent. In February 1936 
S. H. G. Hughes, the accountant-general at the Ministry of 
Health since 1930, suggested to Sir George Chrystal, 
Robinson's successor as permanent secretary, that the 
opportunity could be taken to merge the contributions 
made by local authorities to the Unemployment Assistance 
11. PRO T 161/931/S. 42351: Block grant revision 1936- 
1937, England and Wales. Gilbert to Barlow, 5.3.1936. 
12. PRO HLG 52/255: 1929 Local Government Act, 
Investigation of exchequer grants, January-June 1936. 
Neville Chamberlain to Sir Kingsley Wood, 30.3.1936. 
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Board under the 1934 Unemployment Act in to the block 
grant as of the beginning of the third period. 13 This 
appeared to represent no financial gain to the exchequer 
as it would merely entail a change in the method of 
contribution. Instead of local authorities making 
individual payments to the Unemployment Assistance Board 
they could be deducted en masse from the block grant and 
then paid to the Unemployment Assistance Board. However, 
in early 1936 Liverpool County Borough Council was 
renewing a campaign to have local authority contributions 
to the Unemployment Assistance Board abolished. Hughes 
told Chrystal in March 1936 that "I think it will be 
found increasingly difficult as time goes on to insist on 
f ul 1 payment "- In this context "the large amount of new 
money to be added to the block grant afford[ed] a unique 
opportunity" of making local authority contributions to 
the Unemployment Assistance Board permanent, thus ending 
controversy over their payment and avoiding the 
possibility of their abolition, without soliciting undue 
opposition from local government. Hughes assumed that 
local government would not provide concerted opposition 
to the reduction in an increase in the block grant which 
they had yet to enjoy. 
14 In such a way, then, the 
Treasury and Ministry of Health sought to offset the 
losses through the additional amount to be paid in the 
third grant period with the gain of certain continuations 
13. ibid, S. H. G. Hughes to Sir George Chrystal, 20.2.1936. 
14. ibid, 4.3.1936. 
262 
of local authority contributions to the Unemployment 
Assistance Board. 
The problem for the Ministry of Health was that this 
revision of the block grant would benefit county boroughs 
more than counties, county borough contributions on an 
indivi ual basis being higher than county contributions. 
The merging of contributions in to the block grant would 
spread the liability unfairly to county councils. 
Consequently, Hughes also proposed that the abolition of 
grant with respect to trunk roads, which the Ministry of 
Transport was proposing to make a national 
responsibility, should also be incorporated within the 
block grant. This would benefit the counties and offset 
their increased liability through the block grant for 
contributions to the Unemployment Assistance Board. 15 
The Treasury welcomed the proposals and added the 
proposal that the local taxation duty in respect of male 
servants licence duties be abolished and added to the 
block grant from 1937. 16 B. W. Gilbert, particularly 
pleased about the plan with respect to Unemployment 
Assistance Board contributions, concluded to Hughes in 
July 1936 that in the circumstances "the final settlement 
with local authorities is likely to be a bargain ... the 
question is mainly one of doing the best we can as the 
17 figures we finally fix on is embodied in a statute". 
15. ibid 
16. PRO T 161/931/S. 42351? 2: Block grants revision 1936- 
1937, England and Wales. Gilbert to Barlow, 7.1.1937. 
17. PRO T 161/1228/S. 33386/4, B. W. Gilbert to 
S. H. G. Hughes, 21.7.1936. 
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The result of this Ministry of Health-Treasury 
strategy was to gain some compensation for exchequer 
interests in the block grant settlement for 1937 for the 
fact that overall the increase in the additional sum 
negated the block grant's utility as a grant aid control. 
Even then the reduction from the annual amount of the 
block grant of E2,187,000 for Unemployment Assistance 
Board Contributions and f-133,000 for road grants, with 
the addition of E115,000 in respect of the abolition of 
the male servants license duty, left the total block 
grant for the third period at f47.2 million p. a., an 
increase of fl. 9 million on the annual amount for the 
second period. 18 To further confound Treasury hopes of 
the block grant's fixity being an asset grant-aided 
spending outside the block grant levelled out in the 
first two years of the third period as War approached and 
local authorities cut back on peace-time schemes. (see 
figure 2) Once again this left the block grant, being 
fixed, inflexible to a change in local authority 
spending, representing a greater contribution to local 
authority finances -a contribution exacerbated by the 
E168,825 paid in additional grants in the third period - 
than if there had been no exchequer grant reform at all 
in 1929. Rather than providing a grant saving for the 
exchequer, in the late 1930s, as in the early 1930s, the 
block grant proved to be a liability. 
Overall, then, analysis suggests that in its 
implementation the block grant as a grant aid control far 
18. Parl. Deb., 1936-37,320, cols. 2021-2119. 
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from being successful was an almost lamentable failure. 
Indeed in the early 1930s the ceiling that the block 
grant placed on grant aid was so lofty that it in fact 
substantially increased the costs to the exchequer of 
funding local services. By 1939 it had become clear to 
the Treasury that if the block grant was to have any 
long-term benefits for expenditure control they would be 
completely unpredictable anyway. The fatal flaw in 
Treasury thinking had been the assumption that local 
authority grant spending, where aided by the supposed 
money spinning device of the percentage grant, would 
continue to spiral as it had done in the 1920s. This was 
not the case in the 1930s. The principle of fixing 
grants for periods of years, considered essential to 
grant aid control in the 1920s, was, therefore, found 
wanting in the 1930s. 
It is also important, however, to emphasise how the 
Treasury attempted to claw back losses made on the block 
grant through other means, in particular with regard to 
the retention of the remanet grants and the adoption of a 
minimalist approach to the increase in the block grant at 
the beginning of each period. of equal note was the 
manner in which both the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Health manipulated the block grant, especially in 1937, 
to attain other ends in the financial interests of the 
exchequer. The manner of block grant implementation, 
even in relative failure, suggested a continued 
commitment to the self-interests of the bureaucratic 
elite through pragmatic and incrementalist means. 
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THE BLOCK GRANT AND LOCAL AUTHORITY FINANCES 
This analysis of the block grant as a grant aid control 
during the 1930s necessitates immediate revision of the 
context in which the effect of the block grant on local 
authority finances is to be seen. It is not a matter of 
dispute that in simple money terms every county borough 
and county council was a net gainer from the block grant 
in the period up to 1937. Further, it is now possible to 
suggest that at an aggregate level local government was 
also a gainer from the block grant relative to the 
hypothetical level of grant aid on discontinued grants 
had they in fact been continued during the 1930s. most, 
if not all, local authorities, it may be said, derived 
some benefit from this. As a result it is appropriate to 
raise the significance of debate upon the effects of the 
block grant on the finances and financial policies of 
local authorities to the same prominence as that of 
debate upon public works programmes and the special areas 
grants from 1934. Although the block grant money was in 
aid of revenue expenditure it had the potential for 
exerting a material effect on the continuation and 
extension of existing services as well as the level of 
the local rate. 
However, the extent to which individual local 
authorities benefited from the block grant is highly 
problematical. Two complementary approaches to answering 
this question may be attempted. First, one may inquire 
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in to the working of the block grant formula to ascertain 
how it distributed that part of the grant upon which it 
was operational between different local authorities. 
Then to discover what real gains it provided for local 
authorities one could compare in the case of each local 
authority the amount received through the operation of 
the formula against what would have been received from a 
simple compensation for rate and percentage grant losses. 
Alternatively, one could attempt to compare amounts 
received through the block grant as a whole as well as 
the operation of the formula against hypothetical figures 
for percentage grants and industrial and agricultural 
rate income in the 1930s had there been no reform in 
1929 . 
The second approach would be highly desirable, 
especially given the sharp change in trends in percentage 
grants in the 1930s outside the block grant, which tend 
to suggest that local authorities gained by the block 
grant, and the volatility of local economies in recession 
and recovery. Many local authorities complained in the 
mid-late 1930s that the compensation for industrial 
derating enshrined in the block grant was hugely 
inadequate set against the rate income which could have 
been accrued from revived industry. However, an 
evaluation of the impact of the block grant on local 
finances on this basis is blighted by the absence of 
reliable statistics. Consequently, the discussion of 
grant distribution presented here is informed only by the 
first approach, and then to a great extent by the 
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conclusions based on this approach of Chester. 19 Though 
it is important to emphasise its incompleteness without 
reference to the second approach. 
It is to be remembered that distribution of the block 
grant in the first two block grant periods was prejudiced 
by the settlement reached in 1929 upon the nature of the 
block grant formula and of its introduction. Only 25% of 
the block grant was to be distributed according to the 
formula. It was inherent in this settlement, therefore, 
that the majority of the block grant would continue to be 
distributed in accord with local patterns of grant-aided 
expenditure pertaining before the 1929 Act. Moreover, 
the formula was a questionable indicator of need, given 
that, in particular, so much weighting was given to 
population in the absence of the ideal need indicator, 
rateable value assessed on a uniform basis. 
It must be noted that the formula was designed 
specifically with the first block grant period in mind. 
It was a rough, but nevertheless serviceable, index of 
local need for 1929, this being the only criterion on 
which a formula could be tested in the absence of uniform 
rating and valuation. As a result, although only 25% of 
the block grant was distributed according to the formula, 
in the first period the block grant showed some ability 
to discriminate between poorer and richer local 
authorities, providing much greater additions in terms of 
rate per head to the finances of such authorities as 
19. D. N. Chester, Central and Local Government: Financial 
and Administrative Relations (1951), pp. 256-280.. 
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Durham and Gateshead than to those of more prosperous 
authorities like Eastbourne and Bournemouth. However, as 
Chester points out, if money gains through the operation 
of the formula are set against rate and grant losses, 
then even in the first grant period it can be seen that 
local authority gains made through the operation of the 
formula were highly inconsistent in terms of attempting 
to help the poorest authorities most. The inherent 
defects of the formula mitigated against success even in 
the first period. 20 
In this context, it may be seen the large increase in 
unemployment and consequent pressure on public assistance 
and other services in the necessitous areas served to 
exacerbate the financial problems of poorer authorities. 
The lack of real assistance gained through the block 
grant brought forward a prompt response from the 
necessitous areas in favour of its reform. In June 1932 
a deputation of M. Ps representing local authorities in 
necessitous areas met with Sir Edward Hilton Young, the 
Minister of Health. The local authorities represented 
were Berwick-upon-Tweed, Bilston, Bishop Auckland, 
Cardiff, Chester-Le-Street, Durham, Gateshead, Hull, 
Jarrow, Lincoln, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, 
Norwich, Nottingham, St. Helens, Sheffield, Stoke-on 
Trent, Stockton-on-Tees, Tynemouth, Wallsend- on-Tyne, 
Walsall and West Ham. The m. Ps carried with them the 
fruits of a meeting held earlier in the month. That 
meeting had heard what became known as the Salford 
20. ibid 
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proposal, which envisaged a complete revision of the 
block grant formula so as to produce a nationwide 
equalisation of the public assistance rate. This had 
been dropped in favour of a more moderate proposal for an 
immediate inquiry in to the block grant formula, with a 
view to increasing the weighting in the formula for 
unemployment. This was the proposal put before Hilton 
Young. 
Hilton Young's response was a cautious defence of the 
working of the block grant formula. He was, of course, 
able to point to certain evidence that local authorities 
in necessitous areas had gained substantially more in 
terms of local rate per head than more prosperous 
authorities. He implored local authorities to exercise 
greater economy in local administration. He then stated 
that any revision of the formula must await further 
experience. He was optimistic that the formula would 
take account of the great increase in unemployment and 
the financial needs of local authorities in necessitous 
areas in its distribution of grant for the second 
period. 21 
It was, however, indicative of the fact that the 
formula had mainly been constructed to ensure the 
realisation of limited redistributive ends in the first 
block grant period that the same formula did not bear out 
Hilton Young's optimism for the second period. The 
formula was not a timeless index of local need, and 
its 
21. PRO HLG 30/42: Unemployment in the distressed areas. 
Minute of deputation of MPs calling for the investigation 
of the block grant formula, 30.6.1932. 
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success in terms of directing grant income towards areas 
of high need was subject to random influences acting upon 
individual formula factors. As Schulz has already shown 
such random influences resulted in the formula skewing 
i, grant distribution towards areas of population growth in 
the second period. As population migration was 
essentially from the north to the south in the 1930s the 
formula tended to exacerbate higher funding of southern 
local authorities, conspicuous by their absence from 
lists of necessitous areas, who already benefited most 
from the block grant as in the second period it was still 
75% distributed on an expenditure basis. As a result, 
for instance, between the first and second grant periods 
Croydon, one of the more prosperous county boroughs had 
its block grant allocation increased despite relatively 
low service need, whilst such necessitous areas as 
Burnley, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Rotherham, Salford, Cardiff 
and Merthyr Tydfil actually suffered a decrease, despite 
a continuing high call on public assistance in 1933.22 
Local authorities who had been placated by Hilton 
Young in 1932 protested. A conference of high-rated 
urban authorities from Yorkshire and Lancashire in March 
1933 was followed by one later in the month of Tyneside 
boroughs, which called for the revision without delay of 
the block grant formula to give substantially more 
weighting to the factor of unemployment. Many now 
suggested that this should result in the equalisation of 
22. Munici-pal Review (January 1936), p-10. 
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23 the rate between local authorities. The Daily Herald, 
reporting on the conference of Yorkshire and Lancashire 
authorities, revealed that "speakers urged drastic action 
for the equalisation of the poor law burdens among all 
municipalities in the country, and the inadequate steps 
taken by the Association of municipal Corporations to 
deal with the matter were sharply criticised. 11 The AMC 
was seen as openly endorsing a method of distribution 
which mainly benefited its more prosperous members. 24 It 
was in the context of this opposition and the manifest 
failure of the formula to direct block grant money for 
the second period to local authorities of high need that 
Hilton Young made his decision, with Cabinet approval, to 
make a special supplementary grant available to local 
authorities in the necessitous areas outside the block 
grant mechanism. However, with the review of the working 
of the block grant formula coming up in 1935, a statutory 
requirement under the 1929 Act, there was a ready 
facility for the needs of local authorities to be 
suitably met within the block grant from the beginning of 
the third period. 
The potential for the block grant to more successfully 
meet the aim of grant aid redistribution in the third 
period was further heightened by the fact that the 
formula would be then responsible for the distribution of 
50% rather than 25% of the block grant. However, this 
and the formula review were greeted with trepidation 
23. PRO HLG 30/43, Robinson to Gibbon, 20.3.1933. 
24. ibid, copy of Daily Herald report, 10.3.1933. 
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rather than enthusiasm by the Ministry of Health at the 
beginning of the review. Distribution of 50% of the 
block grant by means of the unrevised formula in the 
third period was predicted as likely to lead to a highly 
undesirable pattern of distribution. Social and economic 
change during the second period acted on the formula 
factors in such a way as their weightings under the 1929 
Act would continue to direct grant aid away from the 
poorer urban authorities. 25 Further, the fact that the 
formula would primarily distribute grant on the basis of 
population meant that the sparsely populated rural 
counties stood to make "almost embarrassingly large" 
26 losses. However, officials knew that any attempt to 
use the review to prevent the formula working in this way 
was fraught with problems. 
First, there was the issue of how redistributive the 
formula should be in the light of experience in the 
1930s. The increase in calls by poorer local authorities 
for the block grant to facilitate the equalisation of 
rates nationwide suggested that the redistributive aims 
of the block grant should go considerably further 
considerably quicker than envisaged in 1929. In July 
1936 Hughes calculated that to reduce the rates in all 
urban areas to a maximum of 16s in the f per head would 
require a subsidy of f-22 million p-a-, paid f or either 
25. PRO HLG 52/254: Investigation of exchequer grants 
under Section 110 of 1929 Local Government Act, August 
1935-December 1935. Hughes to Robinson, 9.11.1935. 
26. PRO HLG 52/256: Investigation of exchequer grants 
under section 110 of 1929 Local Government Act, 
JulY 
1936-December 1936. Report on progress of formula 
investigation by Hughes, 25.7.1936. 
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out of exchequer funds or through a wholesale shift of 
resources from relatively more prosperous authorities. 27 
The former was in contradiction of bureaucratic 
imperatives in public expenditure policy and the latter 
would risk united and unmoveable opposition from the 
local authority associations. 
In addition, Ministry of Health officials were very 
conscious of the constraints imposed by the additional 
grant provisions included in the 1929 Act. These had 
ensured local authorities against loss. Any radical 
reform of the formula which enhanced its redistributive 
qualities would lead to heavy local authority grant 
losers, who would have to be compensated by additional 
grants. This would be opposed by the Treasury. In such 
way, then, one of the apparently more minor concessions 
made in 1929 to more prosperous authorities, who feared 
losses under a block grant, served to prevent any major 
enhancement of the redistributive potential of the block 
grant. Radical reform to meet the needs of poorer local 
authorities was, therefore, not feasible. As a result, 
Ministry of Health officials based consideration of the 
revision of the formula on the assumption that it should 
simply more equitably distribute the block grant in 
accord with local needs "without placing an undue burden 
on any of the more wealthy areas". 
28 The approach taken 
to formula review by the Ministry was, therefore, in the 
27. ibid, Hughes to Sir George Chrystal, 27.7.1936. 
28. ibid, report on progress of formula investigation by 
Hughes, 25-7.1936. 
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nature of a further incrementalist adjustment from the 
policy inititiated in 1929. 
Secondly, even in embarking on this limited reform of 
the block grant, there were technical difficulties to be 
overcome. As Hughes informed Sir George Chrystal in July 
1936 the "wide differences in the present level of rates, 
stage of development of services, local conditions and 
varying requirements together with the important initial 
complication of the combination in the grant of a 
proportion of losses of rates and grants, with money 
distributed on a needs formula basis, make it impossible 
to produce anything to which objections cannot be raised 
on the grounds of inconsistency or its indirect 
results". 29 Such problems continually hampered Ministry 
consideration and testing of formula revision between 
1935 and late 1936. By late 1936, however, Hughes and 
the accountant-general's division had successfully 
evolved a number of proposals which suited their limited 
alms. These included a retention of the weighting in the 
formula for unemployment, provided for in the 1929 Act, 
with an increase in the weighting for this factor with 
respect to necessitous areas. In addition, Hughes 
proposed a superweighting for excessively low rateable 
value, the inclusion of the number of children between 
five and fourteen in elementary education in the children 
factor, an increase in the weighting for the populatlon 
sparsity factor for counties and the addition of an 
entirely new factor of the rate of population decline. 
29. ibid, Hughes to Sir George Chrystal, 25.7.1936. 
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Such proposed revisions to the formula would as 
30 practicably as possible meet Ministry aims. 
Finally, the nature of the Ministry's consideration of 
revision was from the beginning prejudiced by the 
continued desire, first exhibited in the formulation of 
the 1929 Act, to gain consent from the local authority 
associations, thereby legitimising formula revision. 
This was also to the detriment of any more radical aims 
of assisting local authorities in areas of high need. 
Yet, the even greater importance which the Ministry of 
Health now attached to sustaining an apparent consensual 
peace in inter-governmental relations threatened even the 
limited revision of the formula which the Ministry was 
envisaging. The Ministry was entirely dependent upon 
local authorities for the successful implementation of 
many other features of the 1929 Act, and officials 
recognised that their proposals for revision would arouse 
considerable opposition from the local authority 
associations, which represented primarily the interests 
of local authorities who stood to lose relatively by the 
Ministry's proposals. Such opposition and broad conflict 
in relations which would follow were to be avoided at all 
costs. 
There was very good reason to expect local authority 
association opposition. More prosperous authorities had 
turned down Hilton Young's suggestion in 1933 that they 
contribute the equivalent of a 1/2d rate to add to 
30. ibid, Hughes, note of present position of block grant 
investigation, 18.9.1936, and S. H. G. Hughes to Arthur 
Collins, 7.10.1936. 
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Parliament's supplementary vote to assist the necessitous 
areas. 
31 ministry hopes of a more enlightened approach 
by the associations to the aims of the formula in 1935- 
1936 than they had showed in the late 1920s and in 1933 
were not high. S. H. G. Hughes stated in July 1935 that "as 
the problem is one of distribution it will not be 
surprising if there is a considerable body of opinion in 
support of leaving things substantially as they are 
while, at the same time, it may be expected that there 
will be pressure from committees of distressed area 
authorities for modification of the formula in their 
favour, the representative associations being either 
unconvinced by their case or unwilling to recommend 
changes which would involve a lower grant to the majority 
32 for the benefit of the minority". 
Consequently, Ministry officials decided that they 
would not actively promote their proposals until it was 
clear what the local authority associations would accept, 
and as a result the tenor of ministry debate was for much 
of 1936 kept secret. This meant that the formulation of 
policy on the revision of the block grant formula was 
limited not only by the broad imperatives of senior 
Ministry of Health officials but also by what could be 
agreed by consensus in inter-governmental relations. 
Ministry officials, nevertheless, sought to direct the 
local authority associations towards a consensus which 
31. PRO HLG 52/254, Hughes to the secretary, 18.11.1935. 
32. ibid, Hughes to the secretary, 30.7.1935. 
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accorded with the redistributive aims of the formula in 
general and Hughes's detailed proposals in particular. 
This was done by three principal means. First, in 
turning the initiative in the review over to the local 
authority associations, with officials providing whatever 
data they wanted, the Ministry effectively ensured that 
whatever conflict would emerge between the interests of 
different local authorities would be directed inwards and 
not at the Ministry of Health. This would hopefully 
produce some kind of consensus with which officials could 
then treat, or, as Hughes put it in November 1935, allow 
"their ultimate suggestions to cancel out and to some 
extent afford a peg on which to hang our 33 proposals". 
Secondly, in giving the local authorities the initiating 
rather than reactive role, greater power was given to the 
experts advising the local authority associations. 
joint committee of financial advisers was established 
which Ministry officials thought "might be better able 
than other bodies to take a broad and unbiased view of 
the position", and which in turn could then influence the 
different associations to consider revision of the 
formula not solely in terms of the vested interests which 
they represented. 34 Finally, the financial advisers 
committee offered ministry officials a point of contact 
at which they could direct a continuous flow of 
information and suggestions which pointed local authority 
33. ibid, Hughes to the secretary, 18.11.1935. 
34. PRO HLG 52/255, minute of conference held at the 
Ministry of Health between Ministry officials and 
representatives of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers 
and Accountants, 29.4.1936. 
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consideration towards the aim of more effectively 
assisting the necessitous areas through the block grant 
f ormula. 
Though di fferent in form from the approach to 
relations in 1929 the Ministry's strategy again 
represented an attempt to manage intergovernmental 
relations towards centrally defined aims. This strategy 
was not without its problems. First, it was not until 
the spring of 1936 that the local authority associations 
took up the gauntlet thrown down by the Ministry to 
participate in the review and made full usage of ministry 
35 information. Secondly, the committee of financial 
advisers which was then set up, composed principally of 
senior local authority treasurers under the chairmanship 
of Arthur Collins of the AMC, moved only slowly towards 
the aim of improving the grant formula's redistributive 
facility. Only in June 1936 did a discussion between 
Gilbert of the Treasury and Hughes of the Ministry of 
Health yield the conclusion that "there was a general 
feeling among the financial advisers that some of the 
grant would have to be diverted from the richer to the 
poorer authorities" Even then there was "no agreement 
36 how this could be done". 
However, once consensus over the aim of the formula 
review had been established the committee's consideration 
of detailed revision also began to converge with that of 
35. ibid, minute Of meeting between Hughes and Arthur 
Collins, 30 .3.193 
6. 
36. ibid, minute of meeting between Gilbert and Hughes, 
23.6.1936. 
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the Ministry. This was cemented by Collins' decision to 
follow Ministry advice and include special 
representatives of the necessitous areas on the financial 
advisers committee to ensure that their needs were 
properly known. 
37 Such a decision had the further 
advantage, as far as the Ministry was concerned, of 
lending a pluralist legitimacy to whatever conclusions 
the committee jointly reached. By June 1936 the 
committee had concluded tentatively that "it would be an 
improvement in the formula if the weighting factors, or 
some of them, were strengthened". The principal formula 
factors under consideration were unemployment, rateable 
value and the number of children under five. 
38 
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the 
members of the financial advisers committee acted 
corporately above the interests of the local authority 
associations which they represented. County council 
antipathy to greater weighting for unemployment was well 
aired on the committee, and there were various different 
stresses placed by individual members on the variation in 
formula weighting that was needed. 
39 However, Hughes, at 
the Ministry of Health, was adamant that the committee 
should be kept together and as its ideas evolved be 
encouraged to come to a unanimous set of recommendations. 
In September 1936 Hughes put the provisional proposals of 
37. PRO HLG 52/256, Hughes to Sir George Chrystal, 
25.7.1936. 
Hughes and 38. PRO HLG 52/255, minute of meeting between 
other ministry officials with Arthur Collins and 
his 
assistant, Mr Hills, 25.6.1936. 
39. See, for instance, PRO HLG 52/256, Hughes to 
Chrystal, 25-7.1936. 
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the accountant-general's division, which had been worked 
up in the preceding twelve months, to the committee in 
the hope that it could crystallise committee thinking. 40 
The result was that the committee responded favourably 
to the proposals for greater weighting in the formula for 
unemployment and population sparsity, each respectively 
giving greater assistance to county borough and county 
council interests, but rejected Ministry proposals for 
superweighting for low rateable value, the inclusion of 
children between five and fourteen in elementary 
education in the child factor as well as rejecting the 
suggestion of a new factor of declining population. 
Acceptance of the committee's views meant that the 
Ministry proposals for improving the redistributive 
facility of the block grant formula, limited in 
themselves, would be further watered down. Yet the 
committee's response offered the possibility of agreement 
on revision which went some way towards improving the 
block grant formula. In october 1936 Hughes suggested to 
Collins that the Ministry would abandon "the three parts 
of the formula revision to which they must object" in 
return for agreement on the change in formula weighting 
for unemployment and population sparsity. 
41 The 
committee duly complied and made unanimous 
recommendations along these lines to the various local 
authority associations. 
42 
40. ibid, Hughes to Gilbert, 10.10.1936. 
41. ibid, Hughes to collins, 7.10-1936. 
42. ibid, Sir Kingsley Wood to Neville Chamberlain, 
28.1o. i936. 
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The local authority associations generally endorsed 
the recommendations of Collins, committee; any residual 
opposition from more prosperous authorities being 
undermined by the fact that the overall large increase in 
the aggregate sum of the block grant in the third period 
meant that there would be very few losers even if the 
grant did target grant more to poorer authorities. A 
united local government view on formula revision was 
attained, which embraced the retention of population as 
the basis of the formula, advocated extra weighting in 
the formula for two factors which would assist needy 
local authorities, and eschewed the addition of any new 
factor. Only the CCA took a maverick line in advocating 
a variation of all the factors in the formula. However, 
their proposals made comparatively little difference to 
the results gained from the consensus view, which 
ultimately based upon a compromise of the Ministry of 
Health proposals came to be known as test D3 modified. 
The CCA position, therefore, was ignored. 
With some proviso, therefore, Ministry of Health 
officials were highly successful in using the committee 
of financial advisers to secure agreement to the 
improvement of the block grant formula as a 
redistributive mechanism along the lines which they 
originally intended in 1935. In December 1936 the 
Minister of Health, Sir Kingsley Wood, was able to 
inform 
Neville Chamberlain that the block grant would be 
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considerably more favourable to the poorer local 
authorities in the third period than in the second. 43 
Any case for the revised block grant formula more 
successfully benefiting poorer authorities relative to 
their needs in the more favourable economic and social 
conditions of the late 1930s is, however, still seriously 
open to question. The county of Glamorgan was a good 
example of where the additions in income were welcome in 
helping to fund the cost of the increase in expenditure 
on public assistance but compounded disillusionment that 
the block grant would not erode the fundamental 
inequalities in local authority income which left their 
services otherwise deficient compared to other 
authorities. Sir William Jenkins informed the Ministry 
in February 1937 that ls 5d of the 2s rate per head 
additional subsidy that the block grant would provide for 
the authority in the third block grant period would 
immediately go on paying for the natural increase in the 
cost of public assistance between 1936/1937 and 
1937/1938. Therefore, more or less, "what they gained 
under the new formula would completely disappear and they 
would have to continue to restrict their socia 
44 services". 
Equally, it would be hard to suggest that the revision 
of the formula in 1937 bode well for the block grant 
43. ibid 
44. PRO HLG 52/257: Investigation of exchequer grants 
under Section 110 of the 1929 Local Government Act, Jan- 
March 1937, early 1938. Minute of meeting with 
deputation from South Wales and Monmouthshire necessitous 
areas conference, 25.2-1937. 
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being a successful mechanism for redistribution in the 
long-term. As in 1930, in the absence of uniform rating 
and valuation, the revised formula weightings only made 
the formula a rough index of need for the coming period. 
In the mid-1930s the Ministry of Health could have 
pursued rating and valuation reform again with more 
profit. Perhaps with this in mind the 1937 Local 
Government (Financial Provisions) Act stipulated that 
there would be a further review of the block grant 
formula before the end of the third grant period. 45 
Without a timeless and automatic mechanism within the 
block grant formula for achieving its redistributive aims 
the Ministry of Health left itself open to continued 
controversy in inter-governmental relations over the 
working of the block grant as well as the prospect of 
only further incremental adjustments towards the greater 
state assistance of local government on the basis of 
local need. 
The implementation of the block grant as a means of 
equalising the financial resources of local authorities, 
and thus providing the basis for greater uniformity in 
the ability of authorities to meet the service needs 
which they faced, did not therefore, run aground on the 
unforecastable effects of the recession. Rather, it 
proved to be during the 1930s largely the failure that 
one could have predicted in 1929. The block grant 
formula operated on only a quarter of the grant for much 
of the decade, and whilst some of the beneficial impact 
45. Parl. Deb., 1936-37,320, cols. 2012-2119. 
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of the operation of the formula was undermined by the 
recession in the early 1930s, its inherent weaknesses, 
nevertheless, came home to roost fully in the inequitable 
grant distribution it produced in the second grant 
period. Any chance that the block grant review at the 
end of the second period might provide the opportunity 
for the correction of the deal of 1929 was thwarted by 
the continuation of a gradualist approach by the Ministry 
of Health, conditioned as it was by the public 
expenditure and self-interested concerns of the 
bureaucratic elite. That the block grant review would 
fail to erode the essential income inequalities existing 
between local authorities was guaranteed by the 
Ministry's continued respect for the interests of more 
prosperous authorities who had done well under the 
percentage grant system before 1929, and which were 
entrenched in the local authority associations. An 
incremental adjustment towards benefiting the poorer 
areas of the country, which, nevertheless, failed to meet 
their real needs, was portrayed as another great leap 
forward which met with the approval of all of local 
government. The reality of the situation was covered 
over by the Ministry's skilful management of inter- 
governmental relations in much the same way as in 1929. 
The block grant in terms of the equalisation of local 
authority finances indeed remained at the end of the 
1930s akin to placing a plaster over a gaping wound. 
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THE BLOCK GRANT AND FURTHER REFORM 
During the 1930s, therefore, the block grant in terms of 
both of its original aims to act as an aggregate grant 
aid control and a mechanism for grant aid related to need 
largely failed. As was shown in chapter two, the block 
grant principle was a limited option with respect to both 
aims. A consideration of the impact of the experience of 
implementation on the making of future policy shows a 
disinclination both amongst bureaucrats and politicians 
to depart from the block grant option to realise these 
aims. Nor, however, did they continue to think of the 
block grant option in the same terms as in the 1920s. 
They realised that the manner in which the block grant 
had been introduced in 1929 was not a model for future 
reform. Rather, they adopted the attitude that lessons 
could be learned and the block grant principle be used in 
a revised form as the basis for future reform. Such 
lessons were learned more quickly with regard to the 
operation of a block grant as a grant aid control than 
they were in relation to its redistributive capacity. 
The comparative failure of the block grant as a 
negative grant aid control during the 1930s aroused 
heated debate amongst politicians. During the 
Parliamentary debates over the introduction of the block 
grant for the second period in 1933 many government 
supporters in Parliament advocated the reduction of the 
additional sum, and the abolition of the minimum 
proportion formula, which automatically set its level. 
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Some, such as Eustace Percy, made the point that it was 
sheer folly if the government wanted to limit public 
expenditure to carry on fixing the block grant for years 
ahead when at that point further falls in local authority 
spending and grant aid outside the block grant could be 
reasonably assumed. It constituted the waving of 
budgetary control in much the same way as percentage 
grants had done in the 1920s. 46 
The government, whilst undoubtedly wishing to do 
otherwise, defended the block grant reform. The 
principal motivation for this was the undesirability of 
alienating local government. The latter obviously 
benefited greatly from the additional subsidy that the 
block grant constituted and in the 1932 Ray Report had 
called for the further block granting of other local 
authority aided services. 47 They would oppose any 
revision of the existing block grant provisions in 
respect of aggregate aid. Such opposition was 
undesirable if the goodwill of local government was to be 
retained in the implementation of the service provisions 
of the 1929 local Government Act. At the same time the 
government faced legitimate claims that a reduction of 
the block grant would further push local authorities in 
to financial crisis. In any case, any attempt to revise 
the block grant would have necessitated legislation, 
which in this context would have proved massively 
controversial not only with local government but also 
46. Parl. Deb., 1932-33,274, cols. 1617-1681. 
47. Re-oort of the (Rav) Committee on - 
Local ExiDenditure 
(cmd. 4200) PP (1932) . 
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with members on all sides of the House of Commons. Nor 
was a Minister of Health of the knowledge or ability of 
Neville Chamberlain on hand to construct and carry such 
legislation. In 1937, even though calls for revision, 
were made they were more muted, and at that point more 
pressing concerns engaged politicians. 
The Treasury, whilst desiring revision, had to grin 
and bear the block grant as it had been created in 1929. 
However, by 1933 Treasury officials had made certain key 
decisions about block granting of other aided local 
authority services both in the short and long-term. The 
key forum for debate was an inter-departmental conference 
on block grants. Here, officials became aware of the 
disparate views on the block grant question. On the one 
hand they were faced with the Parliamentary suggestions 
which would make future block grant reforms tougher and 
more reliable as grant aid controls. On the other hand, 
they were faced with the exhortations of the local 
authority associations and the Ray Committee to extend 
the present form of block grant to other services, and by 
Ministry of Health officials, who were making optimistic 
noises about the beneficial effect of the block grant on 
poorer authorities. Treasury sympathies were to the 
former as the block grant's role as a grant aid control 
was manifestly a higher priority than its role as an 
equaliser of local authority finances. 
Treasury officials now realised that the bribe of E5 
million to local authorities in the 1929 Act, thought 
originally to be an insignificant short-term loss against 
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long-term gains, had indeed been a very significant 
concession. For such a bribe could continue in the long- 
term to wipe out the grant aid savings to be made from 
having a block grant instead of specific percentage 
grants. This realisation influenced Treasury thinking at 
the conference in relation to the block granting of 
education. Rather than being actively in favour of block 
granting education, as Rhodes suggests, C. L. Stocks, an 
assistant secretary at the Treasury, argued that "at 
present we shall lose by blocking, despite the strong 
arguments in favour of block grants generally .... in 
starting a "block" there would have to be a bribe of E5 
million for education alone (as the percentage grant is 
now down to 48 and the LEAs are demanding more), and this 
would simply give away at the start all the savings we 
expect to acquire laboriously in the next fifteen 
years ... There will probably be 
insufficient set-off from 
local economies due to blocking, because an age of 
economy probably lies ahead anyhow". He considered that 
the block granting of education could be achieved if it 
was done as part of a general block granting of all 
remaining specific grant-aided local authority services. 
However, he considered that "unless, therefore, there is 
a lot of "fat" on road and police grants which will 
secure us large savings there under block, in general, we 
shall lose by blocking, and that is why local authorities 
favour blocking mainly". In the main he was not 
optimistic. 48 
48. PRO T 161/632/S. 39586: Block grants, 1926-1934. 
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As a result of Stocks' arguments, far from advocating 
the rapid expansion of the block grant principle to other 
exchequer-aided local authority services, the Treasury in 
1933 vetoed any further block granting until such time as 
there was a large increase in the expenditure on specific 
grant aided services which would make the initial costs 
of block granting worthwhile. Such circumstances did not 
arise until after the Second World War, and Treasury 
considerations allied to continued objections by 
individual departments to their services going on non- 
specific grant aid, meant that no significant addition to 
the local authority grant aided services included under 
the block grant, was made until 1960. It was at this 
point that education finally came under the purview of a 
block grant. 49 
During the War itself further consideration of the 
experience of the block grant in the 1930s led the 
Treasury to consider also the abandonment of the 
principle of fixing future block grants for periods of 
years. The Treasury wished to retain the principle of 
setting the aggregate level of grant aid centrally but 
also wished to incorporate the flexibility of the 
percentage grant in reflecting trends in local authority 
expenditure. The ideal compromise was to flx future 
central grants again on an annual basis. 
50 Hence, 
whilst, the 1929 Act may have established the principle 
C. L. Stocks to Ernest Strohmenger, 19.7.1933. 
49. See K. B. Smellie, A History of Local_ Government (4th 
edition 1968), p. 142. 
50. See PRO HLG 52/1479: Block grants review 1947. 
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of block grants in central-local financial relations, the 
experience of the block grant in the 1930s helped to 
establish a more cautious approach to the adoption of the 
principle, and a revision of the principle of fixity 
which was embraced first in the exchequer equalisation 
grant from 1948. 
Recognition within government of the inherent 
weaknesses of the block grant as a means of realising the 
greater equalisation of local authority finances was not 
made until towards the end of the Second World War. The 
intervention of the War had meant that the third block 
grant period was extended until 1945 without the conduct 
of a further review of the block grant formula. The 
extension of a deficient system had made its failure all 
the more apparent. In November 1945 even the senior 
Treasury official, B. W. Gilbert, was forced to recognise 
"the inescapable fact ... that some local authorities 
in 
this country are poor and some are rich". Gilbert now 
took the view that it would be "necessary to think of 
assistance much less in terms of standard grants for rich 
and poor alike and much more in terms of concentrating 
our assistance on the poorer areas with the greater 
need". Incoming Labour ministers took a more trenchant 
approach. Arthur Greenwood, who had been Minister of 
Health in the Labour Government of 1929-1931, told Hugh 
Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in November 1945 
that they now approached "a situation in which it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to redress the 
disparities between the richer and poorer areas except by 
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giving the poorer areas what is virtually a 100% 
51 
grant". The review of block grants in 1947 produced 
further condemnation of the block grant formula for 
weighted population and its failure to make up for the 
more ideal indicator of need of rateable value per head 
based upon a uniform system of assessment. 52 
The result of this new debate, free from the self- 
restricting approach to the implementation of the block 
grant during the 1930s, was to point towards a new grant, 
the exchequer equalisation grant, created by the 1948 
Local Government Act which was based more upon the 
specific objective of moving towards local authority 
income equalisation and which had at is heart a reliable 
indicator of local need. Consequently, the exchequer 
equalisation grant was based upon two significant 
revisions of the principles of the block grant of the 
1929 Act. First, it took rateable value as its basis for 
redistribution. A standard rateable value was to be 
calculated for each local authority by multiplying the 
weighted population for the authority area by the average 
rateable value per head of the weighted population for 
England and Wales. Those authorities which had actual 
rateable values beneath their standard rateable values 
gained targeted grant. Chester, in particular, describes 
the greater success with which this method of grant 
distribution narrowed the range of rates levied by 
51. PRO T 161/1200/S. 53198: Division of burden of local 
expenditure between local rate and exchequer funds, 
papers, November 1945. Gilbert to Rampton, 14.11.1945 
and Greenwood to Dalton, 15.11.1945. 
52. PRO HLG 52/1479: Block grants review 1947. 
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different local authorities, in sharp contrast to the 
achievements made under the block grant. Secondly, in 
taking rateable value as the basis for grant 
distribution, the exchequer equalisation grant assumed 
more reliable figures for rateable value. From this the 
logical step was then taken to place responsibility for 
rating and valuation, also as a result of the 1948 Act, 
under the auspices of the Board of Inland Revenue. 53 
These developments echoed what had been originally 
envisaged as necessary for the practical realisation of 
the block grant reform's redistributive aims in the 
period immediately after the First World War by the 
Ministry of Health's then accountant-general, Ernest 
Strohmenger. Such comparison only serves to underline 
the fact that the intervening period, as in so many other 
spheres of public policy, may be characterised as lost 
years even in terms of the aims of government, 
constrained as they were by the overriding objectives of 
the bureaucratic and political elites to preserve and 
allow the preservation of the pre-First World War world 
for as long as possible. What implications the 
implementation of the exchequer grant reform as well as 
the poor law reform of 1929 had for local authority 
health care and the future evolution of public health 
care policy is the concern of the next chapter. 
53. D. N. Chester, Central and Local Government, Financial 
and Administrative Relations (1951), pp. 270-278. 
293 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL HEALTH CARE REFORM 
The 1929 Local Government Act changed the form of grant 
aid for local authority health care, transferred the poor 
law health services to local authorities, and bid local 
authorities to secure co-ordination of local provision 
also by co-operation with the voluntary hospitals. 
Previous analyses of the implementation of these aspects 
of the 1929 Act have suggested that to a greater or 
lesser extent they failed in their aim to secure 
significantly more even development of services between 
authorities, as well as having only highly qualified 
success in securing greater co- ordination, either 
through the appropriation of poor law health services 
under public health acts or through co-operation with the 
voluntary hospitals. It is important to note, however, 
that the extent to which different individual local 
authority services were deficient is still contested. In 
addition, it remains unclear as to whether the principal 
cause of deficiency, where it did exist, was poor 
resources or an inherent deficiency in local approaches 
to health provision. ' An apologia for poor resourcing 
may be found in the view that the potentially helpful 
effects of the block grant were eroded by the effects of 
the recession, and for poor local approaches in a 
consideration of the many mitigating factors influencing 
local health provision and implementation of the 1929 Act 
1. See chapter one. 
294 
in the 1930s. This chapter begins with a reconsideration 
of the nature and causes of uneven local health service 
development, on the basis of the previous paucity of 
research. In particular, analyses have commonly been 
made without reference to the results of the local 
authority health surveys carried out by the ministry of 
Health under the 1929 Act. 
The chapter then re-assesses the views that central 
control was either impotent or generally inappropriate in 
relation to influencing local policies. This 
reassessment is made with reference to the results of the 
health surveys and the central-local relations over 
health provision which were conducted in relation to the 
health survey procedure. Finally, the chapter 
reconsiders the orthodox assumption that, however 
implementation and local health provision in the 1930s 
may be portrayed, it in no way disinclined the Ministry 
of Health, and indeed much of central government, to 
continue to use the local government option as a focus 
for further extensions of public health care until the 
very late stages of planning for the National Health 
Service. This reconsideration is made in the light of 
the fact that previous analyses of the planning of future 
reform have generally focused on high level strategic 
planning within the Ministry of Health rather than 
reactions to the 1929 Act. By these approaches to 
analysis the chapter hopefully provides a more global 
picture of the nature and causes of differences 
in local 
provision, and the nature of central-local relations, as 
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well as eroding some of the assumptions concerning a 
linear progression of local authorities as health 
providers, only upset by the medical Politics which 
transformed the National Health Service at the end of the 
Second World War. 
1. THE HEALTH SURVEYS AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 
It must be clearly noted, first, that at an aggregate 
level the grant reform in 1929 had no adverse 
implications for local authority health expenditures. 
Figure 3 demonstrates how at current prices health 
expenditure rose during the 1930s both in absolute terms 
and as a proportion of total local authority revenue 
expenditure. Given this, the figures showing the steady 
rise in the value of total revenue expenditure in real 
terms indicate that the real value of local authority 
health expenditure was also rising , and during the 1930s 
at a faster rate than during the 1920s. Figure 4 
demonstrates how the rise in total local health 
expenditures during the 1930s is primarily accounted for 
by the growth in expenditure on municipal hospitals, but 
also shows that for three key local health services that 
had previously enjoyed percentage grant aid, the grant 
reform caused no adverse effect upon expenditure. 
Unfortunately, aggregate expenditure patterns are no 
guide to the nature of local health expenditures in 
individual local authorities and the standards of service 
provided. That there was uneven development is equally 
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not to be doubted. What is presented here is a 
discussion of uneven development in health service 
development and standards, and its causes, through 
evidence provided by the Ministry of Health's own 
considerations. Such evidence requires some 
introduction. 
In the place of detailed checking of individual items 
of grant aided expenditure, which accompanied percentage 
grants, from 1930 the Ministry of Health instituted more 
general surveys, to accompany the more general form of 
grant-aid. The surveys represented a major supplement to 
Figure 3 Total Local Authority Revenue Expenditure and 
Local Authority Health Expenditure, 192 0/1921-1936/1937 
YEAR TOTAL LA REV TOTAL LA REV TOTAL LA HEALTH 
EXPEN (1975 EXPEN (CURRENT EXPEN (CURRENT 
PRICES) fm PRICES) fm PRICES) Em 
(a) (b) (c) (c) 
as % 
of (b) 
1920/21 2,165.5 343.2 36.1 10.52 
1921/22 2,878.5 365.0 36.2 9.91 
1922/23 2,883.4 346.7 32.1 9.26 
1923/24 2,844.0 343.3 31.6 9.20 
1924/25 2,910.9 354.9 32.8 9.24 
1925/26 2,900.1 373.1 34.1 9.14 
1926/27 3,475.3 402.2 35.6 8.85 
1927/28 3,440.7 402.6 36.3 9.01 
1928/29 3,584.9 414.7 37.4 9.02 
1929/30 3,758.2 423.7 39.0 9.20 
1930/31 4,034.9 432.7 42.4 9.80 
1931/32 4,143.3 435.0 45.1 10.37 
1932/33 4,201.7 430.3 46.1 10.71 
1933/34 4,212.4 433.2 47.9 11.06 
1934/35 4,396.8 454.8 49.7 10.93 
1935/36 4,460.1 470.9 52.4 11.13 
1936/37 4,405.5 484.6 55.5 11.45 
Source, C. D. Foster, R. A. Jackman and M. Perlman, Local 
Government Finance in a Unitary State (1980), pp. 103-108, 
Ministry of Health Annual Reports, 1920/21-1934/35t and 
Local Government Financial Statistics, 1934-1937 
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Figure 4 Total Local Authority Revenue Expenditure On 
Selected Health Services, 1929/30-1938/39 at Current 
Prices 
YEAR TUBERCULOSIS VENEREAL M&C 
DISEASES WELFARE 
(fm) (EM) (f-m) 
1929/30 3.339 0.411 2.403 
1930/31 3.579 0.417 2.855 
1931/32 3.601 0.439 3.013 
1932/33 3.614 0.434 3.052 
1933/34 3.699 0.436 3.077 
1934/35 3.827 0.440 3.221 
1935/36 4.016 0.449 3.505 
1936/37 4.162 0.468 3.731 
1937/38 4.475 0.472 4.977 
1938/39 4.700 0.486 5.716 
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the reports already received from county and county 
borough medical officers of health, and, indeed, allowed 
the construction of a comprehensive picture of every 
local authority's health service and a comparison thereof 
by a central government department for the first time. 
The surveys were begun in 1930 and it was intended that 
they be completed by 1933 so as to provide the 
comparative basis necessary for evaluating which, if any, 
local authorities should have their block grant 
apportionments withheld or reduced. In the event such a 
deadline became impossible to meet. 
Dr Macewen, a senior official in the public health 
division, was placed in charge of the surveys. Each 
survey was conducted by one inspector over a period 
lasting at least two weeks and then written up in report 
form, generally with a special section on maternity and 
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child welfare researched and written by another 
inspector. The inspectors looked to describe and 
evaluate the main themes of a local authority, s services 
in the context of local need and resources. 2 On t-hp 
whole inspectors were received with great enthusiasm by 
local public health officials and furnished with all 
available data and information. Often local authorities 
asked for early survey in order to gain informed guidance 
in relation to the implementation of the transfer of 
former guardian services and future health planning. In 
this context the Ministry sought, in particular, to build 
up expertise amongst its inspectors in the field of 
hospital planning and administration so as to facilitate 
expert inspection and advice. The sheer number of 
local authorities providing health services meant that 
surveys were limited to county and county borough 
councils. ministry officials decided to place their 
reliance on the county councils to draw their attention 
to any second tier local authorities, responsible for 
maternity and child welfare provision, who were 
considered deficient in any way. Even then the time 
consuming nature of the surveys meant that they were not 
3 
completed until towards the end of 1934. A compilation 
of the health survey results was, however, then possible. 
2. PRO MH 55/10: Papers relating to public health 
surveys. Memorandum for guidance of inspectors, written 
by Sir Arthur Robinson, 24.6.1930. 
3. PRO MH 55/17: Progress and scope of public health 
Surveys, 1931-1935. J. C. Wrigley to Mr Maclachlan, 
17.4.1931; Mr Maclachlan to Sir George Newman, 30.4.1931; 
Mr Maclachlan to Sir George Newman and Sir Arthur 
Robinson, 26.10.1931. 
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It revealed the nature of uneven development and some of 
the causes of deficiency. 
Of course, the surveys showed up many notable local 
successes. Especially where there had been good 
resources, and health provision had been a high priority 
before 1929, the extra income from the block grant at 
least in part was directed towards the improvement of 
that provision. This was the case, for example, with 
Bristol, which became one of the leaders in local health 
provision nationwide by the mid 1930s. 4 Further, the 
surveys also revealed good provision in local authorities 
which were basically hampered by poor resources. 
Middlesbrough and Tynemouth, for example, are conspicuous 
by their absence from major criticism. In these areas 
one may perceive that the block grant had at least a 
partially beneficial effect, or that local preferences 
were made that benefited health provision only at the 
expense of other services. Nevertheless, such examples 
suggested that the attainment of good health provision, 
at least in the eyes of Ministry of Health inspectors, 
was not simply a function of local resources. 
Despite the successes there were, however, many 
notable failures. In sum the health surveys revealed 
that in England alone 22 out of 49 county councils and 23 
out of 79 county borough councils were sufficiently 
deficient to require re-survey and the application of 
central pressure for improvement. This was over 1/3 of 
4. PRO MH 66/487: Ministry of Health public health 
survey of Bristol county borough, 1932. 
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local health authorities. What is particularly striking 
from the survey files is that in many cases this sort of 
comprehensive knowledge of the scale of deficiencies in 
local authority provision was being gained for the first 
time, and findings were very often at odds with the 
encouraging tones of many local medical officers of 
healths' reports on which ministry officials had 
previously largely relied. Such evidence bears out quite 
strongly a more pessimistic view of local health care in 
the 1930s. 5 
The summary conclusions of causation of deficiency 
derived from the Ministry health surveys, and expressed 
in their own words, are shown in figures 5 and 6. They 
reveal the perception of poor standards of overall 
provision in a large proportion of the authorities listed 
for re-survey. Moreover, only in two local authorities 
was the basic resource problem recognised as the 
principal reason for poor standards of overall provision. 
These were South Shields and Gateshead, which were listed 
sympathetically in April 1934 as "two depressed areas 
where conditions are very difficult and where we might 
with advantage keep 
6 in touch" . However, even 
then, a 
distinction was made between the two authorities. In his 
report on South Shields in September 1931 Dr Donaldson, 
the inspector, suggested that the council was "somewhat 
difficult to deal with as they are apt to confuse 
5. See PRO MH 55/16: Progress of public health survey 
correspondence, 1931-1935. 
6. ibid, memorandum by J. C. Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
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7 
parsimony with economy". Comparison by Ministry 
officials of South Shields, performance with Gateshead, 
which they considered to be of equivalent size and 
resources, suggested that "there can be little doubt that 
Gateshead makes a much better show than South Shields. 
one gets the impression from the Gateshead survey report 
that the council are doing their best, whereas the South 
Shields council seem reluctant to put their health 
services in order". 
8 This view of South Shields was 
indicative of the much more common assessment that the 
origins of deficiencies in local health provision were to 
be found primarily in the unhelpful attitude of the local 
authorities themselves. 
Inspectors reports and the office consideration of 
their contents all too often concluded that local 
authorities had little interest in developing health 
services and the new freedom to use block grant aid in 
other ways merely confirmed them in their reactionary 
attitudes. Most prominent amongst these were the county 
councils of Yorkshire, North Riding, Hereford and 
Bedfordshire, the latter of which was listed as "another 
authority which will always give the minimum response", 
especially on maternity and child welfare. 
9 
Huntingdonshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire (Holland), 
Great Yarmouth, Burton-upon- Trent, and to a slightly 
lesser extent Leicestershire, Staffordshire, Gloucester- 
7. PRO MH 66/890: Ministry of Health public health 
survey of South Shields county borough, report 
by Dr 
Donaldson, p. 5. 
8. ibid, D. C. Ward to J. C. Wrigley, 7.11.1931. 
9. PRO MH 55/16, memorandum by J. C. Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
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Figure 5 County Councils Designated For Health Services 
Re-Survey and Results, 1931-1935 
DEFICIENT COUNTIES REASON 
Cornwall Backward 
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Figure 6 County Boroughs Designated For Health Services 
Re-Survey and Results, 1931-1935 
DEFICIENT C. BOROUGHS 
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Plymouth Favourable survey, but restriction 
of services since, especially 
hospitals 
Source, PRO MH 55/16 Progress of Public Health 
Correspondence 1931-1935 
shire, oxford and Worcester were all relatively well off 
local authorities which also simply opted not to provide 
good all-round services. Some of the poorer authorities 
who faced a greater demand on their health services, 
moreover, were perceived by the Ministry as exhibiting a 
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distinct lack of enthusiasm for health provision, thus 
ensuring generally poor provision. These included 
cornwall, Sunderland, West Hartlepool, Doncaster and 
Grimsby. The Ministry perceived these authorities as not 
even using grant aid gain made through the block grant on 
the improvement of health provision. Indeed, it was 
suggested that some of these authorities used the new 
freedom to spend grant aid as they pleased to arrest even 
existing development. 
10 
On the basis of the Ministry's own judgment of the 
reasons for local policy failure lack of financial 
resources barely ranked as a reason let alone one of 
primary importance. The principal reason for general 
failure where it occurred was perceived as being that of 
a reactionary and backward approach to health care, 
irrespective of whether the local authority was well 
resourced or not. Ministry of Health assessments of the 
causes of general local deficiency should, however, be 
treated with some scepticism. Webster, Macnicol and 
Mayhew have already shown how the Ministry was inclined 
to disbelieve, ignore or suppress evidence which 
suggested that health standards were low in any 
particular area because of inadequate public resourcing, 
for the reason that if they were to accept such evidence 
it would imply a much greater role for state 
10. See, for example, PRO MH 66/988: West Hartlepool 
county borough, public health survey under 1929 Local 
Government Act, 1931. Report by Dr Donaldson, March 1931, 
introduction; PRO MH 66/991: West Hartlepool public 
health survey correspondence, 1931-1934. memorandum 
by 
Mr Infield, 23.2.1932. 
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responsibility. Such acceptance would have been in 
contradiction with the Ministry of Health's compliance in 
the 1930s with the bureaucratic and governmental 
imperative to keep public expenditure down. " 
Similarly, therefore, it may be argued that Ministry 
officials refused to accept in internal discussion that 
any of the local authorities could not provide health 
services at even the minimum standards laid down by the 
Ministry because of inadequate resources for the reason 
that it would have laid the basis for an argument for an 
increased subsidy to those areas, which would have meant 
an increase in the block grant or a revision of its 
formula more strongly in the favour of poorer areas. As 
was shown in the last chapter the Ministry could not 
expect the former and were not inclined to promote the 
latter. It was much easier and less controversial, then, 
to simply describe poorer authorities who were generally 
deficient as backward or reactionary. 
There are obvious difficulties in ascertaining whether 
a local authority in a necessitous area should have been 
more properly defined as backward in its approach to 
provision or inadequately resourced. Certainly the 
evidence that poorer authorities were little helped by 
the block grant during the 1930s lends credence to the 
view that such authorities as South Shields and Gateshead 
11. C. Webster, 'Healthy or Hungry 
Worksho-o Journal, no. 13,1982, pp. 12 
The Movement for Family Allowances, 
chapter five; M. Mayhew, 'The 
Controversy', Journal of ContemDora 
no. 3, July 1988, pp. 445-464. 
Thirties', History 
0-129; J. Macnicol, 
1918-1945 (1980), 
1930s Nutrition 
-v History, vol. 23, 
306 
were found deficient for the root reason of inadequate 
resources, and the discussion in the previous chapter 
suggests that an apologia for the block grant in this 
respect is inappropriate. In addition, health survey 
reports showed scant regard for the wider service demands 
placed upon local authorities in necessitous areas, 
particularly in regard to public assistance. They were 
inclined to review health services in isolation. 
Consequently, the case that such authorities were wrongly 
characterised as being merely reactionary or backward is 
strengthened. Yet, the important conclusion to be drawn 
from the results of the surveys is that there were many 
authorities found generally deficient who did not suffer 
inadequate resourcing. This suggests that the exercise of 
local autonomy on block grant aid was at least as 
important a factor as low resources in determining poor 
provision. 
The exercise of local autonomy against the development 
of public health services should not, perhaps, always be 
seen in critical terms. West Hartlepool was a good 
example of an authority which claimed its relatively low 
prioritisation of health service development was offset 
by its emphasis on a housing programme as a better long- 
term policy to improve living conditions and so erode the 
incidence of disease. It laid the stress on a 
preventative rather than a curative approach to 
health 
care. 12 However, West Hartlepool's case, as did that of 
12. PRO MH 66/988, report of conference of north-east 
local authorities to discuss general shortage 
of 
residential accommodation for tuberculosis patients, p. 
4. 
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others, as an authority committed to public provision 
fell down in the context of consideration of the rate 
policies of local authorities during the 1930s. 
On the one hand, it is entirely proper to suggest that 
local authorities were merely complying with central 
direction when they stabilised or reduced rates in the 
early 1930 (See figure 7). Indeed, there was almost 
universal local authority compliance with the national 
economy circular of 1931. It is important to remember in 
this respect that the vast majority of local authorities 
were run by Conservative-minded political alliances, 
which had the same political commitment to economy as 
government at a national level. Only in a handful of 
local authorities did the rate actually go up in the 
early 1930s. In this context it was highly logical for 
local authorities to use some or all of the extra money 
coming in through the block grant to relieve the rate 
further. The Ministry of Health had no logical grounds 
for chiding them for doing so for it had issued the 
economy circular. The call for economy and for health 
service expansion at the same time were in essence 
contradictory. 13 
13. PRO HLG 52/1008: National economy, social health 
services policy, particularly, J. C. Wrigley to Mr 
Maclachlan, 18.11.1931 and a copy of "A Vicious Circle", 
in Public Assistance Journal and Health and HosDital 
Review, 23.12.1932. 
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Figure 7 Annual Average Rate for England and Wales, 
Selected Years 1913/1914-1938/1939 
YEAR AVERAGE RATE 
1913/1914 6s 9d 
1919/1920 9s 7d 
1927/1928 12s 10d 
1928/1929 12s 5d 
1929/1930 lls 7d 
1930/1931 lls 8d 
1931/1932 Ils 2d 
1932/1933 los 10d 
1933/1934 los 10d 
1934/1935 los 10d 
1935/1936 Ils 3d 
1936/1937 Ils 7d 
1937/1938 lls 8d 
1938/1939 12s 4d 
Source, Summary of Local Government Financial Statistics, 
1936-1937 and Rates and Rateable Values in England and 
Wales, 1938-1939. 
On the other hand, rate statistics and the health 
surveys suggest that some local authorities, notably 
county councils, had a much longer-term commitment to 
keeping the rate down irrespective of the state of the 
local or national economy. In the counties there was 
often an undeveloped sense of the council as a co=unity 
focus for provision for those in need. The focus, if it 
existed at all, was provided by voluntary associations, 
and the county council was intended to intervene in 
people's lives as little as possible. Rate limitation 
was also, of course, often an election winner. The 
shortcomings and realities of local politics were, 
therefore, principally responsible for a long-term 
reactionary attitude against improved social provision. 
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Similar situations could be perceived in urban areas. In 
nine of the county boroughs considered sufficiently 
deficient to require re-survey a policy of rate reduction 
in the early 1930s was followed by stabilisation at the 
lower level throughout the rest of the 1930s. These 
included West Hartlepool, as well as Great Yarmouth, 
Plymouth, Burton-Upon-Trent, Gateshead, Wigan, 
14 Darlington, Derby and Doncaster. Gateshead's rate 
policy, it should be noted, led to a waning of Ministry 
sympathy in this case as well as that of South Shields 
during the mid-late 1930s. 
It may be argued, therefore, that the block grant was 
doubly malign in its impact upon local authority health 
care. Not only did the exercise in grant redistribution 
fail to help poorer local authorities sufficiently to 
improve their health services to standards acceptable to 
the ministry of Health, but also in granting local 
authorities greater local autonomy in its expenditure the 
block grant facilitated the entrenchment of anti- public 
health policies and the subsidisation of the rate 
instead. This latter point could be seen further in 
microcosm in relation to those authorities listed for re- 
survey on the grounds of deficiency in a particular 
service. 
Here again there were a large number of authorities 
found culpable. Somerset, West Bromwich and Wigan, for 
example, were very poor on provision of maternity and 
14. This summary is based upon rate statistics collected 
from local taxation returns and reports in the Municinal 
LeL-v_iew (1928-1939). 
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child welfare services; Southampton and Bournemouth on 
tuberculosis; Lincoln, Oxford and Wigan again on hospital 
provision; Exeter on the provision of blind welfare. 15 
Many of the local authorities listed in figures 3 and 4 
with the addition of a further six county councils and 
twenty-four county borough councils were also guilty of 
having conducted very few relations with the voluntary 
hospitals in their areas by late 1934.16 The reasons for 
such deficiencies were many and varied. The reasons for 
non-appropriation of Poor Law infirmaries as hospitals 
and lack of co-ordination. with voluntary hospitals, and 
the factors mitigating against the appropriateness of 
criticising local approaches to provision have already 
been discussed extensively by Abel-Smith. With regard to 
other specific deficiencies, however, local authorities, 
on the basis of Ministry evidence, were found to have 
been wilfully negligent. Local ignorance of health 
problems and means of solution appears to have been a 
major reason for deficiency, especially with regard to 
maternity and child welfare provision. Reasons for 
deficiency could be highly idiosyncratic. Bournemouth 
County Borough Council, for instance, was loath to 
provide good facilities for the tuberculous for it feared 
in view of the town's position and history, that they 
15. PRO MH 55/16, memorandum by J. C Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
16. PRO MH 55/22: Progress of public health surveys-co- 
operation with voluntary hospitals, unsigned minute, 
November 1934. 
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might attract more prospective tuberculosis patients to 
the area. 17 
Otherwise deficiencies in provision arose as a result 
of wasteful inefficiency on the part of the local medical 
officer of health. This was especially the case in 
Dorset, Gloucestershire and Preston where Ministry 
inspectors held the local medical officers of health 
mainly responsible for the poor use of what money their 
departments were allocated by Council. 18 This should be 
seen, however, as also a product of local choice. A low 
council priority for health provision would habitually 
mean a low salary for the medical officer of health. It 
was hardly surprising then that the officers they 
appointed were not greatly experienced or well qualified. 
Slack council practices of appointing on the basis of who 
you know rather than what you know were also to blame. 
Although this did work to a local authority's advantage 
in certain places, such as Bristol, where a medical 
officer of health, with very little formal 
qualifications, was appointed as a result of his 
friendship with the chairman of the health committee, and 
went on to achieve great success. 
19 
More generally, local authorities were found to be 
unenthusiastic in the discharge of their public health 
responsibilities. This was found in its most acute form 
17. PRO MH 66/473: Bournemouth county borough, public 
health survey, report by Dr Donaldson, April 1932, p-10. 
18. PRO MH 55/16, memorandum by J. C. Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
19. PRO MH 66/487: Ministry of Health public health 
survey of Bristol county borough, 1932, report by Dr 
Allan C. Parsons, pp. 160-170. 
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in relation to provision for the mentally deficient. 
Ministry inspectors found that it was an unpopular 
service with many local public health committees and 
officials. They found the work unpalatable and left to 
their own devices were apt to assume responsibility as 
little as possible. Sir Lawrence Brock of the Board of 
Control, which was responsible for mental deficiency, 
informed Arthur Robinson in October 1931, for instance, 
that "my trouble with the councils is that either they do 
nothing, or else when we ginger them in to activity they 
want to spend far too much because the county architect 
sees a chance to make a splash". Officials of the Board 
of Control came to mourn the passing of the percentage 
grant. In the 1920s it had at least provided some 
specific incentive for local authorities to act. However, 
in the 1930s, with the new freedom to spend the block 
grant, money was shifted to more attractive health 
20 services or out of the health budget altogether. 
This was symptomatic of a larger truth. Local 
services in the 1920s had not reached the position where 
uneven development in relation to scope and standards was 
merely a function of inequalities in income between local 
authorities in relation to local needs. Whilst low 
resourcing was clearly a major cause of poor provision, 
on the evidence of the Ministry surveys standards of 
provision, both in relation to health services generally 
and in relation to specific services, were uneven 
20. PRO HLG 52/1010: National economy, accommodation of 
mental defectives and persons of unsound mind- Brock to 
Robinson, 6.10.1931. 
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principally because of fundamentally different approaches 
to health care by different local authorities. The 
surveys merely served to prove the case of those in the 
ministry of Health who had argued for the continuance of 
percentage grants in the 1920s; that local provision had 
not reached the stage where its future development could 
be left to the benign discretion of local authorities. 
Further central stimulus and close central control was 
still needed. The question that became pressing once the 
depressing results of the health surveys had been 
collected in the Ministry of Health was just how 
effective the new mechanism of central control 
established under the 1929 Act would prove to be. 
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 
The results of the health surveys as a basis for the 
usage of the power under section 104 of the 1929 Act to 
withhold or reduce grant aid was originally intended to 
provide the means by which central control could be 
wielded over local policies. However, the experience of 
the 1930s proved to reveal that both facets of this new 
form of central control were inherently flawed. First, 
in May 1933 public health officials began the task of 
tabulating the results of the surveys as a basis for 
comparing local performance on which evaluation of the 
usage of section 104 could be made. By July 1933 Dr 
Macewen had concluded that it was difficult to evaluate 
the adequacy of local tuberculosis services against 
local 
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needs, and further that it was, therefore, impossible to 
compare tuberculosis services between different local 
authorities except in the most general way. This was 
because of the huge problems of quantifying local needs 
and the huge disparities in local needs and conditions 
that appeared to pertain anyway. He came to the same 
conclusions in relation to venereal disease services. 
Efficiency could only be measured comparatively by 
reference to the facilities and staff provided and the 
use made of the facilities by the staff. 21 
As a result, Ministry officials acquired great insight 
in to the nature of the services provided by local 
authorities and were able to form general impressions, as 
the survey results show, upon which working comparisons 
between the performances of different local authorities 
could be made. However, they were not able to provide a 
technical evaluative basis on which the Minister of 
Health could go to the House of Commons and justify 
sanction against any particular authority under section 
104. 
In addition, it was soon realised that in the context 
of the 1930s recession and the sensitivities of local 
authorities, anxious not to lose grant aid because of the 
introduction of the block grant or experience any erosion 
of new-found autonomy, that the power available under 
section 104 was politically unusable. Its usage on any 
local authority would have been politically unpopular and 
21. PRO MH 55/22: Papers relating to a general review of 
progress on national public health surveys, reports by Dr 
Macewen, 3.7.1933. 
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divisive, but particularly so if it had been used on a 
local authority in a depressed area. In such a case it 
would also have been counter-productive to the desired 
aim of gaining increased spending on health care, as it 
would have eroded the already seriously deficient 
resources at the local authority's disposal. Local 
resentment would also have been increased, for, in stark 
contrast to percentage grants where central power could 
be exerted by not giving grant aid, with the block grant 
money would have to be specifically taken away through a 
deduction of a local authority's agreed grant 
apportionment for a given year. 
For these reasons the intended basis for central 
control was eroded. This would not have been of major 
importance to ministry officials had the results of the 
health surveys been more comforting, as had originally 
been expected. As it was, the survey results showed 
serious deficiencies, against which the Ministry had only 
resort to persuasion and advice. The real means by which 
the Ministry attempted to exert central control, in the 
absence of any other means provided by the 1929 Act, was 
through the medium of survey letters, sent out to each 
local authority after the relevant survey report had been 
considered within the ministry, and subsequent 
correspondence and, where necessary, re-survey. 
In all cases survey letters were sent to local 
authorities listing criticisms and suggested spending. 
Ministry expectations of local response varied over time. 
Those authorities surveyed before the fall of the 
Labour 
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Government in 1931 were bid to make immediate response. 
However, once the National Government had been formed and 
the economy circular of 1931 issued, expectations were 
somewhat changed. Ministry survey letters and 
correspondence suggested that local authorities strike a 
balance between economy and improvement, addressing 
themselves to those criticisms and recommendations which 
either required urgent attention on the grounds of public 
health or did not involve substantial expenditure. This 
approach mirrored the Ministry's parallel approach to the 
use of the power of loan sanction in respect to capital 
spending. From c1934 onwards Ministry correspondence to 
all local authorities except those in the most depressed 
areas reflected the restoration of a Ministry imperative 
to gain local health improvement and co- ordination and 
the implementation of the 1929 Act as quickly as 
possible. 
Actual local responses to Ministry survey letters 
varied. In the case of the better authorities the 
criticisms were marginal and it can be assumed that they 
were generally heeded. However, Plymouth was a notable 
exception in that it was initially surveyed favourably 
but ignored the suggestions in the survey letter, and, 
indeed, faced with local economic problems, restricted 
the development of services, especially the hospital 
services, in the mid-late 1930s. 
22 Ministry pressure and 
advice was incapable of diverting the council 
from its 
changed course. With respect to the authorities 
found 
22. PRO MH 55/16, memorandum by i. C. Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
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sufficiently deficient to require re-survey, the general 
experience of ministry officials is more difficult to 
establish as no summary statement of the position by the 
late 1930s is to be found amongst ministry papers. Three 
examples of Ministry relations with deficient county 
boroughs may be briefly considered to suggest the nature 
of that experience. Burton-upon-Trent was an example of 
a relatively wealthy authority, experiencing low 
unemployment during the 1930s, which was found generally 
deficient. West Hartlepool was also an authority found 
generally deficient but with almost the exact opposite 
social and economic basis. Finally, Bournemouth may be 
taken as an example of a relatively wealthy authority 
which was found deficient in a specific way for specific 
reasons. 
Burton-upon-Trent was initially surveyed in 1931 and 
found to have significant problems in a number of areas. 
First, the development and organisation of the venereal 
diseases and blind welfare services did not meet Ministry 
standards. Secondly, the local authority had inadequate 
in-patient provision for expectant mothers. Thirdly, the 
appropriation of Belvedere House, a transferred public 
assistance institution, as a general hospital under 
public health legislation, had not been considered. 
Finally, the local authority had had no consultations 
with the voluntary hospitals in its area to formulate a 
co-ordinated hospital policy. The Ministry considered 
that a solution to most of these problems could be found 
initially through the appropriation of Belvedere House, 
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which it considered eminently suitable and requiring 
little new expenditure. Belvedere House could provide 
more beds for, amongst others, expectant mothers, who 
refused to attend it whilst it remained a public 
assistance institution, and could provide the basis for 
the authority's planning of a long-term hospital policy 
23 in conjunction with the voluntary hospitals . 
Despite a survey letter and subsequent correspondence, 
when the authority was re-surveyed in 1935 much the same 
problems were encountered. The venereal disease service 
remained open to censure primarily because it was 
administered by what Ministry officials considered to be 
an unqualified and incompetent officer, Dr Brindle. More 
importantly, Dr Cowie, the medical officer of health, had 
failed to take any interest in assuming control of former 
guardian health services. He merely followed his 
council's direction, and with a strong public assistance 
lobby within the authority, public health and public 
assistance services remained separately administered. 
The poor co- ordination of the authority's health 
services which resulted was compounded by the fact that 
although the voluntary hospitals had created a committee 
Cowie had made no moves to initiate consultation. 
24 
In subsequent relations Ministry officials were able 
to secure certain improvements by Burton-upon-Trent. Dr 
Brindle, for example, was dispatched on training courses 
23. PRO MH 66/501: Ministry of Health public health 
survey of Burton-on-Trent county borough. ond 24. PRO MH 66/505: Burton-on-Trent county borough sec 
survey, November 1935. 
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and more minor remaining problems in relation to blind 
welfare and maternity and child welfare education were 
broached. However, the authority resisted the 
appropriation of Belvedere House and the creation of a 
co-ordinated hospital policy throughout the second half 
of the 1930s. The cost of appropriation it was suggested 
was too high and the voluntary hospitals were too zealous 
in the preservation of their own interests to enter in to 
meaningful discussions. In October 1937 Dr Donaldson, who 
had conducted both surveys, commented rather wearily that 
"the arguments against appropriation are those almost 
universally employed by councils who have no intention of 
improving their hospital services and can be answered in 
the usual way" . From 1937 onwards Ministry officials 
ceased to apply consistent pressure on Burton-upon- Trent 
for the implementation of health reform, having been 
defeated by a local response mainly conditioned by an 
adherence to a low rate and inertia on the break up of 
the poor law. 25 
The ministry experience of West Hartlepool was no less 
galling. The survey report in March 1931, also 
undertaken by Dr Donaldson, uncovered a long list of 
ma]or problems. There were very low staffing levels, 
particularly in relation to sanitary inspectors and 
health visitors. Provision for the treatment of venereal 
diseases was poor, due mainly to the clinic 
being sited 
in a highly public place, therefore, deterring sufferers 
25. PRO MH 66/507: Burton-on-Trent county borough second 
survey, post survey correspondence, 1935-1939. 
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from attending. The provision for infectious diseases 
was inadequate, a fact made all the more incomprehensible 
by the fact that the authority had bought a site for the 
building of a new hospital twenty-six years previously 
but never built on it. There was inadequate provision 
for pulmonary tuberculosis and very little assistance 
given to general practitioners in the out-patient 
treatment of the tuberculous. There was a lack of 
facilities for x-ray treatment and no definite scheme for 
orthopaedic treatment. In virtually all respects mental 
deficiency provision needed improvement. There was 
little co-operation with the public assistance committee 
and little prospect of the appropriation of Howbeck 
Hospital as a general hospital. Finally, there had been 
no consultations with voluntary hospitals in the area. 26 
Recognition was made of the fact that West Hartlepool 
was suffering from the worst effects of the recession and 
that response to Ministry criticisms and recommendations 
was likely to be affected by this. However, in his 
report Donaldson suggested that "it cannot be denied that 
in the past, in the days of the town's prosperity, 
economy was practiced too much at the expense of the 
public health services". It remained inherently an 
authority with a backward approach to public health 
provision. ministry officials viewed with sympathy the 
medical officer of health, Dr Mckeggie, who prior to 
26. PRO MH 66/988: West Hartlepool county borough, public 
health survey under 1929 Local Government Act, report 
by 
Dr Donaldson, March 1931, and D. C. L. Ward to Town Clerk, 
West Hartlepool, 31.7.1931. 
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Donaldson's survey had attempted to have his staff 
increased and Howbeck appropriated, only to have both 
proposals suspended by the council pending a survey 
27 letter. The council's enthusiasm for the suspension of 
such proposals was revealed when the response to the 
Ministry survey letter stated that consideration of all 
of its criticisms and recommendations were to be deferred 
until a later date. This response was accompanied by a 
letter from the local M. P., W. G. Howard Gritten, 
protesting on behalf of prominent West Hartlepool 
councillors at the Ministry's recommendations for 
expenditure at a time when economy ought to be 
28 practiced. 
Ministry officials were appalled at West Hartlepool's 
wilful suspension of even the most urgent and meagre of 
improvements. Closer scrutiny revealed that West 
Hartlepool was primarily interested in rate reduction and 
had used additional grant aid through the block grant 
mainly for this purpose in 1931/32. Moreover, J. C. Wrigley 
wrote to Dr Macewen and Dr Maclachlan, a principal 
assistant secretary at the Ministry of Health, in 
February 1932 suggesting that "the expenditure on health 
services is abnormally low compared with that on other 
services, though these are well below the average, and 
the standard attained does not suggest that any 
exceptionally good value is being obtained for the money 
27. ibid, report by Dr Donaldson, pp. 68-72. 
28. PRO MH 66/991: West Hartlepool public health survey 
correspondence 1931-1934. Town Clerk, West Hartlepool, 
to Secretary, ministry of Health 12.10.1931, and 
W. G. Howard Gritten to Minister, 9.10.1931. 
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which is spent. Dr Donaldson points out that the health 
services were starved in the days when the town was 
prosperous and judging from one's general knowledge of 
the council, I imagine that the council passed their 
resolution to defer consideration of any improvement 
29 
without any regrets". 
For the following twelve months there followed further 
letters from the Ministry imploring the council to adopt 
a more balanced approach between economy and health 
improvement, which induced replies from the town clerk, 
Harold Stanton, stating that the council continued to 
defer consideration of all issues. A flurry of 
correspondence in November 1932 elicited a further letter 
from Howard Gritten, the local M. P., to Sir Edward Hilton 
Young, the then Minister of Health, protesting again at 
the Ministry pressure on West Hartlepool, and confirming 
the council's view that, in particular, appropriation of 
Howbeck would be too expensive. "I am pertinently 
asked", he wrote in relation to his discussions with West 
Hartlepool councillors, "whether a Conservative minister 
is as much under the influence of socialistic bureaucrats 
as a Labour minister". 
30 By February 1933 Ministry 
officials had for the time being given up trying to 
persuade West Hartlepool in to making improvements or 
implementing the 1929 Act. An internal memorandum 
compared the experience of West Hartlepool with that of 
29. ibid, D. C. L. Ward to J. C Wrigley, 15.2.1932, 
memorandum by Mr Infield, 23.2.1932 and Wr 1 gley 
to 
Macewen and Maclachlan, 25.2.1932. 
30. ibid, W. G. Howard Gritten to the Minister, 25.11.1932. 
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Burton-upon-Trent. "Both councils are extremely obsessed 
with the importance of economy ... both of them are far 
from satisfactory and will need to be kept under 
review". 
31 
The battle to shift West Hartlepool's Position was 
rejoined when Dr Donaldson re-surveyed the council's 
health services in 1935. His report again praised the 
efforts of Dr Mckeggie, who had managed to secure an 
increase in sanitary and office staff, better premises 
for the school clinic and improvements in the venereal 
diseases clinic, although without re-location. Yet, 
Donaldson concluded that "he has undoubtedly had a very 
difficult council to deal with, and it was not altogether 
surprising to find at the re-survey that he had not made 
much headway during the intervening years". In 
particular, West Hartlepool still had no hospital policy. 
This in addition to criticisms and recommendations 
concerning the services for tuberculosis, child welfare, 
mental deficiency and venereal diseases formed the text 
of the re-survey letter in January 1936.32 
One seed of hope was planted during Donaldson's visit 
to West Hartlepool with respect to hospital policY. 
Changes on the health committee had meant that it was no 
longer dominated by economy minded councillors. The 
Committee and Mckeggie hoped that cautious pressure 
form 
the Ministry would help them in their internal council 
31. ibid, J. C. Wrigley to P. Barker (Board of Control), 
15.2.1933. 
32. PRO MH 66/993: West Hartlepool county borough second ýard 
Survey, report by Dr Donaldson, 29.7.1935, and 
D. C. L. ',, 
to Town Clerk, West Hartlepool, 9.1.1936. 
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struggle for the appropriation of Howbeck. Yet, 
Donaldson had also met Alderman Hyde, the chairman of the 
public assistance committee. Hyde was against 
appropriation - Indeed, Donaldson reported, "he argued 
that all medical services, under whatever acts they are 
administered, are "public assistance". He said that 
Howbeck was all one institution, and that appropriation 
of the hospital would mean dual control. He expressed 
the opinion that the public assistance committee should 
take over all services provided by the council for the 
relief of those who could not af ford to pay for them" . 
Hyde had also objected to Donaldson's suggestions of the 
need for more staff at Howbeck. Donaldson reported that 
"Hyde would not believe it and made somewhat offensive 
remarks about officials always wanting to make work for 
33 other officials". 
As a result off such prevailing local attitudes the 
survey letter fell on stony ground. In the three years 
before the Second World War very little was achieved by 
renewed Ministry pressure, and the West Hartlepool health 
committee was forced to embark upon plans for building an 
entirely new hospital by one of the town's voluntary 
hospitals. After debate in an office conference in 
February 1939 even these proposals had to be vetoed on 
the grounds that they represented an extravagance when 
general hospital accommodation could be so much more 
cheaply secured by appropriation of Howbeck 
hospital, a 
policy which the council public assistance 
lobby 
33. ibid, report by Dr Donaldson, esp pp. 24-25. 
325 
prevented. After nearly a decade there was still impasse 
on the council's implementation of the 1929 Act and its 
dilatory attitude to the improvement of health services. 
The Ministry came out of it with little achieved. 34 
One might have expected Ministry officials to have had 
more success in relations with an authority which 
otherwise seemed to have a progressive approach to health 
provision and potentially could be persuaded to overcome 
a specific deficiency. Yet relations with Bournemouth 
County Borough Council suggested otherwise. Dr 
Donaldson's report in April 1932 praised the council's 
venereal disease scheme and the establishment of a post- 
natal clinic. Yet, the problems of provision for the 
tuberculous were but the tip of an ice-berg. The 
improvement of provision entailed essentially greater 
residential accommodation. In this respect Donaldson's 
report suggested that the council was likely to be 
indigent because of a deep-rooted opposition to public 
hospital provision which mitigated against the 
appropriation of Fairmile House as a hospital in which 
all the tuberculous could be treated. Indeed the medical 
officer of health, Dr Henry Gordon Smith informed 
Donaldson that he "found that the Bournemouth Council 
were largely uninterested in public health matters. The 
Policy of the council has been to develop Bournemouth as 
a holiday and residential town, and to get away 
from the 
original conception of it as a health resort. The result 
34. See PRO MH 66/995: West Hartlepool county borough re- 
survey correspondence, 1936-1939. 
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is that certain members of the council have developed a 
rather ridiculous "orgueil" and refuse to believe that 
this particular town can be as other towns, which need 
organised medical services .... these members believed that 
voluntary agencies were sufficient to cope with all the 
35 public health services". 
The Ministry's survey letter in 1932 stressed the need 
to develop provision for tuberculosis and as part of this 
to appropriate Fairmile House. Ministry officials wanted 
the council to make Gordon Smith the medical officer for 
the whole council in order to bring about a co-ordination 
of all the council's health services. 36 The 
appropriation of Fairmile House was, however, 
successfully opposed on the council. Later, in 1935, Dr 
Asten, the chairman of the public health committee, 
informed Ministry officials that "the question was 
erroneously regarded as purely political and the 
overwhelming Conservative majority looked upon 
appropriation as a socialist measure which should be 
opposed". 37 Opposition to appropriation on the council 
did not, however, preclude the following of other routes 
to meet the Ministry's recommendations. An ill-conceived 
plan for a tuberculosis and infectious diseases hospital 
in 1932 was followed by negotiations with both Poole 
35. PRO MH 66/473: Bournemouth county borough, public 
health survey, report by Dr Donaldson, April 1932, P-10. 
36. ibid, H. H. Turner to Town Clerk, Bournemouth, 
13.8.1932. 
37. PRO MH 66/476: Bournemouth public health survey, 
Post-survey correspondence, note of meeting between 
chairman of Bournemouth public health committee and 
medical officer of health with officials at the Ministry 
Of Health, 13.6.1935. 
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Borough Council in late 1934 and Dorset County Council in 
early 1935 for new joint provision. The negotiations 
with Poole, however, broke down as a result of the 
latter's change of heart and insistence that tuberculosis 
patients be not taken by the planned hospital. Further, 
Dorset pulled out of negotiations as a result of what the 
council perceived as extravagance in planning on the part 
38 of Bournemouth. 
Nevertheless, in June 1936 Bournemouth public health 
committee were given the go ahead by the council to plan 
a new tuberculosis hospital and whilst the Ministry still 
ideally wanted tuberculosis provision to be made in an 
appropriated Fairmile House loan sanction for the 
purchase of land for the building of the new hospital was 
given in May 1937.39 What occurred in Bournemouth's 
policy on tuberculosis provision in the second half of 
the 1930s is unclear from Ministry correspondence, but 
nothing had been achieved by 1939. one can only assume 
that the root opposition to new hospital provision and 
the provision of good facilities for the treatment of 
tuberculosis, observed by Dr Donaldson in the early 
1930s, reasserted itself. Relations based upon 
persuasion and the power of argument had achieved as 
little for Ministry aims for health service improvement 
with regard to Bournemouth as they had done with regard 
to Burton-upon-Trent and West Hartlepool. 
38. ibid, note of visit by Arthur Macnalty (Ministry of 
Health) to Bournemouth, 2.7.1933 and J. N. Dark to Town 
Clerk, Bournemouth, 29.5.1935. 




There is strong evidence to suggest that the lack of 
success for the Ministry in relations with these three 
authorities was symptomatic of the wider experience of 
relations with local authorities found sufficiently 
deficient in the initial survey in the early 1930s to 
require re-survey. The overall lack of Ministry success 
by 1935 with regard to influencing Plymouth and the local 
authorities that were initially surveyed unfavourably can 
be seen in the results of re-survey shown in figures 5 
and 6. Although the Ministry's summary conclusions, 
again expressed in their own words, are incomplete, they 
suggest that only in four cases of seriously deficient 
authorities were there great improvements in provision 
noted before 1935. These were Berkshire, Blackpool, 
Grimsby and West Bromwich. In the case of Berkshire 
improvement came as a result of the appointment of a new 
and better qualified medical officer of health. In the 
rest of the deficient authorities little or no progress 
was observed. Warwickshire openly resented the 
interference of central government and point blank 
refused to take any notice of the survey letter 
criticisms. Others with justification continued to plead 
poverty. Leicestershire, for example, postponed further 
action on financial grounds. The rest simply continued 
in their chosen course, participating with Ministry of 
Health officials in the procedure of central-local 
relations, - surveys, survey letters, conciliatory 
replies, re-surveys and strong Ministry pressure - 
but 
continually fobbing them off with delaying tactics. 
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Amongst these there continued to be richer and poorer 
authorities alike. A Ministry official summed up the 
situation when he wrote of the action taken by Oxford in 
respect of its deficiencies, "Much talk but nothing 
concrete has emerged... 40 
often, as has been shown by the examples of West 
Hartlepool and Bournemouth, the local medical officer of 
health was in agreement with Ministry criticisms and 
would use the survey letter as a means of trying to 
persuade his elected members of the necessity of 
improvement. Whilst such a tactic could gain progress in 
relation to services organised before the 1929 Act, 
rarely did it shift strong politicised sentiment over the 
unity of public assistance services, or scepticism 
concerning a permanent role in hospital provision, which, 
in any case threatened the viability of voluntary 
hospitals, on whose boards of governors many prominent 
councillors sat. In other authorities members and 
officials would pass the buck of responsibility for 
deficiency in local provision so effectively that the 
central official would be unable to get a grip on the 
local policy making process so as to change local policy. 
Ultimately, when extensively pressured, local councillors 
quite legitimately referred to the contradictory central 
pressures for prudence and care of the rate in defence of 
inaction. 
Given the evidence provided by the three case studies 
it is reasonable to posit the view that this general 
40. PRO MH 55/16, memorandum by J. C. Wrigley, 28.4.1934. 
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description of central-local relations for the Period up 
to 1935 may broadly apply to the whole of the 1930s, 
especially given the fact that rate stabilisation 
remained such a high priority for so many authorities. 
In relations with all authorities the persuasion which 
Ministry officials attempted to exert may have been much 
more effective had the ultimate sanction of block grant 
reduction or suspension appeared a real threat. However, 
local authorities were as mindful of the impotence of 
section 104 of the Local Government Act in practice as 
Ministry officials. Consequently, local authorities with 
deficient services largely continued with their existing 
policies, some by necessity, others by choice. ministry 
public health officials and inspectors dealing directly 
with individual authorities had to be content with a 
jockeying role. By the late 1930s there is much evidence 
that such officials were only too well aware of the 
impotence of their position, and, as a result of the 
financial and administrative circumstances of local 
government and its freedom from greater central control, 
the seriousness of uneven development in local health 
care. Extrapolating from the 1935 figures in 1939 21 
counties and 20 county boroughs were still considered by 
the Ministry to be well below desired levels of 
development. The equalising effects of the block grant 
on local authority finances had been by no means 
substantial enough, and the freedom from central control 
had had the adverse effects on local policies feared by 
some outside central government in 1929. The ministry 
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was powerless to reverse this trend. This constitutes 
further evidence for the endorsement of a pessimistic 
view of local health provision throughout the 1930s, 
caused in part by the changes wrought by the 1929 Act. 
THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 
In the light of their experience of the health surveys, 
the implementation of the 1929 Local Government Act and 
relations with local government during the 1930s, it is 
perhaps surprising to conclude that officials at the 
Ministry of Health remained in favour of local government 
as the focus for further health care reform. The 
Midwives Act of 1936 and the Cancer Act of 1939 both 
added significant new responsibilities to those already 
bestowed upon local government, and in planning for the 
nationalisation of the voluntary hospitals and an 
extension of the national health insurance principle 
during the Second World War Ministry officials looked 
upon local government as the ideal administrative 
umbrella. Yet, it was entirely within the logic of the 
bureaucratic elite to think along such lines. Local 
government had been the focus of health care reform after 
the First World War precisely because it involved only an 
incremental extension of the role of existing 
institutions of state provision which it had been 
believed would not threaten the governing interests of 
central government. Centralisation or development 
by way 
of an extension of a general practitioner-led national 
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service had incalculable implications. Moreover central 
policy implementation through local government 
perpetuated a means of administration with which central 
officials were well versed. So again was the logic of 
policy development in the 1930s, and potentially beyond, 
when health care reform was required, irrespective of the 
practical realities of health administration by local 
government. 
It is not too fanciful to suggest, therefore, that but 
for the intervention of the Second World War, the 
experience of the emergency medical service which 
revealed the potential of a nationally run system of 
health care, the publication of the Beveridge Report and 
the ensuing policy debate, that the extension by degrees 
of a state run health care system primarily through local 
government could have been predicted. Local councillors 
and officers generally expected that in view of the 
severe financial problems faced by the voluntary 
hospitals by the late 1930s that they would inevitably 
come under their charge, and that this would precipitate 
more enthusiastic approaches to appropriation of public 
assistance institutions as general hospitals and local 
hospital co-ordination than seen during the 1930s. The 
relationship between local authority and general 
practitioner services, nevertheless, would have remained 
41 problematical. 
41 For a study which reflects this attitude as well as 
providing a detailed case study of hospital development 
in one region see J. V. Pickstone, Medicine and Industrial 
Society, A History of Hospital Development in Manchester 
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r, ' 
The continuation of a bureaucratic consensus on local 
government as health care provider did not, however, 
extend to the means by which local health care was to be 
centrally funded. It had been an agreed part of the 
settlement with local government in 1929 that any 
subsequent new health services bestowed upon local 
government should attract new funding. This issue was 
then pertinent with respect to the new responsibility for 
midwives work from 1936. Rather than add funds to the 
block grant, distributed in theory if not in practice on 
a needs basis, a new specific percentage grant was 
instituted. This was perhaps not as extraordinary as it 
may seem as even in the making of the 1929 Act Ministry 
officials still essentially recognised that in the 
stimulation of a new local authority service the 
percentage grant was the appropriate form of exchequer 
assistance. Moreover in its distribution the grant for 
midwives was to contain some criteria of need. However, 
when, at the beginning of the Second World War, the 
Ministry moved to institute a special grant for venereal 
disease provision, which was already covered in the block 
grant, it was apparent that the Ministry's support of the 
block grant principle in relation to health services was 
again in question as it had been in the early 1920s. 
The source of the Ministry's move for a special 
venereal diseases grant was the expectation of a rise in 
the incidence of venereal disease amongst civilians 
in 
and Its Region, 1752-1946 (1985) in particular, pp. 264- 
268. 
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war time, which would then rapidly spread. After their 
experience of high local authority deficiency in 
provision and unresponsiveness to central pressure 
without a direct financial stimulus during the 1930s the 
public health division of the Ministry was aware that a 
special percentage grant would be necessary in order to 
push local authorities to extend their services or even 
to bring them up to a reasonable standard. Initially, 
such a proposal was blocked by the accountant- general's 
division within the ministry. However, in ]December 1939 
the public health division made representations direct to 
Walter Elliot, then Minister of Health, who duly wrote to 
Sir John Simon, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
proposing a 75% grant. 42 
Simon, under guidance from Treasury officials, wrote a 
stinging reply which backed up the accountant-general's 
division's initial position against a special grant. 
Simon found it incomprehensible that Elliot should want 
to make an additional grant for a service which was 
already provided for under the block grant, and in a way 
which would reward backward authorities for their poor 
provision previously. If local authorities were not 
providing services sufficiently extensive to meet need 
then they should be treated with section 104 of the 1929 
Act. He concluded that to assume "that authorities will 
not perform their duty without financial stimulation 
42. PRO T 161/1176/S. 18153/1: Treatment of VD, 
expenditure by local authorities, Ministry of Health 
circulars, 1922-1940. Internal Treasury minute from Mr 
Tribe to B. W. Gilbert, 7.12.1939 and Walter Elliot to Sir 
John Simon, 1.12.1939. 
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seems to me to be the negation of the whole block grant 
system and indeed to suggest that the system of local 
43 government in this country is in a bad way". 
With these words Simon summed up the conclusions of 
Ministry officials, who had at first hand experienced the 
implementation of the block grant and central-local 
health care relations during the 1930s. The Ministry 
complied with the Treasury's wish that a circular be sent 
out to local authorities merely urging them to prepare 
venereal disease services for additional patients. 
However, after receiving only letters of protest from 
local authorities in reply, Malcolm MacDonald, the new 
Minister of Health, came clean about the Ministry's 
complete impotence in relations with local government 
with respect to health services funded by the block 
grant. He informed Sir Kingsley Wood, Simon's 
replacement as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in September 
1940 that "the suggestion made by Sir John Simon that 
this situation might be met by threatening withdrawal of 
grant under section 104 of the Local Government Act, 
1929, seems to me not merely impracticable but 
indefensible. Such a step has never yet been taken, and 
it would indeed be a double-edged weapon. Even 
if the 
action were taken on the strongest possible grounds, 
the 
effect would almost certainly be a storm 
in local 
government circles, and a reduction rather than an 
increase in the services provided by the penalised 
43. ibid, Simon to Elliot, 20.12.1939. 
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authority". With great reluctance the Treasury now 
complied to the Ministry of Health's proposal for a 
special venereal diseases grant, B-W-Gilbert commenting 
ruefully to a Treasury colleague that "once we start 
restoring in any degree the percentage grants which were 
absorbed in the block grant, there is no knowing where we 
shall stop". The grant was given only on the basis of it 
45 providing no future precedent for grant reform. 
To a large extent, however, these deliberations in 
1939/40 did presage subsequent changes in grant funding 
of local health care services. Under the 1946 National 
Health Service Act, local authorities lost responsibility 
for hospital provision but, nevertheless, retained a key 
role in domiciliary and out-patient health care services. 
The form of exchequer aid was to be a 50% grant for all 
local health services net of approved expenditure. Thus a 
return was made to the financial stimulus of the 
percentage basis of grant aid, to the specification of 
grant aid to be spent on health services, and to a more 
specific form of grant aid control. These had all been 
given up in the 1929 Act and were restored after the 
experience of health provision and central-local grant 
aid relations during the 1930s. At the same time, 
however, the grant was general to all health services, 
leaving local authorities discretion in local spending on 
44. PRO T 161/1176/18153/2: Treatment of VD, expenditure 
by local authorities, 1940-1945. MacDonald 
to Sir 
Kingsley Wood, 9.9.1940. 
45. ibid, Gilbert to Sir Alan Barlow, 17.9.1940. 
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different health services. 46 That the experience of the 
1930s provided an endorsement for those in the Ministry 
who had argued against a block grant for health services 
and lost in the 1920s, and led much more clearly to the 
future reform of the finance of local health care and 
grant aid relations with central government, than to that 
of the future role of local government in health care 
appears an appropriate conclusion. 
46. D. N. Chester, Central and Týocal Government: Financial 




It is to be remembered that the scope of this thesis was 
limited from the start. It provides an analysis of the 
formulation and implementation of only the poor law and 
exchequer grant reforms in the 1929 Local Government Act. 
Even then it is primarily concerned with the poor law 
reform as a reform of local government and of local 
health care, and with both reforms only in relation to 
England and Wales outside London. It is also an analysis 
primarily based on qualitative evidence. The scope for 
further research in relation to the 1929 Local Government 
Act, therefore, remains vast. Not only do the other 
provisions of the 1929 Act need to be considered in 
depth, but some more systematic studies of the 
implementation of public assistance and the fate of the 
workhouse in the 1930s, and the poor law and exchequer 
grant reforms in relation to London and in relation to 
Scotland need to be undertaken. With respect to the 
focus of analysis in the present thesis much more could 
be learned from a quantitative evaluation of the block 
grant as a grant aid control and in terms of its impact 
upon local authority finances and spending patterns. 
Further, analysis could be extended to the nature and 
problems of block grant distribution among second 
tier 
authorities during the 1930s and county council second 
tier relations over finance and service provision. 
Finally, greater understanding of the 
implementation and 
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impact of the 1929 Act would clearly be gained from a 
systematically comparative study of individual local 
authority cases with reference to both finance and health 
care provision and central-local relations. 
This is a future agenda for research. What the 
present thesis was concerned to achieve was the rescue of 
the study of the 1929 Act from a state of backwardness. 
By taking specific parts of the Act as a focus for study 
the thesis aimed to make a step towards suggesting the 
arena for debate, put forward a substantive contribution 
to knowledge and means of re-interpreting the 1929 
reforms, as well as providing a basis upon which future 
debate of the 1929 Act may proceed. Such claims risk the 
accusation of pretentiousness, and the judgment of 
failure. Yet, the highly fragmented nature of the 
literature on the 1929 Act, its absence from 
consideration by most inter-war historians of public 
policy, and its omission or at best fleeting mention in 
text book overviews of the history of the inter-war 
period, economic and social policy, government and, 
indeed, local government, represent compelling evidence 
why such an attempt upon the lines described above should 
have been made. This final chapter summarises the fruits 
of that attempt. 
Having established a context to the understanding of 
the 1929 poor law (health care) and exchequer grant 
reforms and explained their content the thesis was 
first 
concerned to synthesise existing work in relation to 
the 
origins, achievement and implementation of the reforms 
as 
340 
a basis for discussion. A number of conclusions were 
reached. First, the origins of the 1929 reforms are 
generally held to be found in the identification of 
problems of local government, central-local relations and 
public policy, and the rationally conceived solution 
thereof, in the years before the end of the First World 
War. The problems of an anomalous structure of local 
government and the inefficiency of too many local 
authorities with overlapping functions in health care 
were to be solved through the abolition of separate poor 
law authorities, the transfer of their services to county 
and county borough councils and the unification of local 
health responsibilities under their charge. 
Prescriptions for reform on this basis were first made by 
the minority report of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Law in 1909 and then decisively in the Maclean Report of 
1918. 
Problems were also identified in relation to central- 
local financial relations. First, financial resources 
between local authorities were seen as inequitable and 
percentage grants were perceived as perpetuating such 
inequalities. Secondly, percentage grants were perceived 
as giving local authorities, rather than central 
government, control over aggregate levels of grant aid. 
Finally, percentage grants had become associated with a 
high degree of central administrative control at 
the 
expense of local autonomy. Such problems were 
to be 
solved by the introduction of the block grant principle, 
which allowed distribution of grant to 
individual 
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authorities on a needs basis, the fixing of aggregate 
grant aid by central government, and a greater freedom 
for local authorities in the spending of grant aid once 
received. This solution was promoted both in the 
minority report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation 
in 1901 and then again by the Kempe Committee in 1914. 
The achievement of these solutions to prescribed 
problems is then widely considered to have been based 
upon the neutral and uncontroversial development of 
reform proposals in the ministry of Health in the period 
immediately after the First World War. A Ministry view 
on poor law reform and a limited exchequer grant reform 
was enshrined in the Mond memorandum of 1921. The 
failure to achieve reform in the early 1920s is accounted 
for by the obstacles presented by financial crisis, the 
wider deliberations conducted by the Meston Committee and 
the desire by the Treasury for a more wide-ranging block 
grant reform, and the lack of strong ministerial 
leadership. Nevertheless, the Mond memorandum remained 
the Ministry view and was placed before Neville 
Chamberlain in late 1924. 
Chamberlain is then presented as the liberal hero of 
reform. A man with profound desires to carry social 
reform for the good of the people, he recognised the 
utility of the Ministry of Health plan to the attainment 
of a major health reform and the provision of assistance 
to the necessitous areas of the country. His expertise 
and dedication won him the respect of Ministry officials 
and together they enhanced the quality Of the reform 
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proposals. Chamberlain performed the vital function of 
winning the achievement of the reforms in Cabinet, 
despite the delays caused by even more consideration of 
block grant reform by the Barstow Committee and a 
committee of ministers, Cabinet worries over the effect 
of poor law reform on the Conservative rural vote, and 
Churchill's derating initiative. 
Chamberlain also ensured that the reforms met the 
plurality of interests involved, by making concessions to 
guardians and to local authorities which stood to lose by 
a change in the exchequer grant system. Such 
concessions, whilst placating these major interests, did 
not undermine the essential principles involved in the 
reforms. As a result Chamberlain and the Ministry of 
Health achieved major reforms, facilitating the long- 
overdue modernisation of local government and central- 
local relations in the interests of all those concerned. 
Contemporary praise for the 1929 Act is echoed by a large 
number of subsequent analysts. 
The implementation of the 1929 reforms has been less 
widely researched, but major works suggest that the block 
grant was generally successful as a means of controlling 
exchequer grant aid and that the Treasury sought again to 
extend the number of local authority services covered 
by 
the block grant principle. The block grant was 
less 
successful as a means of redistributing grant aid 
towards 
Poorer authorities but this is generally held 
to be due 
to the unforecastable effects of the recession 
which 
eroded the redistributive effects of the 
block gran-ý-- 
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Even then the review of the block grant formula made good 
what defects were discernible in the grant's ability t--o 
distribute on the basis of local need, and the evidence 
of the Ray Committee and contemporary writers suggests 
that local government generally endorsed the block grant 
both as a means of fairly meeting local government's 
financial needs and allowing it greater autonomy. 
Problems in the implementation of the poor law reform 
and the local provision of health care in the 1930s are 
readily admitted, but are again generally put down to 
problems which could not have been foreseen in 1929. 
Suggestions have been made that some authorities were too 
poorly funded or too apathetic to provide efficient 
health services, and that the power of grant reduction 
held by the Minister of Health was an empty one in 
practice. These, however, are countered by the arguments 
that poor funding was not due to any inherent failure in 
the block grant but to the unforecastable effects of the 
recession, and that what may be seen as local apathy may 
be explained away by a discussion of many other 
contingent factors to reform. There is also the 
generally optimistic interpretation of health standards 
in the 1930s which questions the necessity for wide- 
ranging usage of Ministry powers over local authorities. 
Hence, the study of implementation, where made, 
has 
been able to endorse the role of the 1929 reforms as part 
of the long-term liberal improvement of the institutions 
Of government to meet prescribed problems. The structure 
Of local government rationalised in 1929 
lasted until 
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1972. The financial regime instituted in 1929 became a 
model for all future reform, and may be said to have only 
undergone a fundamental re-think in the late 1970s. 
Finally, the role of local government as a major direct 
provider of social policy has been endorsed ever since 
and has only come under serious attack in the 1980s. 
The rest of the thesis then took these conclusions as 
a received orthodoxy, or model of analysis, to be looked 
at critically, focusing on the formulation and 
implementation of the reforms themselves rather than 
their fate in the world of inter-departmental relations 
and high politics. Chapter two, first, questioned the 
presumed rationality of the 1929 reforms as solutions to 
prescri e problems. Other contemporary analyses 
suggested that the block grant far from enhancing local 
autonomy eroded it by making local authorities evermore 
dependent upon central funding, and that the expenditure 
control priorities in its inception threatened the very 
fiscal basis necessary for efficient provision of local 
services. Alternatives were proposed which focused on 
the introduction of new sources of local income. This 
held greater potential for creating greater local 
autonomy and reducing local reliance on grants, and, 
therefore, the importance of greater central control over 
aggregate levels of grant aid. If percentage grants were 
continued a revision could have been made which ensured 
that they were more related to individual local authority 
need. Analysts also suggested that the block grant as a 
solution to problems of inequitable resourcing of 
local 
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authorities faded in comparison with the alternative 
option of reforming local rating areas so as to make 
local authorities in themselves more equitably resourced. 
Contemporaries also poured scorn on the reform of the 
poor law as a solution to prescribed problems of public 
policy. At a general level many considered the 
concentration of the local government structure on the 
basis of counties and county boroughs, which the poor law 
reform provided for, as inadequate to the needs of 
efficient local provision in a period of great economic 
and social change. Larger regional bodies were suggested 
as an alternative. In addition, responsibility for the 
unemployed poor, it was suggested, could much more 
appropriately have been made a national one, in response 
to the growing recognition during the 1920S that the 
causes of unemployment were national and international 
rather than local. Similarly, health reformers from 
before the First World War had begun to think of the 
efficient co-ordination of health care as requiring the 
inclusion of all health services in one state medical 
service, rather than simply those organised at a local 
government level. 
The contemporary discussion of these alternatives 
merely served to prove that the 1929 reforms were 
based 
upon only one set of options for reform amongst a 
host of 
others. As a result one should see the origins of 
the 
1929 reforms as not being based 
in the rational 
development of solutions to prescribed problems, 
but 
rather in choices that were made between options 
and the 
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reasons for those choices, recognising that central 
government did not seriously consider alternative options 
to those chosen, a factor which is assumed in the liberal 
interpretation. Chapter two, therefore, secondly, 
discussed other ways of conceptualising the rationality 
of the origins of the reforms other than in the liberal 
interpretation; of why and how the reform options 
endorsed in 1929 were originally chosen after the First 
World War. Various marxist critiques were formulated and 
whilst their individual explanations were found 
deficient, the notion of reform being made in the 
interests of certain sections of society over others was 
embraced. Discussion thereafter dealt with the 
perception that policy was made by and in the interests 
of governing elites. An explanation of reform by the 
theory of corporate bias was found to be historically 
inappropriate to an understanding of the inter-war 
governing process, but Webb's theory of bounded pluralism 
was found to be an appropriate basis upon which to 
formulate an alternative context to the way in which the 
reforms were formulated and implemented. By this it was 
recognised that reform could be based upon general calls 
for reform , but that the 
detail of reform was 
established within a governing elite. It was proposed 
that for the inter-war period this should be best 
characterised in terms of a bureaucratic elite. Further, 
the notion that policy reform choices were made 
in an 
incrementalist fashion, so as to ensure that new policy 
branched off from existing policy, which was consistent 
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with bureaucratic imperatives, was embraced. It was, 
however, recognised that even within government 
departments there was a high potential for Policy debate, 
and in relation to the local government reforms, the one 
inter-war politician universally accepted as active, 
Neville Chamberlain, was involved. 
It was further proposed, in relation to the theory of 
bounded pluralism, that as well as being pushed generally 
towards reform by interests outside government, elite 
policy makers would also need to access or take account 
of interests outside government in the making of the 
detail of reform, but that they would have a choice over 
who to access. A consideration of the theory of the 
intergovernmental network suggested that the principal 
interests taken account of and accessed would be the 
local authority associations representing the local 
authorities on whom elite policy makers were dependent 
for the implementation of reform. 
This theoretical perspective was set up as an 
alternative approach to the study of the formulation and 
implementation of the reforms, making explicit the basis 
upon which the received orthodoxy was being critically 
examined. The final section of chapter two duly 
reconsidered the origins of reform. This concluded that 
rather than seeing the adoption by the Ministry of Health 
of proposals to reform the poor law in 1919 as part of a 
continuum in policy development towards reform 
from 
before the War, until the War there was little to suggest 
that reform would be promoted. The war was vital 
in 
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throwing up general calls for social reform, which 
government responded to with an adoption of Poor law 
reform in the Maclean Report. It represented the most 
well developed reform option available to elite policy 
makers, and limited health reform to a branching off from 
existing policy through existing institutions of local 
government. Other reform options for health care or for 
the greater efficiency of local government provision 
through area reform were quickly discarded. 
Perhaps, more surprisingly, the section also showed 
how the Ministry of Health did not automatically embrace 
plans for block grant reform allied to poor law reform. 
Nor, when it did, could the principal stimulus be said to 
have come from within the Ministry of Health on account 
of its general responsibility for local government. 
Rather the adoption of a limited block grant reform 
allied to poor law reform was only made as a result of 
Treasury concern over increases in grant aid as a result 
of post-war social reform, and its incremental promotion 
of block grants to be allied to any such reform. Such 
promotion was made through new finance officers 
in 
spending departments. it is in this context that the 
successful insertion of the block grant principle in to 
Ministry of Health plans by Ernest Strohmenger, the 
Ministry accountant-general, should be seen. 
Chapter three then showed that previous arguments 
concerning the neutral evolution of proposals on 
the 
basis of poor law and block grant reform within 
the 
Ministry of Health are groundless. Whilst much of 
the 
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development of proposals for poor law (health care) 
reform was technical in nature, Ministry officials 
inserted their own plans for a strong county council role 
with regard to relations with second tier authorities. 
This was present in the Mond memorandum and remained 
little watered down in to the proposals put before local 
government in 1925. Further, there was considerable 
intra-departmental conflict over proposals to embrace the 
concept of health centres in the reform. Public health 
division arguments defeated those of the accountant- 
general in the preparation of the Mond memorandum, but by 
1925 the reverse was the case. 
More importantly, there was considerable division over 
the adoption of the block grant principle. In the 
preparation of the Mond memorandum public health 
officials argued forcibly in favour of the retention of 
percentage grants for local authority health services. 
Strohmenger's plan for a block grant allied to poor law 
reform was inserted in to the Mond memorandum with the 
crucial support of the permanent secretary, Arthur 
Robinson, but even then intra-departmental conflict 
continued. For it would be fallacious to suggest that 
the Mond memorandum merely remained on the shelves as the 
Ministry view on reform until Chamberlain's arrival at 
the Ministry in 1924. In August jý)2i ana dya-Li, -1-1i 
N 
1922 Strohmenger made proposals for the introduction of a 
health block grant unallied to poor law reform, on 
the 
latter occasion getting as far as being recommended 
by 
Robinson to his minister, Sir Alfred Mond. 
On both 
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occasions and in the preparation of evidence for the 
Meston Committee, public health officials argued against 
Strohmenger's Proposals and for the retention of 
percentage grants. Then between late 1922 and late 1924 
Strohmenger's proposal of a block grant lost the 
unequivocal backing of Arthur Robinson. This was partly 
due to the arguments of senior public health officials 
such as Sir George Newman, the chief medical of f icer, 
but, as was later shown in chapter four, this was also 
due to the perception of a growing opposition to the 
block grant principle in the local government world. 
Consequently, when Chamberlain came to office in late 
1924, Strohmenger only ensured that the Mond memorandum 
would be presented to Chamberlain as a basis for reform, 
complete with the proposal for block grant reform, by 
showing the financial impracticability of poor law reform 
without block grant reform. 
Chapter four then reconsidered the role of actors and 
interests outside of the bureaucratic elite in the 
achievement of the reforms. Section one cast doubt upon 
the liberal social reform motivations of Neville 
Chamberlain in promoting the ministry of Health plan for 
reform. It concluded that Chamberlain was committed to 
social reform through local government reform as much if 
not more so for party political reasons. It was 
electorally necessary for the Baldwin Government to be 
perceived as one of social reform. Moreover, Chamberlain 
endorsed the Ministry's specific programme for reform 
in 
the context of debate upon similar lines 
in the 
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Conservative party. Conservative imperatives in social 
reform were very much in line with those of the 
bureaucracy. It is for these reasons that Ministry 
officials and Chamberlain enjoyed such close 
collaborative relations in formulating the reforms, a 
point born out by a comparison with Ministry relations 
with John Wheatley, the Labour Minister of Health, in 
1924. The Labour party in government were not perceived 
as embracing the values and aims of the bureaucratic 
elite in the same way as the succeeding Conservative 
government. 
The section also showed how Chamberlain developed party 
political motives for reform whilst in office. The poor 
law reform became a major means by which the power base 
of the Labour party in local government, and thus their 
stepping stone to success at a national level, could be 
eroded. Similarly, the block grant became a cheap means 
of having a necessitous areas policy, thus keeping within 
public expenditure policy whilst providing a basis for 
dismissing Labour claims that the Conservatives did 
nothing for the poorer areas of the country affected by 
the slump. Chamberlain's own rationale for a block grant 
became crucial to its retention in reform plans when 
in 
1926, as a result of local authority association 
hostility, senior ministry officials wavered once again. 
This section, therefore, suggests very different reasons 
why Chamberlain was so active in relation to 
local 
government reform, and provides a case against those who 
have previously argued that Chamberlain 
did little more 
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than promote reform plans previously worked out by 
officials. 
Section two then established the views of the county 
and county borough councils on local government reform 
during the early 1920s and showed how important these 
views were to Ministry consideration of reform at that 
time. Both the CCA and the AMC only accepted the 
principle of poor law reform with significant riders 
which suggested the prospect of considerable dissent to 
Ministry plans. Meanwhile in the period up to late 1922 
both the CCA and the AMC appeared to favour the 
introduction of the block grant principle in to central- 
local financial relations. It was, therefore, an 
essential part of Ministry logic in the Mond memorandum 
of 1921 to include a block grant proposal as a dupe to 
get local authorities to accept poor law reform. This 
was not the end of the story, however, as previous 
analysts have suggested. By late 1922 it was clear that 
the CCA was split on the block grant issue and only a 
minority accepted it. In this context the inclusion of a 
block grant reform in the Ministry's plans failed to have 
the advantage of compensating local authorities for poor 
law reform. As a direct consequence senior Ministry 
officials became less committed to the block grant reform 
and its inclusion in the 1925 proposals was made only on 
the basis of powerful arguments by Strohmenger 
in late 
1924 and in the knowledge that it would arouse powerful 
opposition. 
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Section three then showed how Chamberlain and the 
Ministry, far from seeking to ensure that the reforms met 
the full plurality of interests, did indeed limit the 
range of access to reform debate, in particular, 
directing the Royal Commission on Local Government 
towards other issues. This limitation of the scope for 
access for interests outside government meant that 
alternative reform options would not be discussed and, 
therefore, that reform would not meet the full plurality 
of interests, only certain sectional interests beyond 
those of the elite policy makers themselves. In one 
important way the provision of access was forced. This 
was in relation to Chamberlain's discussions with 
Conservative backbenchers representing rural guardian 
feeling. Principally, however, access was given to the 
local authority associations voluntarily, suggesting the 
very great relevance of the concept of the inter- 
governmental network. Appeasement of these interests 
accessed only gave the reforms finally enacted the 
appearance of pluralism. 
The added importance of the concessions given to these 
accessed interests in the 1929 reforms was that 
it was 
not the case that they did not undermine 
the main 
principles of the reforms. Indeed, they very materially 
eroded the potential for success that the reforms 
held 
for meeting prescribed problems of 
local government, 
central-local relations and public policy. 
The 1929 
reforms were at root limited solutions 
to these problems. 
The development and revision of reform 
in the late 1920S 
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further eroded their potential for success. First, 
concessions made to rural guardian feeling eroded the aim 
of gaining a unity of public health administration in 
county areas, and by allowing the continued influence of 
former guardians on public assistance committees after 
reform seriously eroded the possibility of gaining the 
unification of health services and co-operation with 
voluntary hospitals both in county and county borough 
councils. Discussions with local authority associations 
had much less effect upon the formulation of poor law 
reform from 1925, but the opposition of the AMC to 
arrangements in county areas was only overcome by the 
dropping of proposals for a strong county council role in 
relation to second tier authorities. 
Relations with local authority associations were, 
however, much more significant in eroding the potential 
for success of the block grant with regard to its 
prescribed aims. Both the AMC and CCA, essentially 
representing the interests of richer local authorities 
who stood to lose grant aid income by the replacement of 
health percentage grants for a block grant, whilst 
formally accepting the block grant principle in 1926 put 
all of their efforts in to safeguarding the interests of 
richer authorities rather than enhancing the potential 
for success of the grant's redistributive aim. The 
concessions they received in return for their endorsement 
of the block grant reform, whilst not fully meeting their 
aims, thus eroded the redistributive aim of the grant. 
Most importantly, the needs-based formula as a basis for 
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distributing the grant was to be phased in meaning that 
until 1937 only 1/4 of the grant was to be distributed on 
the basis of the formula. 
Central failures to gain rating and valuation reform 
and the formulation thereafter of a cocktail of factors, 
which in themselves, and as a result of being based 
almost totally upon nationally collected statistics, were 
questionable indicators of local need, further meant that 
the potential for the operation of the formula to 
redistribute grant aid to where it was needed was eroded. 
With respect to the detailed formulation of the block 
grant formula the local authority associations again 
showed themselves to be primarily interested in promoting 
amendments which would have made the formula more helpful 
to local authorities who had done well under the system 
of percentage grants rather than enhancing its 
redistributive capacity. As a result the interests of 
poorer authorities were not effectively represented in 
the final deal done between Chamberlain and the local 
authority associations over block grant reform, and the 
formula passed in 1929 remained essentially that 
formulated within the Ministry of Health. 
As a result, the 1929 reforms only represented a 
pluralist success in terms of appeasing all of the 
conflicting interests in central government, and those 
powerful vested interests given access from outside the 
goVerning elite. Appeasement of guardian sentiment and 
acceptance by the local authority associations suggested 
that the reforms had received the acceptance of the 
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country at large. However, the bureaucratic and 
political imperatives which ensured the selection of the 
highly limited reform options on which the 1929 reforms 
were based and the governing approach to managing 
discussion with interests outside government meant that 
the 1929 reforms were not greatly in the interests of the 
country at large. The Webbs clearly indicated the 
inherent flaws in the Act to achieve a major reform of 
provision for the poor and of health care, and beyond the 
weighty words of the local authority associations were 
the local authorities in poorer areas of the country who 
recognised that there was little in the block grant 
reform to meet their immediate needs. Without more 
needs-related grant aid the aim of better health care 
provision as a whole in poorer areas also could not be 
expected. Recognition of the unknown implications of an 
additional sum in the block grant to the capacity of the 
block grant as a grant aid expenditure control, and of 
greater local autonomy in grant aid expenditure to the 
provision of local health services, adds final weight to 
the conclusion that in 1929 the potential for the 1929 
reforms to achieve any of their prescribed aims was 
highly questionable. 
Chapter five then charted the dismal failure of the 
block grant in implementation in regard to its prescribe 
aims. contrary to previous belief it failed as a means 
of grant aid control. This was primarily because of the 
recession which led to reductions in local grant aided 
expenditure, and, therefore, of percentage grants, 
in the 
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early 1930s. The block grant, including an additional 
sum of E5 million and being fixed, represented a major 
boon to local finances over and above what local 
authorities would have received from the exchequer had 
there been no reform in 1929 and percentage grants 
continued in existence and fallen in amount in line with 
other percentage grant aid. Whilst the trend in local 
expenditure moved upwards again in the mid 1930s the 
exchequer still suffered a net loss in grant aid during 
the second grant period, and crucially, local grant aided 
expenditure in 1935-36, on the basis of which the 
additional sum for the third period was set, showed a 
huge jump on previous years. Consequently, the block 
grant in the third period also represented a net subsidy 
to local government compared to if there had been no 
reform in 1929 and percentage grants had continued. 
Throughout the 1930s, therefore, the block grant 
failed as a grant aid expenditure control. The story of 
this failure was further marked by reprehensible damage 
limitation exercises conducted by the Treasury. This was 
most marked in relation to the Treasury's retention of 
remanet grants, which in the spirit if the not the strict 
letter of the 1929 Act should have been paid to local 
government. It was also to be seen, however, 
in the 
strict observance in 1933 and 1937 of increasing 
the 
block grant for the second and third periods 
by the 
minimum amount allowed by the 1929 Act, and 
by the 
siezing of the opportunity, provided by the 
large amount 
of new money provided in the third period, 
to merge local 
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aut ority Unemployment Assistance Board contributions in 
to the block grant. With some justice local authorities 
could have claimed that it was unfair that they should 
pay any such contributions at all, and the merger of the 
contributions in to the block grant headed off any local 
authority campaign upon the issue. 
The second section of the chapter then charted the 
more predictable failure of the block grant to provide 
grant aid to local authorities more on the basis of need. 
Until 1937 the grant formula was only operating on 1/4 of 
the block grant. In the first period the formula, having 
been formulated primarily as an index of need for 1929, 
had some success in its redistributive aim, but the 
inherent deficiencies in the formula and its 
inconsistency in compensating individual authorities for 
their grant and rate income losses meant that such 
success was highly limited. The effects of the recession 
on local service need in poorer areas only served to 
exacerbate the inherent ineffectiveness of the block 
grant to achieve its redistributive aim. In the second 
period the problems of the formula came fully home to 
roost, distribution of the grant on the basis of the 
formula being highly random, and, indeed, because of the 
importance of the factor of population in the formula, 
achieving most help to richer areas of southern England 
experiencing population growth. 
Set against the requests of poorer local authorities 
for a fundamental reform of the block grant, the review 
of the block grant formula between 1935 and 1937, which 
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resulted in only minor revisions of the formula and 
embraced the retention of Population as the principal 
factor, is, therefore, to be seen as essentially a re-run 
of the approach to managing inter-governmental relations 
and its consequent appeasement of only bureaucratic 
imperatives and the richer local authorities, primarily 
represented by the local authority associations, which 
was observed in the run-up to the 1929 Act. Evidence of 
local government endorsement of the block grant by the 
Ray Committee should be seen primarily in terms of richer 
authority enthusiasm. The inability of the formula to 
assist poorer authorities relative to their need in the 
third grant period, in spite of acting upon 50% of the 
block grant, was no less apparent than earlier in the 
1930s. 
The final section, therefore, revealed how further 
thinking, whilst endorsing the block grant option as the 
model for future reform, learned from the revelation of 
inherent defects in the 1929 reform. The Treasury f ar 
from enthusiastically pursuing further block granting 
during the 1930s adopted a more cautious approach, and 
during the Second World War dropped the principle of 
fixity for periods of years in favour of annual grants 
again. Similarly, the inherent inadequacy of the 1929 
block grant formula to achieve more equitable 
distribution of grant aid was recognised at the end of 
the Second World War. The learning of lessons, which 
resulted in the post-war grant reforms, allied 
to the 
reform of rating and valuation as a necessary 
basis for 
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discerning local authority need, was one that in relation 
to the redistributive aim in grant aid at least could 
have been entirely avoided. That even the post-war 
reforms remained within the incremental pattern of 
financial reform on the basis of the grant option 
undermines any idea that the context of policy 
formulation had altered in thirty years. 
Chapter six served the purpose of recording the 
failure of the 1929 reforms in relation to local health 
provision. Contrary to optimistic interpretations of 
health standards, and, therefore, of the adequacy of 
health provision in the 1930s, the Ministry of Health 
surveys revealed by 1935 a high level of local 
deficiency. The poor level of resourcing which the block 
grant did little to erode must have been an important 
factor, yet Ministry records, in wishing to deny the 
relevance of this factor give no clear indication as to 
how important. Perhaps more importantly, the Ministry 
surveys reveal the high number of authorities which were 
perceived as being generally anti-public health provision 
with implications for meeting local need, and how many of 
these authorities were in relatively more prosperous 
areas of the country. The Ministry surveys also show the 
perceived reasons for deficiency with regard to 
individual health services, which suggest a greater level 
of culpability on the part of local authorities than 
previous analysts have suggested. Consequently, the 
reform of grant aid to local authorities 
in 1929 had 
adverse effects on local provision both 
in terms of 
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inadequately helping Poorer authorities to recover from 
positions of backwardness, and, perhaps decisively, in 
allowing local authorities autonomy in the usage of grant 
aid which encouraged local authorities in their 
dilatoriness. This provides grounds for believing that 
even if grant aid had been considerably greater to 
individual local authorities, even in cases of 
authorities in necessitous areas, local provision would 
not have been considerably enhanced. The problems of 
local health care went much deeper than that. 
It is agreed then that in this context the weakness of 
Ministry powers in relation to grant aid was important. 
Section two, however, charted the way in which central- 
local relations were conducted in the light of this. 
Strenuous efforts were made through survey letters, 
correspondence and re-surveys to persuade deficient local 
authorities towards improvement. The conclusion is, 
however, that Ministry officials largely failed through 
relations with local authorities to improve on the 
results uncovered by 1935. 
This analysis suggested the illogicality of Ministry 
officials continuing with the local government option as 
a basis for future health care reform. Yet, the final 
section concluded that if one understands inter-war 
policy making in terms of incrementalism, then such an 
approach was highly logical. But for the impact on the 
health reform debate of the Second World War and 
subsequent events, one could have reasonably expected the 
move towards a state medical service based largely upon 
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local government. It was also concluded, however, that 
the experience of the implementation of reform in the 
1930s did have a dynamic effect on official thinking in 
relation to the grant aid finance of local health 
provision. The adverse effects of allowing grant aid to 
be non-specific, removing the percentage basis for grant 
funding and eroding central control so greatly on local 
provision were recognised. This was shown in the example 
of fears over local authority venereal disease services 
provision in the early part of the Second World War and 
confirmed in the reform of grant aid to local authority 
health provision in the new regime of the National Health 
Service. 
However, it should be noted that even in creating a 
lesser role for local authorities in health provision 
after the Second World War and in reforming grant aid 
again central politicians and bureaucrats did not embrace 
a more wide ranging alteration of local government areas 
to make them better resourced and arguably more 
efficient. This suggests that overall the approach of 
central politicians and bureaucrats to the basis of 
the 
role of local government in social policy also 
had not 
changed in thirty years. 
The thesis overall may, therefore, be used to explain 
why and how inter-war policy makers conducted 
local 
government and public policy reform 
in the way that they 
did: why reform was conducted on a 
limited basis and 
failed even in its limited aims. It also 
provides a 
context for understanding that in the post-war 
period the 
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local government structure, means of local government 
finance, and the role of local government in public 
policy, which were largely retained, may not be viewed in 
the light of a liberal continuum in the development of 
the institutions of government. An inherently 
incrementalist approach to reform of local government and 
central-local relations preserved the interests of the 
central governing elite whilst denying those of many 
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